PolS 221: International Relations, Fall 2012

Gordon L. Bowen, Ph.D.

Professor of Political Science and International Relations

Mary Baldwin College Staunton VA 24401

gbowen@mbc.edu


this webpage last updated May 25, 2012


Daily Lesson Webpage

Links to topics and Questions for class meetings on:

Sept. 3 Sept. 5 Sept. 10 Sept. 12
Sept. 17 Sept. 19 Sept. 24 Sept. 26
Oct. 1 Oct. 3 Oct. 8 Oct. 10
Oct. 15 Oct. 17 Oct. 24 Oct. 29
Oct. 31 Nov. 5 Nov. 7 Nov. 12
Nov. 14 Nov. 19 Nov. 26, Nov. 28, Dec. 3 Dec. 5
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


Mon. Sept. 3: Labor Day

PolS 221: International Relations

Agenda: Introductions... A copy of the agenda projected on the screen during class will be available after class; follow this link.

1. Explanation of Course, level, intended student clientele, policies and requirements: read the course syllabus carefully.

-Basics: Prerequisite, Attendance Policy

-Course content and goals

-Evaluation formula:

attendance and participation...10%

Quizzes...20%

Oral Reports ...15%

Midterm...15%

Final Exam ...20%

Term Paper... 20%

Term Paper ideas: The course syllabus contains a long list of potential topics.  Additionally, the daily notes below contain several additional ideas for term papers, and links to assist you in writing them.  No one is required to pick any of these topics, but if you are looking for a topic and are open to suggestion, then consider them.  To find them, simply hit CTRL-F on your computer, then type in "term paper", and that will take you to the relevant parts of the file below.


2. Photos for Seating Chart and Personal Introductions
- Student introductions: name, hometown, major, class level, foreign travel, internships, summer work, related courses, etc.

- Prof. Bowen's introduction
 
 


Wed. Sept. 5, 2012: Idealism and other Approaches to the Study of International Relations

A copy of the agenda projected on the screen during class will be available after class; follow this link.  Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Agenda: Concepts of I.R.

1. Defining the subject, identifying the key actors

2. Understanding the competing approaches to I.R., with emphasis on Liberalism, or Liberal Internationalism.

3. Evaluating one theoretical proposition: the Democratic Peace thesis


1. Defining the subject
What is politics?

What is international politics?

How does Mingst define international relations?

"International relations is the study of the interactions among the various actors that participate in international politics, including states, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, sub-national entities like bureaucracies and local governments, and individuals."

Question: can you exemplify how each is an actor?


2. Approaches to the study of I.R.: Snyder (see syllabus) will reinforce Mingst's survey here.  Read it.

 

a. The historical approach to I.R.  We also will devote considerable attention to this dimension of the study of I.R. in coming classes.

What contemporary world problems require appreciation of historical context?

Mingst assumes you know much about history. She mentions that interpretation of history can shape "lessons" in I.R. She refers to Munich and Allied Appeasement (in 1938).

  • To what events is this a reference? 
  • What "lesson of history" might be drawn from it? 
  • How might we now see different "meanings" in that case?

For more, see Prof. Bowen's online piece on Munich.



 
 
b. The Philosophical approach to I.R.
Name some of the philosophers Mingst discussed and tell us a little about them, when you have read them or about them, and in what context.

(Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant may be discussed).

Of the philosophers Mingst mentions, which is most optimistic about the possibility of peace in IR? Why?

Which is most pessimistic on this question? Why?

What is meant by the normative approach that guided some of these thinkers? What is the goal here? Is there any alternative to this way of finding meaning in international relations?



 
 
c. The Behavioral Approach.
How do Singer and Small differ from earlier IR thinkers in their approach to understanding the problem of war?

Is their method better? Why or why not?

Summarize the Democratic Peace thesis. In whose thought does it originate? What are its central points? Who first applied this as a practical guide to a real state's behavior? Did it work?

Then, Critique the Democratic Peace thesis: What accounts for its current renown, i.e. is it science or is it a fad? Do you see problems in its explanatory power?


d. Alternatives: Post-Modern and Constructivist Approaches
What most distinguishes these attempts to grasp I.R. from the earlier approaches?

 


e. Kant:

To what extent does Kant agree with Hobbes about Man's nature?

Where do their thoughts diverge?

What does Kant mean by republican principles?

Why do republican principles within states guide us to a formula for changing states' external behaviors?

Is this the same argument as made on behalf of universal international law?

How does Kant then believe peace can emerge?

Is NATO a Kantian "league"?


f. Woodrow Wilson "14 Points"
 

Set the stage:  What is the context of this paper/speech?

Does Wilson view the rules of I.R. to apply equally to all, or do some stronger states get to have different rules?

Did Wilson see WWI as a contest over principles, or over determining who was stronger and thus able to impose rules?

Do you find contemporary American principles among the points Wilson articulated?  Which ones?

What role should lines of nationality play in the community of states, according to Wilson?

What role does Wilson see for international institutions?

 

 



  Mon. Sept. 10, 2012:

 

Agenda: Are the underlying ways of I.R. dependent on context?  Insights from the ancient world.

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

 

A copy of the agenda projected on the screen during class will be available after class; follow this link.

Non-Text reading assignment ahead: A short (3pp) reading for Wednesday is an excerpt from Leviathan, by Thomas Hobbes. Access it here.

 

Discussion of today's readings will consume the rest of class today:

1. Thucydides


1. Thucydides
 
Set the stage: who is doing what in this context?

In what sense do the Athenians explain their behavior as rooted in "Law"?  From whence does such "law" arise?

The Athenians are quoted as saying that "right" only applies "between equals in power."  Is this true?  In what sense does it explain I.R.?

How did the Athenians view neutrality?  Do conflicts of the 20th century seem informed by an Athenian attitude toward neutrality in war?

What became of Melos?


 

 

 

Remember Sept. 11, 2001!

y

Looking for meaning in 9/11.  Prof. Bowen's thoughts


 

Wed. Sept. 12, 2012: topics/questions:

Historical Context of I.R.: the origins of, and age of, sovereignty

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

A copy of the agenda projected on the screen during class will be available after class; follow this link.

Major Topics to be addressed:
 

1. Hobbes' Ideas

2. I.R. in the City-State System

3. I.R. in the era of Empires and after their fall

4. The rise of the state as the primary actor in I.R.


 


1. Hobbes' Ideas  (before class please read: Thomas Hobbes, "Of the Naturall Condition of Mankind, as Concerning their Felicity, and Misery," Leviathan, Part I, Chapter 13, in Classics of International Relation ed. John Vasquez (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1986): pp. 204-206.)   Here is that reading; a brief excerpt of its main points also is linked here.

Who was Thomas Hobbes?  Why is he sometimes regarded as an authoritarian?

According to Hobbes:

  • What is the natural way humans are?
  • Why do humans behave in a civilized way?  Why are laws obeyed?
  • Are the conditions of individuals in a state of nature similar to, or different from, states in a state of nature?

 


2. I.R. in the City-State System
 

To what extent is it ethnocentric to build a science of I.R. based on the antecedents of the European experience?

What are the major works in understanding the I.R. of the world of city states?

What theoretical propositions about the problem of war and peace did the works of Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle produce?

Were diplomatic communications in this era shaped by customs that were generally respected by all parties, or were power considerations evident in how international actors communicated in this era?
 


3. I.R. in the era of Empires and after their fall
 
What forces brought an end to the Roman dominated system of international relations?

In Western Europe, what forms of authority replaced the order than Rome had governed?  What forces centralized, and what forces decentralized, life there?

Outside Western Europe, how did political authority differ from what evolved inside Western Europe?

How did the ideas of Machiavelli alter the way Western Europeans thought about power, and thought about international relations?

Where was the trend to re-centralization of political power advanced earliest in Western Europe?  How?

Were diplomatic communications in this era shaped by customs that were generally respected by all parties, or were power considerations evident in how international actors communicated in this era?

Were non-Europeans treated in the same manner as Europeans in diplomacy in this era?  How were Europeans regarded by non-European political actors?  Give examples.
 




 4. The rise of the state as the primary actor in I.R.
Who was Jean Bodin?  Why are his ideas significant?

What is sovereignty?  Why does Mingst refer to it as "a core concept in contemporary international relations?"

Why did the Treaty of Westphalia set Europe on a course that created a fundamentally changed system of international relations?



5. Europe in the early centuries of the age of Sovereignty
 
5a. The impact of the 18th Century Revolutions
a. Impact on rulers
-consent:  what did John Locke contend?

-legitimacy: what does this mean?
 

b. Impact on the state
-stability: which states were transformed by revolutionary ideas?

-potential power: were states made stronger, or weaker by new beliefs about rulers and their legitimacy?
 

c. Impact on the international state system



 

Sept. 17, 2012 topics/questions

 

The Realist view of the state in I.R.

