PolS 311: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Gordon L. Bowen, Ph.D., Professor of Political Science, Mary Baldwin College Staunton VA 24401

gbowen@mbc.edu

this webpage last updated Wednesday, December 16, 2009

Daily Class Notes and Questions

Jan. 12 topics

 Jan. 14 topics/questions Jan. 19 topics/questions Jan. 21 topics/questions

Jan. 26 topics/questions

 Jan. 28 topics/questions Feb. 2 topics/questions Feb. 4 topics/questions
Feb. 9 topics/questions Feb. 11 topics/questions Feb. 16 topics/questions Feb. 18 topics/questions

Feb. 23 topics/questions

 March 9 topics/questions March 11 topics/questions March 16 topics/questions

March 18 topics/questions

 March 23 topics/questions March 25 topics/questions
March 30 topics/questions.

April 1 topics/questions

 April 6 topics/questions April 8: oral reports  April 13: oral reports

April 15: oral reports, review

Prof. Bowen's inclement weather policy: If the College is open, class will occur; if the College is closed, class is cancelled.  To learn if the College is closed on any snowy/icy day, call 540-887-7000.  Any exception to the statement above will be posted here.

Jan. 12, 2009:

History of Terrorism Fact: This week in 1998, Ramzi Yousef was sentenced to life in prison plus 240 years for his role in the first bombing of the World Trade Center (1993)

PolS 311: First class overview:   Agenda projected onto the screen during class today is now available; follow this link.

1. Introductions to the course: please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

2. Personal Introductions

3. content: "The State System and the Role of Non-State Actors in International Relations"

1. Explanation of Course, advanced level special topic, intended student clientele, policies and requirements, read the syllabus

 

-Basics: Attendance Policy, Need for Oral participation if a semblance of a seminar style is going to work

-Course content and goals

-Evaluation formula:

oral participation including oral report on term paper...20%

Quizzes...20%

Midterm examination...20%

Final Exam ...20%

Term Paper... 20%

2. Personal Introductions

Photos will be taken for Seating Chart

Personal Introductions

- Student introductions: name, hometown, major, class level, foreign travel, internships, summer work, related courses, etc.

- Prof. Bowen's introduction

3. Lecture: "The State System and the Role of Non-State Actors in International Relations"

Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (of the Rand Corporation, a Santa Monica, CA think tank, at the time; now of Georgetown University) once wrote:

"The global security environment has changed.  No longer does ideology dictate superpower confrontation.  No longer do the superpowers and their surrogates compete for the world's allegiance and resources.  No longer do realist and idealist theories based on sovereign state behavior and state interaction provide satisfactory frameworks for discussing American and international security.  Nowadays failed, failing, and rogue states and transnational actors are our chief security concerns." 

Major points: 

 

 

 

Jan. 14, 2009:

Defining Terrorism; and the Contemporary Threat 

History of Terrorism fact of the day:  While Americans widely believe that the world sympathized with them after the attacks of September 11, 2001, in fact the attacks were celebrated widely in the Muslim world.  See picture above, or examine this arresting September 2008 public opinion poll on the matter of who committed the attack of 9/11.  (Many other polls on related topics are linked here).

  • On this date in 2004 at the Erez crossing between Gaza and Israel, the first female suicide bomber from HAMAS killed four and wounded 10 as she killed herself.

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.  I.e.: 

Class will discuss the assigned readings.  

Supplemental (optional) experiences and readings:

Questions from required Readings:  

Hoffman:

Lowther:

Ahmad:

Stapley:

 

 

 

Jan. 19, 2009: 

History of Terrorism Facts: This week in 2002, Palestinian militia leader Ra'id al-Karni was killed by an Israeli bomb outside his home in the West Bank.  On Jan. 18, 1982, American University in Beirut President Malcolm Kerr was assassinated by Islamic Jihad gunmen.

topics/questions: Arab anger and modern terrorism, part one

Follow up to course discussion on Jan. 14 about the conflict in Gaza: a good background story on the Druse of Israel, a Muslim minority, and their service in the Israel Defense Forces has come to my attention.  Larry Derfner, "Covenant of blood," Jerusalem Post (Jan. 15, 2009) now is linked here.

 

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.  While all assignments should be read, we will start with focus on:

Agenda: Class notes projected onto the screen today now are accessible: follow this link. During class, we discussed Makiya, and watched a film about the life of Osama bin Laden (Dr. Bowen's tape #75, originally broadcast on The History Channel, March 28, 2005).  Several points made in the film bear reiteration, including the family's humble background in Yemen, its ties to the ruling House of Saud in Saudi Arabia that produced great wealth for the bin Ladens, the prestigious role the bin Ladens played in the renovations of the holy sites of Islam, and the sources of Osama's estrangement from his family and the state of his birth.  Students first were introduced to the jihad against the Soviet Union in this film, and the mingling of U.S. policies with the migration of Muslim mujihideen to Afghanistan during the 1980's was established.  Also of some importance was the prominent role of the city of Peshawar, Pakistan in the 1980's war as a staging area and as a refugee center.  While this was briefly touched upon be alert to the appearance of Peshawar as a continuing hub of jihadist activities down to the present.  Notably, the film mentioned ties between Al Qaeda to the persons who committed the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New York (1993).  This fact is of greater significance than it was given: the leader of the 1993 bombings was (and is) the nephew of Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, the operational planner of 9.11.  Moreover, ties among non-Al Qaeda Muslim jihadists to Al Qaeda operations will be shown later in the course to be a key dimension of the contemporary terrorism problem.  Thus, it is of importance to show that this always has been the case and is not new.  The film also responded to errors of fact found in earlier readings: it addressed the fact of bin Laden's indictment by a U.S. Court prior to the 1998 Al Qaeda bombings in East Africa, a fact that undermines one of the claims made by author Eqbal Ahmad, whom we read for Jan. 14 (i.e., the faulting of the U.S. for not seeking criminal arrest of bin Laden).  Of somewhat lesser importance is the claim made in the film that Osama fashions himself as a modern Saladin.  On this historic figure, see below:

Insights into the geography of terrorism: an occasional feature of the PolS 311 daily notes, occasionally interesting.

The odd coincidences of history:  Two places, Qom, Iran and Tikrit, Iraq, come up a lot when thinking of the history of anti-Western terrorism. 

Qom is where the Order of the Assassins began in the eleventh century.  Hassan I Sabah, founder of the order, was born in Qom.  Walter Laqueur (1999: 11) explains:

"Sabah adopted an extreme form of Ismaili doctrine that called for the seizure of several mountain fortresses; the first such fortress, Alamut, was seized in 1090.  Years later the Assassins decided to transfer their activities from remote mountain regions to the main urban centers.  Their first urban victim was the chief minister of the Sultan of Baghdad, Nazim al Mulq, a Sunnite by religious persuasion and therefore an enemy.  During the years that followed, Assassins were active in Persia, Syria, and Palestine, killing a great number of enemies, mainly Sunnis but also Christians, including Count Raymond II of Tripoli in Syria and Marquis Conrad of Montferrat, who ruled the kingdom of Jerusalem...[who] was killed by a small group of emissaries who had disguised themselves as monks.   Seen in retrospect, the impact of the Assassins was small -- they did not make many converts outside their mountain fortress, nor did they produce any significant changes in Muslim thought or practice.  Alamut was occupied by Mongol invaders around 1270, but the Assassins had ceased to be a major force well before then. (Their main contribution was perhaps originating the strategy of the terrorist disguised -- taqfir, or deception-- as a devout emissary but in fact on a suicide mission, in exchange for which he was guaranteed the joys of paradise)." (emphasis by Prof. Bowen)

Qom also was the home of Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the 1978-79 Iranian Revolution.  It long has remained a center of Shi'ite religious training, and remains this.  Until the dawn of the new millennium, no modern person did more to rekindle animosities between Shi'ites and Sunnis, and between followers of Islam and the West.

 

two pictures of the late Ruhollah Khomeini 

Tikrit is the home town of Saladin, leader of the Arab armies who defeated the Second Crusade.  Tikrit also was the home of (the late) Saddam Hussein, ruler of Iraq, 1978-2003.  Hussein was captured by U.S. armed forces just a few miles outside Tikrit, in December 2003.  Tikrit remains home to many with kinship ties to him even today, and is one of many centers of violent opposition to the current American role in Iraq.

   

Two images of Saladin

Questions on / foci for study of Makiya:

Arrestingly, Makiya suggests (160) that it is "a world whose own failures are responsible for creating bin Laden in the first place..."

To what "failures," in what "world," and by whom, is Makiya referring?

Recount the main events in the life of Mohammed Atta, and of Ziad Jarrah.

Makiya suggests that "normal, ordinary people perpetrated September 11" (140-141) and that it was not "the tenets of their religion" that inclined them to such "horrific and bestial" behavior.  If so, what did so incline them?

What does he mean by Arabs' "inner defeat"?   What caused this "complex of victim-hood... that is applicable to one degree or another to all peoples of the Middle East" (144)?

Who (or what) does he blame for "a vacuum that was increasingly filled by a conspiratorial view of history" (143-144) among modern Muslim youth?

What difference did it make, according to Makiya, that all the " 'isms'... had hit the dust" (151) by our contemporary times?

Does it point to a meaningful difference when Makiya contrasts the backgrounds of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri as "a very far cry" different when compared with the backgrounds of Arafat, Hussein, Gadhafi, and Assad? (155)

How does "purity" figure in Wahhabism, and in the thought of Osama (according to Makiya)?