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

In readings today, Realist theory is examined, with focus on John Mearsheimer's assumptions about "offensive realism."

Additional issues of relevance today include historic questions about how I.R. worked 1815-1939, and about the theory of realism that further evolved from a focus on the dynamics of these years.


 

Maintaining the European state system, 1815-1914
 

What factors maintained peace in Europe?

After 1870, why did European balance of power system break down?

1. alliances solidified
-Germany, Austria, Italy form Triple Alliance in 1882
-France and Russia (1893)
2. new powers arose: Prussia transformed Germany into an Empire; Japan, USA began to assert a new role

3. Britain abandoned its balancer role

4. Flexibility was lost: In 1914, states honored bilateral commitments more than they pursued flexible policies designed to sustain stability of the international system.


Attentive students are probably aware that while neo-classic works by Profs. Mearsheimer and Walt are assigned for today, these professors are better known lately for their recent screed, "The Israel Lobby."  The notoriety of that work notwithstanding, Prof. Bowen nonetheless believes that the arguments about the basic nature of I.R. they have made elsewhere retain value and should be reflected upon.  (Indeed, one could argue that the basic premises they tendered in the assigned articles for this course concerning how the world works are contradicted by their own suppositions in "The Israel Lobby.")  A news item about these controversial professors and the suspect audiences to whom they cater appeared in 2006 in the Washington Post.  However, students with enough time on their hands to seek out the full froth of this brew and who wish to read the complete "The Israel Lobby" will have to develop those searching skills on their own. I do not recommend the book.

In order to think clearly about the implications of the readings here, a set of charts linked here may inform about the global distribution of power as of 2005.  (These same 2001 facts and 1998 facts also could be consulted in order to view trends.  Given the changes in the world since 2005, an appropriate topic of a 2011 term paper would be to update these charts for future use by students in this course.  If this project interests you, see Dr. Bowen). 

re: Hans Morgenthau, "Realist Theory" (1949)

Walt called him a "brooding" classical realist. Why?

What does Morgenthau assume about Human Nature?

Morgenthau views the national interest of every state at all times to be in the accumulation of power: "the concept of interest defined in terms of power." Can you think of an instance when a state did not so behave? Does this prove, or disprove, Morgenthau?

Morgenthau states: "universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states… Realism considers prudence –the weighing of the consequences of alternative political actions – to be the supreme virtue in politics."

Critique the above quote.

Realists are sometimes viewed (simplistically) as war mongers, in that they do not raise moral objections to war and at times argue that only through war can national interests and overall stability of the international system be achieved.  It might surprise you, then, to learn that Morgenthau opposed the U.S. war in Vietnam. Was that view consistent with realist principles?  Do any modern realists oppose the current "war on terrorism"?


re: John Mearsheimer, "Anarchy and the Struggle for Power" (2001)

(It might interest students to know that Prof. Mearsheimer publicly opposed the 2003 War in Iraq)

What about the international system "mandates that states behave competitively"?

Summarize Mearsheimer's 5 assumptions about the international system.  Then answer, why do these five things add up to "create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively"?

What role does fear play in the behavior of states?

Explain the concept of hegemony as Mearsheimer uses it.  Is the U.S. today a global hegemon?  Why or why not?  What are the consequences of there being a "regional hegemon" in today's world, and what does Mearsheimer believe might happen if another regional hegemon were to emerge?

Why is "peace... not likely to break out in this world"?

If "great powers are not mindless aggressors," why is it that the term most associated with Mearsheimer's theory is "offensive realism"?

What place do objectives such as international cooperation, or action to end instances of genocide, have in the pattern of state behavior that Mearsheimer identifies?  Is his view too cynical?  Why or why not?


Sept. 19, 2012


 

 

I.R. in the 20th Century

Announcements:

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today in class will be linked here after class.

Some of the supplemental (optional) articles supporting today's content are linked here:



I. Review: key concepts


II. Daily Topic: Q and A
What factors within states contributed to the major conflicts of the 20th Century?  How do authors Kennan and Fukuyama assess this?

What factors within the IR system contributed to the major conflicts of the 20th Century?


III. Concepts of IR:  Balance of Power (BoP)
Origins of concept in describing 19th century Europe

What elements of a successful B0P system were not present in the first half of the 20th century?

Analysis of Cold War: was it a BoP system?


IV. Do the factors that most shaped the forms of international conflict present in the Cold War still shape global conflict?  Why or why not?


1914-1939: System breakdown produces World Wars
 

a. WWI and WWII, while different in origins, are closely related to the rigidification of the I.R. system that had developed.  Most key elements of the stable past (1815-1870) now were absent.  Which key elements were these?

b. The conclusion of WWI sowed seeds of conflict:
 

(1). Empires were disassembled, creating rump states with grievances:  

  • Which empires were dissolved?  
  • By whom? 
  • Why? 
  • Why were all empires not dissolved?

(2). New states were formed, but the legitimacy of some of the newly created states was low. 

  • What new states were formed?
  • What role did democratic governance play in building or undermining these states' attitudes toward the international system?

(3). New Ideologies arose and exercised strong appeal: socialism, communism, militarism, fascism, Nazism, nationalism, and others. These became virulent in several states: Where?  Why?

(4). International Organizations proved ineffective tools to institutionalize conflict resolution among states.

  • Their authority was undermined by lack of universal membership.  The USA and the USSR (at first) refused to join the League; Germany was barred from joining until it proved its peaceful character.  Many other states could not afford to send delegates.

 

  • Access to the League of Nations was designed to be universal, but in practice some states were privileged to have their grievances heard there, and the grievances of others were ignored by the League.  Thus, Ethiopia (1935-36), but not Czechoslovakia (1938-39), got a hearing before the League when each was victimized by fascist aggression.  This pattern belied the claim of universal principles that was the basis of the authority they attempted to have recognized.

c. The events of the 1920s and 1930s further strained I.R.

  • trade wars broke out among developed states
  • worldwide economic depression after 1929 strained relations in an era of scarcity.

 

  • revolutionary states challenged system norms:
    aggressive states expanded their power (Japan, Italy, Germany) at the expense of weaker neighbors (China, Ethiopia, Czechoslovakia)

 

  • pacifism inhibited strong states from pursuing their interest in a system of balanced power.


 


1945-1990: Elements of Stability in the State System of the Cold War Era
 

Historian John Lewis Gaddis once proposed the Long Peace thesis, arguing that the global system during the Cold War was not a dangerously unstable one, but had elements that promoted stable international relations:

Elements of Stability he found included:
 

-formal system reflected real distribution of power after 1945

-bipolar system was simple, did not require sophisticated leadership

-alliances tended to be stable, yet defections from them were "tolerated" unlike the rigidified system that preceded WWII
 

Stability also was sustained by:
-moderation by leaders
-caution in crises
-spying revolution
-tacit rules evolved:
  • respect other powers' spheres of influence
  • avoid direct military confrontation among superpowers
  • use nuclear weapons only as last resort
  • prefer anomaly over unpredictable rationality
  • do not seek to undermine opponents' leadership
  • maintain a sharp distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons


George Kennan (aka Mr. X)
 

Does Kennan seem more guided by Thucydides' Athenians or by Wilson in describing how peace can be obtained in the world of his times (i.e., 1946-47)?

According to Kennan, was the Soviet Union a new type of state?  Did such a state as it was require a response that was similar to the way other Russian states had been responded to, or did it require a fundamentally new response?

What does Kennan's view suggest about the relative importance of a state's internal makeup in explaining its international behavior?


Mon. Sept. 24, 2012: topics/questions:
 

Agenda: Analyzing  I.R. by thinking through theory

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today in class will be linked here after class.

Announcements:

  • Readings from Sept. 17 (especially those by Mearsheimer, and by Morgenthau) inform us about the topic again under study for today.  Be sure to review those notes in addition to being prepared on the assigned readings for today.

 

 


1. Major theoretical perspectives on I.R. are reintroduced and discussed:
 

a. Liberal Internationalism
b. Realism
c. Marxism
2. The levels of analysis problem: what is it?

3.  Applying what we learn:

 


Detail on the main topics (above): 1. Analyzing Using Major Theoretic Perspectives

a. Liberal Internationalism
Describe:
 
what does this theory assume about Man's nature?

what does this theory assume about the nature of the state?  what does Axelrod / Keohane's "Prisoner's dilemma" tell us here?

what does this theory assume about the nature of the international system?

Analyze
Apply this to the Gulf War.  Who is at fault?

What do events of the 1990s suggest about the cogency of this approach?
 

Evaluate
What are the strengths, and what are the weaknesses of relying on this approach in most places, at most times?

 b. Realism
Describe
what does this theory assume about Man's nature?

what does this theory assume about the nature of the state?

what does this theory assume about state decision makers?

what does this theory assume about the nature of the international system?


Analyze

Apply this to the Gulf War.  Who is at fault?

What do events of the 1990s suggest about the cogency of this approach


Evaluate

What are the strengths, and what are the weaknesses of relying on this approach in most places, at most times?

Is the world still as "Hobbesian" as this theory suggests?  Why or why not?


c. Radical approaches (Marxism)
Describe
 What, according to this view, is the cause of war?
Analyze
At what level of analysis does the Marxist explanation of war proceed?

Use this theory to explain the Gulf War of 1990-91
 

Evaluate
To what extent is this view tenable in the new millennium?
What similarities in foci are there between this view and the Bin Laden ideology?

2. Analyzing in light of the "Levels of Analysis Problem"

What are the 3 levels of IR analysis?  What does each find to be the most significant information to look at?
 
a. Iraq, 1991: use each level and
What do we look at?  What do we find?


b. Iraq, 2003: use each level and

What do we look at?  What do we find?


c. War on Terrorism 2001-12: use each level and

What do we look at?  What do we find?


Which approach (or major theoretic posture, e.g. Realism) guides us to which level most heavily?  Why?

Which approach (or major theoretic posture, e.g. Realism) seems to you to provide the most convincing explanation of the War on Terrorism as an IR problem?
 


Wed. Sept. 26, 2012.  

Thinking about the Global System in I.R.: 

Applying concepts of realism : Polarity , Stratification, and Balance of Power

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Additionally, motivated students might wish to read a brief news story about this attempted attack by a terrorist in Chicago, an attack that was thwarted a couple years ago this week by the F.B.I.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today in class will be linked here after class. 


1. Items from current events will be discussed. Regarding these, consider this review question: How does being conscious of the "level of analysis" problem affect what we examine relative to current events? 

2. Realist International Systems analysis
 

1. Basic concepts: 

2.  Is the pursuit of hegemony by a leading state (such as the U.S. in the post-Cold War period) likely to lead to an international system of peace?

3. How do liberals and realists view the international system differently from one another?  What views do they share that radicals (e.g., Wallerstein) reject?


Realist International Systems analysis

Polarity

Stratification

Balance of Power: "In a balance of power system, the essential norms of the system are clear to each of the state actors... If an essential actor does not follow these norms, the balance-of-power system may become unstable.  If the number of states declines to three, stability is threatened, because coalitions between any two are possible, which would leave the third alone and weak.  When alliances are formed in balance-of-power systems, they are formed for a specific purpose, have a short duration, and shift according to advantage rather than ideology.  Any wars that break out are probably limited in nature, designed to preserve the balance of power."  

Karen Mingst, Essentials of International Relations third edition (NY: Norton, 2005): 88.

See also Prof. Bowen's discussion of the concept of alliance, and how realists and liberals view this matter differently.

Basic Norms of a balance-of-power system:

Karen Mingst, Essentials of International Relations third edition (NY: Norton, 2005): 88.


Hans Morgenthau, “The Balance of Power” (B-o-P)

 

Morgenthau sees B-o-P as an expression of a deeper human tendency toward equilibrium.  What factors inhibit equilibrium in the present world?

 

Illustrate these methods of B-o-P with examples from history, then from current world affairs:

·        Divide and rule

·        Adding to the strength of weaker nations

·        Awarding compensation

·        Developing armaments

·        Forming alliances

If, as Morgenthau argues, “all nations must ultimately seek the maximum of power obtainable under the circumstances,” how does B-o-P ever come about?  Explain.



Monday Oct. 1, 2012

Competing Perspectives on the International System.

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today in class will be linked here after class.

Before Class:  Prof. Bowen's 2005 charts about "indicators of national power" may usefully be consulted when thinking about the realities of the current world when weighing the content of these articles.  (see also the same charts, based on 1998 information or on 2001 information).

Announcements:

 

 

Class Agenda:

1. Current events, Questions.

2. Discussion of Bull, and of Naim.


Questions on Hedley Bull on "International Society" (1977)

How did “Christian international society” evolve into “European international society”?

How did rules/customs of “European international society” affect non-European areas?  Explain.

What illustrates a further evolution of international society in the 20th and 21st centuries?

Do these trends negate or simply supplement understandings of state behavior that flow from the (Hobbesian) state of international anarchy?  Explain.


Questions on Naim (2003):

In what sense are the several issues Naim addresses actually "wars"?

Is state sovereignty likely to be a casualty if effective responses to these "wars" is to occur?  Why or why not?

 

 

Oct. 3 , 2012: topics/questions

 
Agenda:

The State in I.R.

The elements needed in a PolS 221 Term Paper Proposal can be summarized:  follow this link to a chart on this.

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today in class will be linked here after class.

1. Readings: Mingst, Krasner, Juergensmeyer.  Additionally, your thinking may be assisted by reading the overview webpage on Sovereignty maintained by Prof. Bowen elsewhere at this website.

2. Discussion today will attempt to integrate concerns in all the readings, and help prep students for essay questions on the Midterm.  Reference to current events also may occur.  Beginning Question: "To what extent are states masters of their own ship?" and "Has the rise of terrorism fundamentally changed the sovereignty of states?"

3. Lecture may follow, on "Knowing State Power"

-sources of power
-tangible versus intangible elements of state power
-relational nature of power

4. Measuring power involves both potential power and actual power.  Two graphical illustrations may help grasp this distinction:

5. Using Power

diplomacy, e.g. issues such as:

economic means

military means
 

6. Conceptualizing how states determine what means to use: rational actor models vs. bureaucratic politics models

Classifying States' Potential Power According to
"Components of National Power".  Illustrate each with a specific example:
 
tangible aspects:
-population resources
-natural resources
-geographic isolation
-level of industrial capability


intangible aspects:

-capacities of leadership
-disposition of general population to follow leadership
 
Questions:
Power:  Enumerate the components of National Power.
How is our understanding of the role of each factor above in IR enhanced by:
differentiating between potential power and actual power?

differentiating between tangible and intangible power?
 

In understanding IR, military strength is a central element of national power.  In measuring military strength, precision is difficult because of qualitative factors.  Give a practical example of the role of each of these:
 
-quality and morale of troops
-technological capability
-leadership
-strategy


Diplomacy (follow this link to an expanded discussion of diplomatic techniques).  Questions:

Why do states "negotiate" even if they do not truly seek an agreement?
What kind of agreements can emerge from negotiations?

What are "preliminaries" in negotiations?  Why are they important?

What are some of the key tactics in diplomacy once negotiations begin?

How do states "signal" one another inside and outside negotiating meetings?

Contemporary Signaling in the War on Terrorism:

In real diplomacy, these categories are not mutually exclusive, and combinations of these often are involved in actual cases of signaling.  Examples: 

  • A list of terrorist groups issued by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on Sept. 24, 2001 constituted a "diplomatic signal" by omitting Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas from the list of "terrorist organizations of global reach."  

    What was that signal?  Was there a response?  What happened subsequently?  Read the most recent official U.S. list of terrorist organizations, issued Jan. 12, 2012, here.   Background on each group also is provided at that U.S. Department of State website.  

  • Similarly, the U.S. did not directly target law enforcement resources toward the leaders of Hamas for nearly two years after Sept. 11, 2001.  But, after Hamas officials took credit for a terrorist bombing that killed 20 (including three Americans) and injured 150 in Jerusalem in August 2003, the Bush Administration announced it was requesting U.S. banks and foreign governments to seize all assets of six top Hamas leaders.  Given that Israel had killed a top Hamas militant the day previous to the announcement of this new policy, what was the signal that was sent?

Reference to Iraq also may occur.  E.g.: this chart appeared in Washington Post (Sept. 27, 2006): 22, six years ago.  Iraq's elected government signed a status-of-forces agreement with the U.S. in December 2008.  It permitted U.S. troops to remain in Iraq until December 2011, when they left. 



Oct. 8, 2012: Midterm Exam.  Please bring a Blue Book test taking booklet with you to the test.

Oct. 10, 2012: Midterm Exams will be returned.  Continue current events readings, as they may be discussed in class today.  No new text readings: use the extra time to work on your proposal and presentation for Mon. Oct. 15.

 

 

 

 


Oct. 15, 2012: Oral Reports on Term Papers

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

Term Paper sources and other term paper issues: Your course syllabus carefully explains this project and supplies a list of topics for research.  This note supplies guidance about how to prepare a bibliography and bibliographic citations properly.  The term paper project is a learning exercise in doing research in international relations.  To facilitate your presentation of the sources you have used, Prof. Bowen offers some online guidelines.  These are summed up on a linked chart, and are further explained below:

MBC also has a hard copy collection of Current History, in the basement of Grafton Library.  Once you have a citation from the online index, you know enough to find it as the year, month, and page number are listed online.  Only abstracts of the most current articles are online at the Current History website.  MBC Library also may give access to articles you find in the index (linked above) if you seek them via Expanded Academic Index, and other indexes.  But the hard copy of the articles are certainly available right now at our library in the bound periodicals section, located in the Library basement.
 