Questions on Cronin:

Cronin writes: "Analyzing terrorism as something separate from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous." What does she mean, and in light of what you have learned from reading Makiya, do you agree?

To what extent, if any, do different rates of national development in the State of Israel and in  the Palestinian Authority shape the political choice to engage in suicide / homicide bombing?

What roles does Cronin contend have been played by ____  in the emergence of contemporary terrorism:

  • struggles to end imperial "empires"
  • struggles for self-determination and against colonialism
  • the internationalization of terrorism that occurred in the 1970s and 1980s
  • the revival of religion as a political force
  • the lowering of barriers to commerce, trade, and the flow of ideas in the modern age

Makiya reminded us that Saudi Arabia never was colonized: does that point diminish to any degree the argument made above by Cronin?  Why or why not?

What do these two authors think of the effectiveness of a counter-terrorism policy based on ending the "state based power" from which terrorism arises?  

To what extent does the present situation in Iraq confirm Cronin's views?  ... does... Afghanistan?

 

 

 

Jan. 21, 2009

History of Terrorism facts:

  • On this date in 2003, a gunman ambushed a U.S. vehicle in Kuwait, near Camp Doha, killing one contractor and wounding another.
  • This week in 1991, the air war phase of Operation Desert Storm began the first U.S. war against Iraq, a chief sponsor of international terrorism at the time.

topics/questions: Where shall we look to find the problem? Facilitators of modern terrorism

Announcements: Materials (with the exception of PowerPoint slides) projected onto the screen during class today now are available: follow this link.

Term Paper Ideas:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.  Additionally,

Questions on / foci for study of Bowen, "Measuring the Enemy: Social Support for Islamist Terrorism" in Lowther and Lindsay, pp 32-59 (2009):

How has support for the goals of Al Qaeda evolved since 9/11?  Has it largely gone up, or gone down?

Is support for Islamists' terrorism principally an Arab problem, or is it a trans-national, trans-regional Islamism problem: 

  • To what extent is support for extremism and terrorism primarily a problem among Arabs, only? 

  • To what extent is support for extremist ideals and terrorism found in non-Arab Muslim populations?

Evaluate the claim made by the author that the "significant minorities" who support Al Qaeda and/or jihadist violence are more important than majority opinions against Al Qaeda or against terrorism.

Questions on Takeyh and Gvosdev, "Do terrorist networks need a home?" in Howard and Sawyer, pp 79-87 (2002):

According to the authors, how are terrorist networks similar to international business organizations?  Does this make them fundamentally different from earlier political organizations?  How?

What do the authors contend on each issue: 

  • Do governments create environments that sustain terrorist networks?  Who? 
  • Or is it that lack of governance allows for terrorist networks to thrive?  Exemplify.
  • What are some of the failed states that the authors mention?  Do these each still facilitate terror networks?
  • How do failed states provide terror groups more than the anonymity to hide in scattered safe houses?
  • What roles do human smuggling and drug trafficking play in this?

Should the nominal sovereignty of what are in fact "failed states" be respected by other states, or is it fair game to conduct anti-terrorism operations on their soil without regard to the preferences of the ostensible government?

In 2002, the authors wrote (p. 82) that "the U.S. and its allies has been largely successful so far in destroying Al Qaeda's infrastructure on Afghan territory."  Is this a dated statement?  Why or why not?

How does the problem of "de facto statelets" figure in the anti-terrorism strategy of the U.S.?  Of Russia?  Is there any solution to these areas across Southeastern Europe and Central Asia?

What is nation building?  What position do the authors take about "nation building" as a bulwark against terrorism?  Why is the U.S. military less enthusiastic than are the authors?

Questions on Patrick, "Weak States and Global Threats: fact or fiction?" in Howard and Sawyer, pp 88-111 (2006):

What are "weak and failed states"?  Has their role in facilitating terrorism been exaggerated as it concerns U.S. national security? 

Are the weak states that incubate terrorism also the poorest states?  If not, then why do policymakers pursue economic development as a solution to terrorism? 

Are there particular regions in which weak/failed states should be of particular concern to U.S. national security?  Which ones does Patrick identify?  Are these identical, or even substantially similar, to those identified by Takeyh and Gvosdev?  What can account for their differing foci?

Patrick (94) wrote: "In other words, weak and failing states can provide useful assets to transnational terrorists, but they may be less central to their operations than widely believed."  Evaluate his reasons for arguing this.

Consider these points made by Patrick:

"When states do not meet basic social needs, they provide openings for charitable organizations or educational systems linked to radical networks" (95).  Evaluate.

Patrick suggested (95) that Pakistan (a weak state) and Saudi Arabia (a not weak state) each impede the struggle against transnational terrorism.  He suggests that we need to distinguish between a state's capacity to perform comprehensive counter-terrorism tasks and a state's will to do so.  Evaluate which factor most is missing in these cases.

Who is Abdul Qadeer Khan?  What does his case show us about the importance of poor versus middle level countries in regard to threats to U.S. national security?

 

 

 

 

Jan. 26, 2009

History of Terrorism facts:

  • This week in 1999, France sentenced to eight years in prison eight leaders of the Algeria-based terrorist group known as the G.I.A.

  • On Jan. 25, 1993, Mir Amal Kansi killed two and wounded three more in an attack on CIA personnel outside CIA headquarters in McLean, VA.

topics/questions: Suicide / Martyrdom Terrorism, part 1

Announcements:  

 

In class film: “The Suicide Bombers: Cult of Death” (Discovery Channel, 2005).  CIA veteran Robert Baer presents his thesis on why, when, and how "martyrdom operations" evolved into their modern form.

Discussion will be brief today, and more extensive on Wednesday.  Focus on the film’s thesis about the origins of, and nature of suicide terrorism. As we view the film, students should compare the film’s thesis to those offered by Hoffman, and Crenshaw, and be prepared to discuss similarities and differences in these several perspectives in light of what we have seen in recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Supplemental (optional) readings on this topic:

 

Jan. 28, 2009 topics/questions

History of Terrorism facts:

  • This week in 1987, four Americans were abducted by terrorists in Beirut: Allen Steen, Jesse Turner, Robert Polhill, and Mithileshwar Singh.

  • On Jan. 27, 2002, a female suicide bomber from Fatah killed herself and one Israeli, and injured 150 others, in an attack in Jerusalem.

Suicide / Martyrdom Terrorism, part 2

Materials projected onto the screen during class today now are available: follow this link.

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Announcements: 

Follow ups about the content in class on Mon. Jan. 26:

Viewing the film “Suicide Bombers: The Cult of Death” (Discovery Channel, 2005), one could get the impression that Israel is under constant siege by terrorist bombings.  From Prof. Bowen's study of this issue, he argues that this impression is a myth.  Many of the figures he has on this cannot be cited due to the confidential terms under which the statistics on this were provided to him by well informed Israelis.  But some evidence to support the view that the problem has waned in recent years has been made public, and it is to be found on this chart.  Only 6 suicide attacks occurred February 2005-January 2006, and their were fewer in 2006, 2007, and 2008.  While this is six more suicide attacks than most of us would prefer to see there or anywhere, one attack every other month (approximately) is hardly a siege, and compares quite favorably to the average week in Baghdad. 

Specific updates regarding the film:  “Suicide Bombers: The Cult of Death” (Discovery Channel, 2005): 

  • The author of the film we viewed actually overstated how many attacks have occurred in Israel:  more suicide / martyrdom attacks were targeted on U.S. forces in Iraq in May 2005 alone than had targeted Israel in the entire period of suicide bombing there to that moment (i.e., in the 11 years down to May 2005).  Source:  International Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Jihad: Change and Continuation," Strategic Comments 11, 7 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, September 2005).  That study is annotated in the Supplemental online materials for this course: follow this link to read Professor Bowen's annotation there about that study.  A link to the website where the original study can be found also is provided there.

Editorial aside by your professor on today's topic:

  • Suicide attacks do not occur in a vaccum.  States respond to them (and so do pundits).  Several years ago, Prof. Bowen discussed the controversial assassination of the leader of Hamas, Sheik Yassin, by Israel in March 2004.  Follow this link to my Weblog entry of January 16, 2004.  The commentary I made the day after Yassin was killed also is to be found there, in my entry of March 22, 2004.  Additionally, on March 23, 2004, I published an editorial defending the killing of Yassin.

  • Not all Americans or Westerners, of course, favor taking direct action against those who send forth suicide / homicide terrorists.  Some apologize for them, some even praise them (e.g., UK House of Lords member Jenny Tonge), and others have reacted by seeking face-to-face audiences with terrorists in order to engage them.  E.g., paid representatives of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. (i.e.: the national organization affiliated with this College) publicly met with leaders of Hezbollah in Fall 2004, meetings which had Church officials appearing on the propaganda television station of Hezbollah, Al-Manar TV of Lebanon, which was the television propaganda arm of Hezbollah that was mentioned in the film.  Those shocking meetings and appearances occurred and have been acknowledged by the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A.  On three occasions in Prof. Bowen's weblog (Nov. 15, 2004, Nov. 17, 2004, Feb. 24, 2005) and in a published editorial on these matters, I have summarized the pertinent facts related to these shocking events.  In fairness, it must also be said that the Church employment of the employee who organized these meetings was ended shortly after they occurred in Fall 2004.  However much this may make it appear that the Presbyterian Church, USA has distanced itself from Hezbollah and its tactics of suicide / martyrdom bombing, that same Presbyterian national organization also officially in 2004 condemned, and has since repeatedly affirmed its condemnation of, the erection of the Security barriers by Israel (which more aptly should be called a fence).  These walls and fences protect Israelis from infiltration by suicide bombers, and I support building them as a legitimate act of self defense.  The Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. apparently would prefer a more vulnerable Israel. 