 

 


Oct. 17, 2012: A Clash of Civilizations?

Agenda: Are there new bases for conflict in the contemporary international system?

Announcements:  

.

Today's Readings: Huntington

1. Huntington's thesis will form the core of today's conversation.  We will look at some items from current events, then analyze the extent to which Huntington's perspective better explains them than do state-centered models of I.R.

2. S. P. Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations." A biographical sketch about Samuel P. Huntington, published in 2009 by Prof. Bowen, can be found here: The Legacy of Samuel P. Huntington: His Contributions to International and Area Studies(Also, in 2008, Prof. Bowen published a retrospective about Huntington's famous 1968 work Political Order in Changing Societies in a book from Salem Press.  See publications section of his vitae for details).

Into what periods of history does Huntington break IR history since 1648?

Earlier phases of IR conflict:

·        1648 to French Revolution: conflict of princes

·        French  Revolution to 1917: conflicts of nation states

·        1917-91: ideological  conflicts. 

All eras were WESTERN “civil wars”

How does the present age fundamentally differ?  Is this new world really "new"?

New age is one of conflict between the Western Civilization and the non-Western ones

What is meant by "clashes of civilizations"?

 

Clashes of civilizations are clashes of cultures: common language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and the subjective self-identification of a people.  A civilization is the "broadest level of identification with which he intensely identifies"

What are the "civilizations" that he believes now exist in which the "clash" hypothesis will be tested?

  Today there are 7 or 8 civilizations:

·        Western

·        Confucian

·        Japanese

·        Hindu

·        Islamic

·        Slavic-Orthodox

·        Latin American

·        and possibly African

Why will these civilizations produce IR conflict?

  1. Differences are “basic.”

  2. World has become smaller, there are more interactions

  3. Economic modernization is separating people from their deeper identities

  4. While Western power is ascendant, everywhere else there is a “return to our roots” searching for a separate identity

  5. Cultural characteristics are not as mutable as political or economic ones of earlier conflicts.  It is no longer, “which side are you on?”; it is “who are you?”

  6. Economic regionalism is rising, stimulating an “Us versus Them” mentality.

In his original article (and in his book of this title, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, pp 255-258), Huntington most controversially said: "Islam has bloody borders."   What does this mean?  Is this a fair reading of the contemporary world?  

·        He says: “In the Arab world, in short, western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces.”  Have the forces unleashed by the 2011 "Arab Spring" confirmed or refuted this interpretation?

·        He cites growing racism in Western Europe shows that it is not just in Islamic areas that tension is up. Do events since he wrote this in 1993-96 refute this interpretation, or confirm it?

·        He enumerates conflicts which are occurring all around the border of Islamic civilization, in South vs African Christians in Chad and Sudan, in North all across Caucuses, Balkans, Central Asia.  Are there others since he wrote?  Kashmir?  Inside India?  Al Qaeda?

·        Do the relations of Iran with the rest of the world support or undermine Huntington’s thesis?

·        What are the implications for U.S. policy if Huntington’s thesis is correct?  Can this be “Western” policy?

 

.


No class on Monday October 22, 2012: Fall Break


 

  October 24: Agenda:

The Individual's role in Statecraft


Announcements:

 

I. Questions:

1. What is different between the "rational actor" assumption of realist theory and the role of the individual in liberal IR theory?  Does this matter?

2. Exemplify how the assumption of rationality is part of the theory of Deterrence
 

II. Today's Readings
The Individual and statecraft
-Elite Theory has a marginal place in Marxist and Realist IR but:
-Founding Fathers matter when institutions are weak
-times of crisis matter
-when the issue falls outside S-O-P
-Personality characteristics affect decision making, but study thereof requires much evidence of their "operational code."

-Information processing techniques affect decisions

-cognitive consistency
-evoked sets
-mirror images
-Groupthink
Concepts of IR: Deterrence
definition: "With deterrence strategy, states commit themselves to punish a target state if the target state takes a negative action.  Threats or actual warfare is used as an instrument of policy to dissuade a state from pursuing certain courses of action.  If the target state does not take the negative action, deterrence is successful and conflict is avoided.  If it does choose to act despite the deterrent threat, then the first state will deliver an unacceptable blow."
Karen Mingst, Essentials of International Relations, first edition, p126
 

Requirements for successful deterrence:

1. states must have the hardware, the means through which to undertake a response to the negative action, a second strike capability.

2. states must communicate their objectives and the threat to retaliate to negative actions.

3. states must have the will to follow through and be believed to have this will by their adversaries.

4. rationality: both the deterring state and the deterred state must behave rationally.


Factors which affect processing of decisions:  cognitive consistency

"individuals select or amplify information that supports existing images and ignore or downplay contradictory information" 

examples:

  • spotters discount unmarked planes flying at Pearl Harbor
  • U.S. officials misread slide toward UK-Argentine war over Falkland Is.
     
Students may be asked to apply this factor toward the current problem of war in Afghanistan, and related crises.   

An example which might fit would be Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon viewing as identical suicide bombings there and in NY City, and the view that "Arafat is a terrorist" which he often expressed.


Factors which affect processing of decisions:
evoked sets:
"elites... look for those details of a present episode that look like a past one, perhaps ignoring the important differences" (Mingst)

examples of misplaced parallels in evoked sets:

  • U.K. PM Eden sees Nasser's moves on Suez Canal as moves of another Hitler.
  • U.S. Presidential advisors viewed Vietnam aggression as Korea II, yet the substantial Chinese and Russian role in North Korea was not present in the initiation of the Vietnamese insurgency in the South of Vietnam c. 1960.
Contemporary examples of evoked sets:
  • Clinton team views Milosevic actions in Kosovo as a fourth Balkan war of aggression by Yugoslavia.
  • G. W. Bush responses to any conditions made by Iraq regarding resumed U.N. weapons inspections: more evasion.
Students may again be asked to apply this concept to current situations.


Factors which affect processing of decisions:

mirror imaging
"while considering one's own action good, moral and just, the enemy is automatically found to be evil, immoral, and unjust." (Mingst)  

This concept is often used to impugn the allies of an adversary as evil, and to inflate ones' own allies as pristine.
 

  • U.S. leaders' opinions about Soviet allies' behavior during the Cold War:  Secretary of State Dean Rusk refers to "the bloc" in dismissing French Ambassador's argument that some Soviet allies can be assets to the West.
  • In 1980s, these views helped build support for anti-Soviet factions in Afghanistan; but they also minimized U.S. perceptions of diverging interests between the U.S. and the anti-Soviet Afghanis and their "Arab Afghan" allies.

Students may be asked: How does this factor affect contemporary decision makers' thinking?
 

  • It can be argued that Pres. G. W. Bush initially avoided doing this in differentiating between Bin Laden's Al Qaeda and the Taliban on the one hand, and the Iraqi, Iranian, Syrian governments and the groups that composed the Palestinian Authority on the other.

All have sponsored terrorist acts against the U.S. on a global scale, but only Bin Laden and the Taliban initially were identified as targets in the post Sept. 11, 2001 American anti-terrorism war.

  • Was this careful discerning and differentiating continued?  Why or why not?

 

  • What other examples of mirror imaging can we think of?
     

Factors which affect processing of decisions:

Groupthink
definition:  "a mode of thinking people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when members strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action... Individuals not sharing the groupthink were both informally and formally removed from the group." (Irving Janis, in Mingst)
 
  • L.B. Johnson's "Tuesday Lunch Group" of advisors' responses to escalating Vietnamese attacks in 1965: gadfly George Ball gets ostracized.
  • George H. W.  Bush's advisors' unanimity about NOT proceeding on to Baghdad after defeating Iraqi Army in battle for Kuwait in 1991.  Advisors who concurred with the decision included: Powell, Cheney, Haass, Quayle, Wolfowitz.

More Term Paper ideas:

1. Consider what you know of the Report of the 9/11 Commission.  Does "groupthink" appear to have played a role in U.S. policy prior to the 9/11 event?  (link to 9/11 Commission Final Report)

Or 2. Has Groupthink played any role in shaping post-9/11 U.S. policy?  Consider the findings in the Duelfer Report  (Sept. 2004) and the Final Report of Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (March 31, 2005) regarding pre-war U.S. intelligence and policy toward Iraq?

OR 3. Consider the decisions made by the Obama Administration during the Fall of 2009 regarding a changed policy for the U.S. in Afghanistan in light of the revelations in Bob Woodward's 2010 book Obama's Wars. Did group processes shape decision-making more than rational choices by top officials? Were some alternatives ruled out of order by "groupthink"?


 

Questions re: Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception" (1988)

Consider and evaluate each of Jervis' hypotheses.

 

 

 

 

Oct. 29, 2012: topics/questions

Applying I.R. Concepts to The Problem of War

Announcements:

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

Today's course content: Some clarifications and an additional fact or two oddly omitted by the authors of the text:

Entebbe: The Mingst reading for today has many insightful elements, but is lacking in one specific area.  On pages 257-258, Mingst reported about a 1976 incident in which “a French plane with mostly Israeli passengers was hijacked by a Middle Eastern organization and flown to Uganda, where the hijackers threatened to kill the hostages unless Arab prisoners in Israel were released.”  The text fails to name the incident (usually known as the Entebbe Incident) and fails adequately to explain either who did this, or what the outcome was.  The hijackers were eight members of the PLO -- the organization that has evolved into the contemporary leadership of the Palestinian Authority--  plus two European members of the German terrorist group the "Baader-Meinhof Gang."  They were assisted after the hijacking by the Government of Libya, and once the plane landed at Entebbe, Uganda, the hijackers were assisted by the armed forces of that nation, which at the time was led by Gen. Idi Amin. (Amin, incidentally, lived for many years in Saudi Arabia after his removal from power in 1979 by Tanzanian armed forces; and died in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2003).  These terrorists, and the state terrorists of Libya and Uganda who assisted them, were delivered a forceful knock-out punch on July 4, 1976 by a rescue party of Israeli commandos led by Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, who died in the raid along with 3 hostages.  One hostage, 75 year old Dora Bloch, who was in an Ugandan hospital at the time of the rescue, was murdered by Ugandan soldiers.  In the Israeli raid on Entebbe, 100 of the 103 hostages safely were rescued; 6 hijackers were killed; and 45 Ugandan troops supporting the hijackers were killed.  The raid had an electrifying effect on both Israeli and U.S. public opinion, coinciding as it did with the celebration of the Bicentennial of the U.S. Declaration of Independence. 

Jonathan Netanyahu's brother, Benjamin, later became Prime Minister of Israel in the late 1990s and is the current Prime Minister of Israel.  He has led the faction in the Likud Party that in 2005 opposed Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's policy of giving over Gaza to the Palestinian Authority; and in 2006-08, he opposed the (fruitless) policy of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert which aimed to turn most of the West Bank over to the Palestinian Authority.  In 2009-12, he has returned as Prime Minister, where he has been less than enthusiastic about Pres. Obama's attempts to "settle" the Palestinian - Israel dispute.

Balkan Wars: Prof. Mingst also quickly conveys the essence of the difficulties encountered in bringing war to an end in the Balkans in the 1990s.  She concludes (218) that "no effective international arbiter existed in the international system to settle these competing claims.  In the face of this anarchy,..." many tried, but failed.  Her point is to guide students to the virtues in looking at several different levels of analysis in order to reveal what causes any war, and what can restrain wars.  She is not attempting to convey the complexities involved in the Balkans in any detail, and her account largely is accurate.  (For a much longer account, see my essay).  One important point not reported may enrich student understanding of additional issues in our course, e.g. the nature of alliances.  In the 1999 NATO air war over Kosovo, one of the reasons that our pilots had to fly at such heights, and had such difficulty in hitting important targets that might have induced Serbia/Yugoslavia to ask for peace sooner than it did, is because the Serbs knew NATO's war plans in detail.  These were provided to them by Pierre-Henri Bunel, a French Army Major at NATO's Brussels headquarters.  For this, Bunel was arrested in November 1999, and in December 2001 he was convicted of treason in France.  Oddly, however, Bunel only was arrested after other Western nations' intelligence agencies uncovered the treason.  Civilian courts were barred from trying him; a French military court heard the case out of a stated fear that state secrets would be revealed otherwise.  At his trial, Bunel insisted he was following orders, and no evidence in the trial was presented that showed that the Serbs paid him any money for this crucial information.  He was convicted of treason by the French military court, and then was given an unusually short sentence of five years, and was released after serving but two years.  This pattern has led a well informed U.S. former official, Richard Perle, to allege that not just Bunel, but France itself may have undermined the NATO war effort in Kosovo in 1999.  (see: David Frum and Richard Perle, An end to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror NY: Random House, 2003: 238).  Bunel later added his tarnished voice to the conspiracy theories that rattle about the internet to allege that the U.S., not Al Qaeda, attacked the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001; his earlier treason seems not to undermine to his current audience the outrageous charges he makes.  Students: it must be emphasized.  Prof. Bowen does not endorse Bunel's theories, or any aspect of the website just cited.  The link is included solely for the purpose of demonstrating the connection between proven anti-U.S. traitors and 9/11 conspiracy theorists.

In class, Prof. Bowen may present a brief analysis of the dangers inherent in the situation in the Balkans.  Your thinking on the region may benefit from reading two news items from the Washington Post ("Russia Pursues Crackdown, Nov. 25, 2007; and "Obituary: Vladimir Kryuchkov: KGB Chief Led Coup against Gorbachev," Nov. 26, 2007), an editorial by the editors of the Post ( "The Net Tightens") on Nov. 25, 2007, and by an alarming editorial by the late Richard Holbrooke, "Back to the Brink in the Balkans," that appeared there on that same date.  Hobrooke was the Obama Administration's chief diplomat regarding Pakistan and Afghanistan before his untimely death in December 2010.


1. Current Events: the end of U.S. military presence in Iraq, the death of Libya's Gaddafi, withdrawal of U.S. Ambassador from Syria.

2. Discussion Lesson. 

2. a. Apply each concept to current events:
 

What is the "security dilemma?"  How does its management contribute to international tension?  Is this avoidable?

How do liberals, realists and Marxists view differently the causes of war in general?  Fit each approach to the current situation and critique.

How do the levels of analysis we choose affect what we find important in the events of the last 2 years?

What is collective security?  How would those advocating it, and/or the related arms "control and disarmament" approach, advise re the current war?

Summarize the realist approach to the problem of war.   Would its concepts of "balance of power," and/or "deterrence" lead the USA to now behave differently?

Mingst sums up this chapter saying (244): "...the fact is all kinds of wars have declined in number. The state system is more secure, although the daily headlines and news reports suggest otherwise." Is this a reasonable statement?


2.b. von Clausewitz (from On War):

Critique the expression: “war is only a part of political intercourse,... War is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse with a mixture of other means.”

What does this insight mean in the context of the oft heard complaint that “wars should be managed and fought by generals”?

  • Col. Harry Summers, (US Army, ret.), On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1995) makes an excellent assessment of the relationship of political goals and military strategy in the Clausewitz tradition.

Clausewitz discusses the role of intangible factors in the Napoleonic Wars.  What was the "blunder" involved in the underestimation of France by Prussia in these wars? 


Topics in the text readings which also are important, but are less likely to be discussed during our limited class time:

Differentiate between "first generation peacekeeping" and "second generation peacekeeping."  Are either suited to the situation we confront in the current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Summarize what caused the Yugoslavian Wars of the 1990s.  Which IR approach is most fruitful to explaining their outbreak? ...to explaining their outcome?  Why?


Oct. 31, 2012 topics/questions: 

Politics and States' use of Force: Explaining the Role of Wars in IR, Part II.

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

Announcements:

The readings today are extensive.  Class should be most prepared to discuss the assigned authors in the following order (top will receive first attention, then the others in the order below): 


Re: Thomas Schelling

Differentiate the concepts of "brute force" and "power to hurt".  

“...brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to hurt is most successful when held in reserve.” (in Mingst and Snyder, fourth edition, 347)

“Hostages represent the power to hurt in its purest form.” (329)

“Violence is most purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used.” (331)

“...victory is often but a prerequisite to the exploitation of the power to hurt.” (331)

Each of these two classical authors in the area of strategy should be read in full by serious students of this topic.  Timeless in their applicability, the context from which each analysis arose also is important to recognize.  Indeed, the fact that Schelling came to the conclusions he did about nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold War underlines the ability of the most cogent analysis to transcend limitations imposed by context.


Re: Edward Luttwak ( "Give War a Chance" Foreign Affairs [July/August 1999]: 36-44)

Does an armistice and/or a cease fire truly promote peace?  What has Luttwak to say about this popular nostrum?

What leads Luttwak to the conclusion that “frivolous motives” led to the continuation of devotion to cease-fires as a strategy to build peace?  Who committed this folly?  Why?

What are the implications if we subscribe to Luttwak's view about Peacekeeping? 

About the Middle East, Luttwak wrote:

"The United Nations Relief and Works Agency...was built on the model of its predecessor, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), which operated displaced person's camps in Europe immediately after World War II.  The UNRWA was established immediately after the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war to feed, shelter, educate, and provide health services for Arab refugees who had fled Israeli zones in the former territory of Palestine.