In the Bowen weblog some time ago I revealed a further chapter in the misguided pattern of fawning over Hezbollah terrorists engaged in by the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., i.e.: the national religious organization affiliated with this College. 

As recently as January 26, 2009, the official website of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. continued to proudly display this disturbingly anti-Israel resolution: follow this link to see it.  In 2006. Presbyterianism-central continued to pose as holier than thou, reproducing on their website grossly one sided condemnations (since removed) of Israel's role in Lebanon in 2006 without the slightest effort to report that armed terrorists from Lebanon precipitated the 2006 war there by crossing the recognized Lebanon-Israel border, killing and kidnapping Israeli soldiers.  Not one word calling for the release of those kidnapped Israelis appeared, even as the official website of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. posed piously, advocating an alternative policy they label "peace making," but which Prof. Bowen would label Appeasing Terrorists.

Yet, along with other offensive measures, it is this security barrier that Prof. Bowen contends has done most to reduce the number of successful suicide bomb attacks on Israel: follow this link to read a chart from the Washington Post that presents evidence that tends to support this interpretation.  I cannot explain why the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. opposes this effective measure against suicide / martyrdom terrorism, nor why this College remains mute on the matter of the outrageous positions taken on these matters by the Presbyterian Church, USA.

Class today will discuss the film: “Suicide Bombers: The Cult of Death” (Discovery Channel, 2005), which was viewed earlier. 

Discussion then will engage issues raised by Moghadam regarding the evolution of suicide terrorism.  This should prepare us to compare and evaluate the film’s thesis about the origins of, and nature of suicide terrorism. Students should prepare to be able to compare the film’s thesis to those offered by Hoffmann and Crenshaw, and be prepared to discuss similarities and differences in these several perspectives.

Before class read all items for today (i.e., same assignments as for Jan. 26).  We are likely to begin with Moghadam, as his research is an overview of differing explanations, whereas the other readings fall broadly into one of the approaches he identifies:

Questions from Moghadam (2007): "The evolution of suicide terrorism and its implications for research"

Periodizing suicide terrorism.  Moghadam suggests suicide terrorism has been around for a long time, and breaks it into three periods: ancient times to the early 1980's, early 1980's to 1998, 1998 to the present. 

What is "Salafi-Jihadist ideology"?  What unique contributions has this school of thought brought to suicide terrorism?

Schools of thought about suicide terrorism:

Questions from Crenshaw:  

She argues that "terrorism is assumed to display a collective rationality".   What does this mean?  Do you agree?  If so, does that necessarily mean that the actions of Al Qaeda are rational?

If something is rational, does that mean that it must be accepted as legitimate?  Why or why not?

Do all revolutionary and/or nationalist organizations seeking radical change resort to terrorism?  Why or why not?

Who was Sean MacStiofain?  What is the importance of his innovative idea of the "one shot sniper"?

What were the two "innovations" in terrorism in 1968?  Why might that moment have been a particularly fertile opportunity for terrorists to turn in new directions?

What is "the power to hurt"?  Why is the taking of hostages a potent form of it?  What calculations affect the release of hostages?

What counter-terrorism strategy does Crenshaw suggest will be most effective against suicide / martyrdom terrorism? 

Questions from Hoffman (2003): "The logic of suicide terrorism."

What is the "smile of joy" in regard to suicide terrorism?

How does living under a siege of suicide terrorism alter life?  How do these responses conform to the expectations of the strategists behind a terrorist campaign?

What does the experience of Israel teach us about the assumption that suicide campaigns are launched out of desperation by poor, miserable people who have few other options?

Why are "handlers" and "minders" necessary in this dirty business? 

Hoffman quotes an Israeli officer as saying "We try to make certain that we fight on their ground... We are now bringing the war to them."  Has this approach worked (follow this link to the Washington Post's 2004 suicide bombings chart)? 

Has this strategic approach been imitated by the U.S. since 9.11?

What counter-terrorism strategy does Hoffman infer will be most effective against suicide / martyrdom terrorism? 

Questions from Kennedy and Homant (2008), "A Social Psychological Perspective on Terrorist Behavior,” :

The authors are essentially dealing with the question "are they nuts?"  In reviewing literature about the psychological health of Islamist extremists (and some others), what is their overall answer?  What qualifications do they make in being less than totally categorical?

In what circumstances do the authors suggest that "routine processes present in social interaction, especially group dynamics, can be sufficient for converting an otherwise psychologically healthy person into a terrorist, including the 9/11 bombers as well as suicide terrorists in general, whether or not motivated by a religious ideology" (167).

What are the strengths and limitations of the authors' concept of "cultural neurosis?"  Why do you think some people might resist this notion?

The authors blandly state (150): "Islamist terrorism is rooted in a number of religious beliefs."  Is this a social scientific observation, or a form of racism?

Summarize what the Milgram and Asch studies tell us in general, and about terrorists in particular.

Additional questions from Atran (optional reading):

Atran subscribes to the "rational" interpretation of suicide / martyrdom terrorism, but emphasizes that religion is less fully an explanation than do some other authors.

Does Atran's account of the origins of suicide terrorism differ from that offered in the film?

What counter-terrorism strategy does Atran suggest will be most effective against suicide / martyrdom terrorism? 

 

 

 

Feb. 2, 2009: topics / questions

History of Terrorism fact:

  • This week in 2004, in Jerusalem Hills, a bomb planted on an Israeli public bus by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade killed 10 and injured 50.

  • Also, on Feb. 1, 2004, in Iraq Ansar al-Sunna attacks Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, killing 117 and wounding 221.  

 topics / questions: Netwar: The New Terrorism Model

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Announcements:

  • The extent of Muslims' support for jihadist terrorism will remain an important focus throughout the course.  This is a matter of global significance, not just a regional issue relevant to the politics of Egypt or Pakistan alone, as Gunaratna will argue in today's readings.  As several authors in our course contend, Europe is a key venue in the conflict. To understand this better, one first must be convinced that the problem is real.   In January 2007, a study of British Muslims' attitudes about this topic was released, and it largely supports the thesis that it is a growing problem in the West.  It makes sobering reading.  Here is a key chart from it, but I recommend the whole study: "Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism"; it is worth reading in its entirety.
  • In preparing for today's class, interested students may also wish to read the Terrorist Training Manual and other documents seized in Manchester, UK, to which Brig. Gen. Howard refers.  If that link at the Australian Armed Forces goes dead (as it might), the manual can always be found on this website maintained by your Professor, Dr. Bowen.

Our Day's readings:

  • John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, from "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," in Ian O. Lesser, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism (RAND Corporation, 1999), in Howard and Sawyer, pp 134-157.
  • Russell D. Howard, “The New Terrorism,” (2007), in Howard and Sawyer, pp 112-133.
  • Rohan Gunaratna, “Defeating Al Qaeda—The Pioneering Vanguard of the Islamic Movements,” Washington Quarterly (2007) in Howard, et. al., Chapter 3, Article 3.

In others' words: The topic of today's class --what to do about "netwar" terrorism-- is one of the subjects addressed in an April 2005 study from the Atlantic Council of the United States.  It contains the following thought provoking statement in its discussion of how better to coordinate U.S., European, and Russian policy responses to terrorism:

"... terrorism itself seems to be evolving, as more connections develop between traditional 'nationalist' terrorist groups and global terrorist networks. Terrorism is increasingly characterized by decentralized networks that allow maximum flexibility in operations. Different nodes of the network may have considerable autonomy, and destroying one cell — or even several — may not affect operations planned by another. Even a global terrorist network such as al-Qaeda may find it convenient to cooperate with international criminal networks or with traditional nationalist terrorist groups, such as the IRA or ETA, especially in weapons smuggling, training, and various criminal activities designed to provide financial support. Changes in the nature of terrorism are happening so rapidly that analysts must constantly rethink their conclusions about terrorist operations and the threats they represent. This convergence of views about the nature of terrorism has not, however, led to a consensus over the most appropriate way to respond to that threat. Differences reflect the complexity of the terrorist threat, but also grow out of the distinct experiences the United States, Europe, and Russia have had with terrorism and the different capabilities each can bring to bear. Responses can be divided into three distinct elements, not all of which are equally accepted in importance among the U.S., Russian, and European governments: protection of domestic society, penetration and defeat of the terrorist groups, and the pursuit of political steps to divorce terrorists from their broader base of support."
 

The whole of the study makes interesting points.  Given the high public hopes that accompany the inauguration of more engaging qualities to U.S. foreign policy in the Obama Administration, student study and thought about the role alliances and allies have played, and can play, in the Global War on Terrorism is especially timely.

Questions on Arquilla et. al. (John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, from "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," in Ian O. Lesser, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism, RAND Corporation, 1999)

What is “Netwar”?  Why do these authors regard it as both new and of increasing importance?

Who is involved in it?

How does it differ from “cyber war”?

What roles do old techniques of asymmetrical conflict play in “netwar”?

How has “netwar” affected Middle Eastern terrorist groups and what they do?  

Are states playing greater or reduced roles with these new groups?  Who/what is replacing their influence?

  What roles do “willing amateurs” play in “Netwar”?  Exemplify using Al Qaeda.

Countering “Netwar.”  What do the authors think is needed to meet this challenge? 

The authors pose three "paradigms" of terrorists' uses of netwar.  What difference to counter-terrorism strategy does it make if they are following a paradigm of:

  • coercive diplomacy?