"By keeping refugees alive in Spartan conditions that encouraged their rapid emigration or local re-settlement, the UNRRA's camps in Europe had assuaged postwar resentments and helped disperse revanchist concentrations of national groups.  But the UNRWA camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip provided on the whole a higher standard of living than most Arab villagers had previously enjoyed, with more varied diet, organized schooling, superior medical care, and no backbreaking labor in stony fields.  They had, therefore, the opposite effect, becoming desirable homes rather than eagerly abandoned transit camps.  With the encouragement of several Arab countries, the UNRWA turned escaping civilians into lifelong refugees who gave birth to refugee children, who have in turn had refugee children of their own.

 

"During its half-century of operation, the UNRWA has thus perpetuated a Palestinian refugee nation, preserving its resentments in as fresh a condition as they were in 1948 and keeping the  first bloom of revanchist emotion intact.  By its very existence, the UNRWA dissuades integration into local society and inhibits emigration.  The concentration of Palestinians in the camps, moreover, has facilitated the voluntary or forced enlistment of refugee youth by armed organizations that fight both Israel and each other.  The UNRWA has contributed to a half-century of Arab-Israeli violence and still retards the advent of peace.

"If each European war had been attended by its own postwar UNRWA, today's Europe would be filled with giant camps for millions of descendants of uprooted Gallo-Romans, abandoned Vandals, defeated Burgundians, and misplaced Visigoths -- not to speak of more recent refugee nations such as post 1945 Sudeten Germans (three million of whom were expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1945).  Such a Europe would have remained a mosaic of warring tribes, undigested and unreconciled in their separate feeding camps.  It might have assuaged consciences to help each one at each remove, but it would have led to permanent instability and violence."


re: Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma"

Summarize the “stag hunt” dilemma.  What does this analogy mean in terms of the possibility of international cooperation?

In terms of its inclination to cooperate, what difference does it make if a state is “highly vulnerable” versus being “less vulnerable”?

Jervis (339) stated: “A state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly than a state that sees its environment as benign.”

Does this axiom seem to apply to any contemporary state?  Explain.

Jervis (341): “…if wars are frequent, statesmen’s perceptual thresholds will be adjusted accordingly and they will be quick to perceive ambiguous evidence as indicating that others are aggressive.”

Any comments on the above?

According to Jervis, how did “lessons” drawn from the Franco Prussian War affect thinking about the role of war in I.R., making World War I more likely?


Re: Lieber and Baram, "Containment Breach"

The authors view as naive analogies of stable nuclear deterrence in the Cold War being applied to the Israel-Iran relationship.  What points to they make to sustain this argument?  Is their emphasis paranoid, or realistic?  Why?


Term Paper idea/ announcement about Iran from Prof. Bowen.  Students in PolS 221 are expected to pay attention to current events, both to stay informed as citizens in general and because much that appears in the news adds to the range of examples available through which we can weigh the relative explanatory power of different theories and approaches in the study of international relations.  One key item in dispute among the theories is the extent to which states and their leaders should be assumed to behave in a rational manner in making their decisions.  The Jervis reading (i.e., in the notes from our class today) seems particularly insightful at this moment:  “A state that is predisposed to see either a specific other state as an adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly than a state that sees its environment as benign.”  A paper on the theoretical implications of the current Iranian state and its behavior would be timely.

In this spirit, Prof. Bowen calls to your attention the statements on various matters by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the recently re-elected President of Iran,  and by other prominent Iranian authorities in recent years.   Begun in Fall 2005, with Ahmadinejad's call for "wiping off the map" the state of Israel, a series of provocative statements in the time since have deepened concern over other Iranian efforts, especially in the area of developing nuclear technologies in defiance of Iran's obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and resolutions by the U.N. Security Council about the Iranian nuclear program.  Our government, and those of several allies have condemned the Iranian President and his statements, but many observers have tended to portray the problem as one of an unstable individual.  The problem is not so limited.  Across the Iranian government, both "moderates" and radicals, both religious authorities and secular ones, openly have been embracing policies that threaten.  The following links might prove helpful in thinking about the meaning here, both for the U.S., and for better understanding of the forces in general that guide the behavior of states:

 


 

Nov. 5, 2012 topics/questions:

Agenda:

"Non-state actors, and patterns of violence in I.R."

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

Readings:  Arquilla on the extent to which terrorism really is a new challenge to states; Mingst/Snyder articles: Kydd and Walter (pp 392-415), and Kilcullen (pp 416-443)

 

Integrative questions about the assigned readings for today:  Is there any sense in which these authors agree about the nature of the threat to peace?  Explain.  If they disagree, what is the essential difference in the threat the perceive?  Does realization of the American national interest require that we respond to jihadist Muslims' terrorism today in a way that is fundamentally different from the ways states responded to insurgencies and terrorism in the past?  Or, will U.S. interests likely be protected if we imitate certain other powers' past behavior?  Explain.


Arquilla on "The End to War as we knew it?..."

What does the author mean by the "blurry relationship of insurgency to terrorism" across history? 

Has state terror ever worked?   Explain.

When and under what conditions have 20th century insurgent groups used terrorism?  Assess the conditions for success.

When and under what conditions have 20th century states succeeded when designing strategies to confront insurgent groups that use terrorism?  Assess the general elements needed for success.

Given Arquilla's analysis, what is required of counter-insurgent / counter-terror forces if they are to succeed today?


Kydd and Walter, "The strategies of terrorism" (2006)

Which of these was, according to the authors, involved in Al Qaeda’s 2001 attack on the U.S.? 

Kydd and Walter argued that terrorist groups are likely to be rewarded for being more militant, rather than for being more reasonable and willing to compromise.  Why?

Following from Kydd and Walter’s analysis, what strategic purpose seems to have been advanced by Israel’s decision in October 2011 to trade 1027 prisoners with HAMAS in exchange for one Israeli, Gilad Shalit?

 


Kilcullen, "The Accidental Guerrilla..." (2009)

Briefly explain what Kilcullen means by each:

What does seeing the problem in each of these ways suggest needs to be done to improve the advancement of U.S. interests?  Why?

Which of the 4 options above does Kilcullen suggest is the best way to understand the conflicts the U.S. finds itself in at the present time?

 


 

Nov. 7, 2012
 

"Managing the International System through Global Governance: Are old institutions worn out?"

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

Announcements:

 

Today's in-class presentation may contain (in its section on the evolution of the U.N.) materials about which Prof. Bowen published an article a few years back, "The U.N. and the Contemporary World Crisis" (2004).  

Comments on current events in world politics?

1. A point about the content today: PolS 310 International Organizations, is a whole course that addresses this topic. 

Discussion starters:

Diplomatic historians have yet to identify a single instance of interstate violence that actually was stopped by the United Nations.”

Michael J. Glennon, “The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law,” Foreign Affairs 78, 3 (May/June 1999): 3.

Institutions have mattered rather little in the past;… the false belief that institutions matter has mattered more, and has had pernicious effects.

John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, 3 (Winter 1994-95): 49. 

A lecture will likely address these points:

2. The Antecedents of Modern  International Organizations (I.O.s)

-intellectual roots: Hugo Grotius' thought : there ought to be a law!
-Three key 19th century developments:
  • Concert of Europe: establishes the principle of compromise in the settlement of disputes via I.O.s: multilateral decision viewed as key to managing Europe's interests as a whole.  The Concert may have been a "hegemony of the powerful," but it went beyond being mere war-ending “Peace Conferences” by seeking to manage problems by consultation.
  • Creation of Public International Unions: establishes the principle of cooperation on functional matters among states.  Common problems (rail gauges; telegraph; disease eradication; mail rates; etc.) produces common desire to solve problems.
  • Hague Conferences on international peace:  built on principle of equality of sovereign states; strove for universal participation (unlike the Concert of Europe).  Establishes the principal of regulation: rules need to be articulated in advance of crises so to solve disputes.

- The League of Nations was the first effort at establishing a universal body to preserve peace.  It faltered (1) when its membership proved to be less than comprehensive, (2) in its application of the principle of self-determination which was not uniform, and (3) in several cases (Northern China; Bolivia; Ethiopia) in which the idea of "collective security" (i.e., all states will join together to stop aggressor states) could not be realized.  While the goals pursued by the League were laudable, and endured as the prime focus of its successor (i.e., the United Nations), the remedies contemplated by the founders of the League proved too often to collide with the separate interests of important states.

3. International Organizations in Modern World Politics: the U.N.

3. International Organizations in Modern World Politics: Phases of the U.N. (overview)
 

The role of the U.N., an international organization created for the purpose of advancing peace, has evolved in distinct phases.  Each will be discussed below:
  1. Preservation of the Wartime Alliance
  2. American instrument for prosecuting the Cold War
  3. Preventative Diplomacy
  4. Developed vs Underdeveloped worlds
  5. Post Cold War Peace maker
Questions to consider in each era:

-what was the main focus of the organization in each era?