  • war?

  • creation of a "new world"?

Questions on Howard, "The New Terrorism" (2007):

How do "new" terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda differ from "old" ones, such as the Red Brigades or Abu Nidal?

How is what is new about terrorism of significance to developing a strategy to defeat it?

What relationships are there between "new" terrorism and charitable organizations?  Between traditional systems of money-transferring?

How authentic are claims of a jihadi attempt to develop and use WMD?

Questions on Gunaratna, “Defeating Al Qaeda—The Pioneering Vanguard of the Islamic Movements,” (2007).

Gunaratna argues that the U.S. and its allies must "start to think beyond the counter-terrorist military and financial dimensions" of the war on terrorism.  What additionally does he think needs to be done? 

Gunaratna states that "the rate of production of Islamists is greater than the rate of their kill or capture."   Is this the case, and if so why is it so?

Against whom does Gunaratna believe the U.S. "war on terrorism" properly should be focused?  Against whom is Al Qaeda's war focused? (179).  Who is winning, and who is losing, and why? (181)

Why are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, and Iraq, important to Al Qaeda?

What significance do Peshawar, Pakistan, and Sudan have in showing us something important about Al Qaeda's historic tendencies?

How does Gunaratna characterize the relationship over the years of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Al Qaeda?

Gunaratna speaks of Al Qaeda both as a capable terrorist group and as a vanguard inspiring and training up to three dozen other Islamist groups worldwide.  The core group has decentralized and is resilient.  What, then, does he recommend be done to combat this?

How and on what basis are linkages established between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups?  Who leads and who follows in these relationships?  Where geographically is the danger posed most acute?  Why?

Gunaratna states: "government countermeasures have increased the vulnerability of population centres (sic) and economic targets." (166).  What does he mean, and can you exemplify some cases where this has been shown to be true?

Gunaratna states: "Mapping the family and social trees of leaders, members, supporters and sympathizers is key to understanding the deepening operational nexus between al-Qaeda and its associate groups" (167).  Why?  Can you explain a real world example to support his conclusion?  (E.g., the Limburg, and Bali incidents)

How do "stand-alone attacks" differ from "wave attacks" (also called "swarming" by Arquilla and others)?  What advantages do "wave attacks" present for Al Qaeda?

Why does Al Qaeda frequently call for targeted peoples to convert to Islam? (169)

 

 

 

February 4, 2009:

History of Terrorism fact:

  • This week in 2001, a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands found guilty Libyan Abd al-Beset al-Megrahi in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988, killing 240 people, including 189 U.S. citizens.  He received a 27 year jail term.

 

Religious Terrorism 

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Announcements:  

 

 

Class today may discuss:

Class will view the film "Religious Terrorism" (Prof. Bowen's tape #74) then will discuss the film and the readings.

Questions about readings:

Discussion today will first focus on the "classic" arguments made by Ranstorp; and then we will examine the contemporary issues raised by Wiktorowicz and by Sivan. 

Why is greater attention paid to religious terrorists now?  Is this America’s obsession or is it objectively indicated?

Is this day's lesson misnamed: should it be titled religious terrorism (as it is) or should reference be made to Islam (i.e., "Islamic terrorism")?  Why or why not?

To what extent is contemporary terrorism a manifestation of a "civil war" within Islam? 

To what extent is contemporary terrorism chiefly a manifestation of inter-civilizational war?

Describe the factors that have produced a great upswing in religion-based terrorism within Islam since 1979.

Are these factors “reversible” through any sort of foreign policy or counter-terrorism policy?  Why or why not?

How has religion-based terrorism had impact on the Israel – Palestinian conflict?  Did a peace agreement between secular political authorities (1993) break down due to actions of religious zealots, 1993-2000?  Have religious authorities played constructive roles in regard to the current violence (Sept. 2000-present)?  Have societal religious beliefs?

 

Questions on Wiktorowicz:

To what degree are differences among Salafis (or Wahhabis) add meaningful insights into our understanding of the societal factors that contribute today to terrorism?

What organizations were influenced by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb?

What are "voiders" to jihadists (or jihadis)?

What role did Abdullah Azzam play in the development of modern Muslim understandings of jihad?

On the matter of targeting civilians, what position did earlier Salafi jihadist ideologues (e.g., Qutb, Ibn Wahhab) take on this important contemporary issue?

How did the Algerian G.I.A. contribute to the evolution of Salafist thinking on the matter of targeting civilians?

In what ways do Al Qaeda and other modern jihadist Salafis tend to blur the line between civilian non-combatants and military personnel?  Why do you think they might do this?

Questions on Sivan:

The "clash within Islam," the author argues, pits liberals against both traditionalists and radical Islamists.  Why, in an age of global democratization, are these liberal forces despondent and not influential in the Muslim world?

What is "ijtihad"?  What does the struggle to realize it entail?