-who were the main actors in each era?

-to what degree did the U.N. contribute to international peace and stability in each era?


Phases of the U.N. (A 2004 article published by Prof. Bowen broadly parallel to the content that follows is linked here).

1. Preservation of the Wartime Alliance
 

The main foci of the organization was to:
 
-create U.N. institutions
-establish authority of U.N.
-preserve great power coalition
-stop wars when started by small nations
The main actors were:
-the members of the Security Council
-the great powers who operated outside the U.N. through collective security arrangements authorized under the Charter
The U.N. contributed to international peace and stability
-by providing a forum in which disputes could be aired.
-by exercising leadership in problems of de-colonization (e.g., Israel-Palestine)
 Phases of the U.N.
Phases of the U.N.

2. American instrument for prosecuting the Cold War, 1950-55
 

The main foci of the organization was to:
 
-legitimize U.S. actions to contain communism
The main actors were:
-the General Assembly, through "Uniting for Peace" resolution

-the members of the Security Council who operated outside of the Soviet veto in the case of communist aggression in Korea

-the U.S. who operated through the U.N. to carry out its containment policy
 
 

The U.N. contributed to international peace and stability
-by providing an enforcement mechanism against aggression in Korea

-by providing a mediation mechanism in other disputes



 
 Phases of the U.N.

3. Preventative Diplomacy, 1955-1973
 

The main foci of the organization was to:
 
-prevent crises from crossing into wars involving superpowers

-give legitimacy to the grievances of  the underdeveloped world

-deploy neutral peacekeepers to separate war weary combatants, so to give time for negotiated settlement of disputes  (e.g., Cyprus; Israel and Egypt)
 
 

The main actors were:
-the General Assembly, increasingly under the influence of neutral Third World states

-to the extent that superpowers acquiesced, the Security Council
 
 

The U.N. contributed to international peace and stability
-to help mediate cease fire agreements, e.g. Suez 1956

-by providing peacekeepers to serve as trip wires to notify the U.N. of  future conflicts



 
 Phases of the U.N.

4. Developed vs. Developing Worlds, 1973-90
 

The main foci of the organization was to:
 
-legitimize demands for a New International Economic Order, N.I.E.O.

-orchestrate anti-Western grievances of Third World states

-isolate unpopular states: South Africa, Israel
 
 

The main actors were:
-the General Assembly

-the functional agencies of the U.N., e.g. UNESCO

-the use of the veto by the USA
 
 

Did the U.N. contribute to international peace and stability?
-Yes: by facilitating negotiated settlements of conflicts, e.g. the Iran-Iraq war of 1981-88

-No: the Jeane Kirkpatrick thesis of U.N. as vehicle for "conflict extension"



Phases of the U.N.

5. The Post Cold War U.N. role as peace maker, 1990 onward
 

The main foci of the organization was to:
 
-authorize members to stop international aggression, e.g. the coalition vs. Iraq (1991), NATO (and others) to protect Libyan civilians by assisting in removal of the Gaddafi Government (2011)

-expand the definition of U.N. authority to include threats to the peace that arise within one nation, e.g. the protection of the Kurds of Iraq, or the Kosovars of Serbia-Yugoslavia, the Libyan people

-intervene to end humanitarian disasters, e.g. starvation due to conflict in Somalia (1992), government killing of civilians in Libya (2011)

-facilitate transitions to peace by dispatch of mediation teams, observer missions, and electoral monitors, e.g. Cambodia, El Salvador, Kosovo
 
 

The main actors were:
-the Security Council

-the members who operated through the U.N. to carry out its new policies

-new functional agencies designed to gird the peace promotion function, e.g. the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda; the International Criminal Court
 
 

Overall and review questions:

 


Questions on Mearsheimer:
 
What social factors make Americans especially likely to be convinced of the value of international institutions?

What, according to Mearsheimer, is the "downside" of policymakers following the guidance of international institution theories?

What is your affective response to the tone and content of this article?  Does that in itself tend to prove the thesis point of the author?

 


Announcement:

Sunday is Veterans' Day.  If this is treated as as usual, this important national holiday will have passed with too little attention given, which, in the view of your professor, will have been deplorable.  To remedy,

 


 


 

Nov. 12, 2012: topics/questions

 

Transnational Issues

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

 

  • In class today we will set our schedule for oral reports.  Please come prepared to pick a time to deliver your oral reports: either Monday Nov. 26, Wednesday Nov. 28, or Monday Dec. 3.

Class today included content on peacekeeping operations by the U.N., especially in Bosnia, 1992-95, and the relationship of that failure to the heavy emphasis the U.N. subsequently has placed on post-conflict justice processes carried out through conflict specific U.N. war crimes tribunals (e.g., the ICTY for Yugoslavia, and the ICTR for Rwanda) and carried out since 2002 through the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.).

Instructor's comment on the Beinart and other readings for today:  No doubt, questions on all today's readings will be asked in class, e.g. is it actually a true statement that Mingst leads chapter ten with: "Today, states are interconnected and interdependent to a degree never previously experienced."  But in the interest of being straight with my students, I am going to give out in advance my critique of this section of the text, and the concepts it introduces.

Professor Bowen is well aware that many people believe the topic about which Mingst presents content in this set of readings to be most illuminating, a veritable "new" key to understanding IR.  This, for example, is the position of NY Times reporter Thomas Friedman, whose several books harp incessantly on the theme that "globalization" has changed everything.  This perspective airs regularly on Friedman's program on the Discovery Times channel of cable television.  The reader interested in Friedman's ideas might turn to his 2005 best seller, The World is Flat: a brief history of the 21st century (follow this link to several reviews); or his influential The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000; follow this link to reviews).

However, Prof. Bowen disagrees with Friedman's argument and the thrust of globalization studies and globalization thinking by others, both in its specifics and in its broad contours.  Globalization solves no element of the "security dilemma" of states, and is no more an analytically useful concept for understanding international security issues than was "interdependence" thinking in the 1970s and 1980s. 

Indeed, if we are schooled in a still longer time frame, one is reminded of the faith vested in the power of similar economic variables to restrain states prior to World War I.  In what one critic (Peter Beinart) described as "perhaps the best-selling book on international relations ever written," The Great Illusion (1910), Nobel Peace Prize winner Norman Angell anticipated most of the main points of "globalization" thinking when he said:

"International finance has become so interdependent and so interwoven with trade and industry that... political and military power can in reality do nothing.... These little recognized facts, mainly the outcome of purely modern conditions (rapidity of communication creating a greater complexity and delicacy of the credit system) have rendered the problems of modern international politics profoundly different from the ancient."

That was one hundred plus years ago!  Four years before August 1914, four years before interdependent Europe, "globalized" or not, lurched into the most horrific war in human history to that date, that sort of fatuous nonsense charmed people.  Norman Angell and the globalizers of his age were wrong then; Thomas Friedman and the globalization theorists of our age today are wrong again: no amount of economic interdependence trumps the independent behavior of states, the influence of power on international relations, or the ultimate recourse to use military instruments to deal with their security dilemmas. 

For further reading, please see :


Keck and Sikkink, "Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics"

Under what conditions do advocacy networks arise?  Are the circumstances under which they can exercise influence on states fairly common or extraordinary?  Why?


Henry Kissinger, "The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction," Foreign Affairs (2001); pp 265-270 in Mingst/Snyder.

Who is the author?  With which school of thought in IR is he associated?

Without recognition of its irony, Kissinger wrote "...an excessive reliance on universal jurisdiction may undermine the political will to sustain the humane norms of interntional behavior so necessary to temper the violent times in which we live." (270)  Why is this ironic?

Kissinger writes of the danger of judicial "witch hunts."  Is this hyperbole, or have the ten years since he wrote this confirmed his dark fears?  (E.g., the Goldstone Report)

Kissinger played a major role in the 1975 treaty known as the Helsinki Final Act, which obligated signatory states to comply with human rights standards.  How is this different from "universal jurisdiction"? (266)

What does the author (266-267) think of the precedent set by the 16 month detention in Britain in 1998 of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet on an extradition request by a Spanish judge?  How was this case resolved by Chile removal in August 2000 of Pinochet's immunity from prosecution under Chilean laws?

Kissinger argues (268-269) that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia weighed complaints against NATO (and by extension, against its member states' governments) in regard to its bombing of Kosovo, and by so doing implied that it was within the jurisdiction and "responsibilities" of that court to investigate and potentially file criminal charges against such officials.   If future national courts attempt to follow up on this, how does the doctrine of "universal jurisdiction" influence this?

How does the 1982 sinking of the Argentine battleship General Belgano impact doctrine of "universal jurisdiction"?

 


 

Kenneth Roth, "The case for universal jurisdiction,"Foreign Affairs (2001); pp 270-274 in Mingst/Snyder

Who is this author?  With which school of thought in IR is this argument associated?

Before Sept. 11, 2001, Roth contended that "As a nation committed to human rights and the rule of law, the United States should be embracing an international system of justice, even if it means that Americans, like everyone else, might sometimes be scrutinized." 

Given what has happened since then 9/11, do you think most Americans would support a system in which American soldiers, intelligence operatives, and government officials "might sometimes be scrutinized" by foreign nations' courts?  Why or why not?

Roth suggests that Kissinger offers an "alternative ... little better than a return to impunity."  Evaluate this contention.

Roth cites the 1975 Helsinki Treaty, the 1984 Torture Convention, and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 as international agreements that the U.S. ratified and which contain elements of universal jurisdiction within them.  Is this a complete presentation of the U.S. position on universal jurisdiction?  E.g., how did the arrest, conviction and detention of former Panama president Manuel Noriega occur? (272)  Do you think considerations such as these may have contributed to the methods used in bringing the life of Mohamar Gaddafi to an end in 2011?

 


 

Kenneth A. Rodman, "Is Peace in the interests of Justice?..." (Re: the Charles Taylor case)

The author writes of the "tenuousness of peace without justice" (279).  Evaluate where you think the emphasis properly ought to be put.

Tensions exist between what is necessary to bring conflicts to an end, and what is necessary to insure that the fighting of conflicts not be done in such a way as to violate laws of war and human rights.  Where does Rothman's argument come down on this dividing line?

How does "broad prosecutorial discretion" contribute to peace and justice, in Rothman's view?

Did the 1995 indictment of Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic by the ICTY undermine, advance, or have no impact on peace processes? (278)   Why?

Is the pursuit of peace and justice in Sierra Leone / Liberia a special case, or is it representative of a broader trend?  If it is a trend, do U.S. interests lie in advancing or retarding this trend?  Why?

 

 


 

Nov. 14, 2012 topics/questions

Humanitarian Intervention: Rwanda, Libya and Syria

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that were projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

Announcements. 

Students interested in learning background facts about other cases related to today's topic are referred to

Agenda:

1. Comments on current events in world politics?


2. Before class read Mingst/Snyder articles by Power and by Fortna.

The student also might reconsider the arguments made earlier by Luttwak in the context of this set of readings.


Questions on Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide:... Rwanda" (2001)

Why was there a U.N. Peacekeeping Mission in Rwanda in the first place in the early 1990s?

Does anything about the Rwanda case suggest that new norms for states' actions are evolving when human rights are in danger?  What are the barriers to effective multilateralism?

Is Maj. Gen. Romeo Dallaire a hero, or one of the parties responsible for the disaster?  Why?

Assess the behavior of the United States: did specific Americans behave in a manner worthy of our country, or were they all louts?


Massimo Calebresi, "Hillary Clinton and the Rise of Smart Power," Time 178, 18 (Nov. 7, 2011).

What are the main elements of "smart power"?

How essential are allies to this form of humanitarian intervention?

What role was played by formal international organizations such as the U.N. Security Council and NATO in the Libyan intervention?

Are the methods used in Libya applicable to Syria?  If so, why have they not been so applied?


 

Virginia Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Work?" (2008). 

Fortna said: "peacekeeping is an extremely effective policy tool" (228) to keep civil wars from recurring, but does "not necessarily [leave] more democratic societies in its wake." 

Per "Democratic Peace" theory, and given what we know about the long term prospects of peace without democracy, is this outcome sufficient?  And, gven what we observed about Bosnia in our class meeting on Nov. 7, does Fortna's conclusion even seem reasonable? 

Fortna wrote: "Peacekeeping missions should establish a formal mechanism for handling disputes over compliance.  This gives both sides an alternative to, on the one hand, doing nothing in the face of perceived violations by their antagonists, and on the other hand, responding in kind and risking escalation." (230) 

How, if at all, does this insight help us better to understand the situations that unfolded amid a U.N. peacekeeping operation in Rwanda? 

Would any "formal mechanism" be more capable than the U.N. Security Council was at that time?  Is the real problem a lack of "formal mechanisms," or lack of political will to intervene within the members of that Council?  

 


Mon. Nov. 19, 2012:

Can we solve, or only manage, international problems?

Before class, do all readings on the course syllabus and note them carefully.

Class agenda/notes/questions that would have been projected on the screen in class today will be linked here after class.

Announcements related to the course: 

 

 

Before class review our earlier reading by Kant (in Mingst/Snyder, 12-15); and read Hardin, and Snyder and Vinjamuri; and Sharansky (online).


Kant:

To what extent does Kant agree with Hobbes about Man's nature?

Where do their thoughts diverge?

What does Kant mean by republican principles?

Why do republican principles within states guide us to a formula for changing states' external behaviors?

Is this the same argument as made on behalf of universal international law?

How does Kant then believe peace can emerge?

Is NATO a Kantian "league"?


Garrett Hardin (1968):

What is "the tragedy of the Commons"?

Is this insight still cogent?  Why or why not?


Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, "Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of International Justice," International Security 28, 3 (Winter 2003/04):  Here the general topic is what brings about peace and the rule of law after the fighting stops; and the specific focus is on the utility, or lack thereof, of trials, amnesties, and Truth Commissions in the case of gross violations of human rights.  One school of thought in IR analysis, the Constructivists, argue that new norms against these scourges are "cascading" forward, transforming the way people and governments not only think but act.  These two authors evaluate whether these claims of the constructivists are borne out by the evidence since the end of the Cold War.

General issues raised in the article include:

Why, according to the authors, are trials of human rights violators sometimes unwise if future violations are to be prevented?  Under what conditions are trials both possible and prudent?

What types of conditions led the authors to contend that amnesties “can be an indispensable tool in reaching peace settlements” (610) ?  What has limited their effectiveness as a tool to promote the rule of law?  In this context, what is a “de facto” amnesty?

The authors suggest that "a strategy ...[of] prosecution of perpetrators of atrocities.... risks casuing more atrocities than it would prevent, because it pays insufficient attention to political realities."  What are the major points of evidence used in making this controversial reading?

Which policy, in the view of the authors, is most effective in most places in deterring future gross violations of human rights?  Do you agree or disagree with their analysis?  Why?

Specific positions taken by the authors that address materials encountered elsewhere in our course:

The authors contend "the democratization and pacification of the Yugoslav successor states likely occurred despite the tensions provoked by the tribunal, and not because of it." (602)  "Rather than individualizing guilt, the ICTY seems to have reinforced ethnic cleavages." (603)   "The deterrent effect of the ICTR has likewise been unimpressive." (604)  Assess these statements: was sound evidence presented supporting them?

Other major ideas in the article include:

  • the tension between the "logic of appropriateness" versus "a prudent logic of consequences"
  • the role played by prosecutorial discretion


Sharansky: (hear a tape of Sharansky on these topics by following this link)

Sharansky believes U.S. policy helped force democracy onto Soviet Russia in the 1980s, and that similar techniques should have been used to promote democracy in the Arab world of the 2000s. 

  • What were, and are, these techniques? 
  • Have they been tried? 
  • Could these ideas have been made more central to U.S. policy in light of developments since this interview in 2004?   
  • Should they have been?  Why or why not?

Beyond simply holding elections, what does Sharansky think is needed in order to get in place regimes committed to peace in the Middle East?  Do the changes emerging in the "Arab Spring" give promise to achieve these conditions, or has the "Arab Spring" been a setback for these types of changes?
 


 

Mon. Nov. 26, and Wed. Nov. 28, and Mon. Dec. 3: Student Oral Reports on Term Papers.

Schedule of Oral Reports Nov. 26: (to be determined):

Schedule of Oral Reports Nov. 28: (to be determined):

 

Schedule of Oral Reports Dec. 3: (to be determined):

 


Dec. 5, 2012 : topics/questions.  Concluding the course, reviewing for the final exam.

Announcements:  Typed Term Papers Are Due at start of class on Wed. Dec. 5, 2012

Discussion questions on Sen in Mingst/Snyder:

Does building a world in which human rights and democracy are international norms constitute building a "Westernized" world?  Would such a world be inconsistent with the local customs and inalienable right of self determination of non-Western peoples?  What does Sen say on these matters?

Is Westernization the solution to international conflict?  Why or why not?

Has Pres. Obama embraced or abandoned the idea that peace in the U.S. is bound up with the type of civil society that Afghanistan becomes?


 

 

Final Examination: Monday December 10 through Friday December 14:  The PolS 221 Final Exam is a comprehensive exam.  It may be taken during any of the scheduled test taking periods between these dates, only.  Bring a Blue Book / Green Book test taking booklet to the exam and write your essay answers within it.

 

 


This page last updated May 25, 2012


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