What does the author think of the prospects for democracy if groups like the Muslim Brotherhood come to power in states, much like the AKP party has come to power in Turkey?

Is Indonesia ripe for a radical Islamist takeover through the ballot box?  Why or why not?

 

 

Feb. 9, 2009:

History of Terrorism facts:

  • this week in 2001, France and Algeria signed an agreement in which each state pledged to cooperate in stopping terrorism

  • Feb. 10, 2004: terrorists in Iraq attacked police recruitment station, killing 55 and wounding 67.

topics/questions:  Egyptian Islamism, the terrorists' use of the Islamic concept of jihad, and the roots of Al Qaeda 

Today's required readings are extensive.  Qutb is a leading ideologist of the thinking that has led to modern Islamist terrorism.  He is assigned so that students can become aware of the mode of argument, and the mode of invoking religious justification, used to de-legitimize secular Arab regimes and all others who are viewed by Islamists as unworthy.  His interpretation of Islam is foundational, and is essential to acquiring the needed understanding of contemporary Islamists.  Laqueur's article, along with Wiktorowicz's background article from Feb. 4, gives important guidance in orienting students to the practical historic impact of Qutb's thought.  (Laqueur also is an important analyst of terrorism and revolution in other contexts, and has written extensively about Nazism and Soviet communism).  Rodgers goes to the source, and puts fresh perspective on the roots of the suicide/martyrdom problem in the words attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, and in the later development of Islamic theology.  Each of these readings need to be fully understood to grasp the enemy, and the course.  Among the supplemental (optional) readings, Pipes' very short linked article will provide arresting analysis for motivated students, insights likely to provide a useful counter-weight for those whose familiarity with the concept of jihad has been shaped by voices overly guided by political correctness.  Pipes rebuts those insistent that all thinking about these topics must be defined by an ecumenical view of the world.  Woolsey, a former CIA Director for Pres. Clinton and an advisor to the McCain 2008 campaign, also offers arresting insights into the state he believes most responsible for our current problems with Islamism, Saudi Arabia.

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.  An additional reading of great value is Mary Habeck, “Teaching the Long War and Jihadism,” Footnotes (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Foreign Policy Research Institute), Vol. 14, No. 25, October 2009.  Should that link go dead, a copy is available permanently here.

Warning: some of what is described in the Laqueur reading for today is grisly, and may seem excessively graphic in its depictions of the techniques employed by jihadists against their targeted enemies.  Prof. Bowen understands these reactions.  However, it is important to grasp even the aspects of terrorists' tradecraft that disgust our sensibilities. As much as we must understand their motives, we need to connect the dots that tie the ways in which jihadist terrorists interpret religious texts to compel them to act on their felt need to commit specific acts of violence.  Laqueur's incorporation of information about mutilation and beheading (etc.) into his analysis is not only historically accurate but necessary to his argument about "The Origins of Islamic Terrorism."  If students are going to be able to fully understand the link between jihadists' ideological inspirations, their tactics, and their overall goal of uniting all Muslims, on occasion we must look with open eyes at the methods of violence they feel entitled to use toward those persons who are targeted as enemies.  These techniques are intended to induce fear both among enemies and among Muslims.  For further study on the specific relationship between beheading and radical Islam, I recommend Timothy R. Furnish, "Beheading in the Name of Islam," Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005): http://www.meforum.org/article/713

Class notes projected onto the screen today now are available: follow this link.

 

An excerpt from "Obsession," a twelve minute version of the film from www.honestreporting.com , will focus our attention on today's topic.  Feel free to view it in advance, even though we will see it again in class.

Students may also gain insights from films not shown today about the life and influences on the leaders of Al Qaeda today.  I recommend these two films: "Osama bin Laden: In the Name of Allah" (The History Channel, 2005) and "Osama bin Laden: Prophet of Terror" (Times Discovery Channel, 2007) .

Announcements:

Before class read (required readings):

 

  • Several of the issues raised in today's readings are discussed on this associated webpage maintained by Prof. Bowen.
  • Qutb in America: transcript of a May 6, 2003 broadcast on National Public Radio, concerning Qutb's stay in Greeley, Colorado in 1949, and how what he experienced there contributed to his world view.
  • Highly motivated students also are encouraged read further the MEMRI Institute's numerous materials related to today's theme.  Of special interest may be, for example:
    • The Saudi Arabian section of the Middle East Media Research Institute; follow the links.   It should be emphasized that some of these Saudi Arabian items contain content in which some social and political authorities attempt to dissuade people from supporting terrorism, and other items appear to be supporting it.  If this material disturbs you, consult Woolsey's December 2005 analysis assigned for today.
    • A Palestinian Islamic leader now deceased, Dr. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi, urging Iraq to respond by attacking Americans with the suicide bomber tactic.  Dr. Rantisi was one of the top political spokesmen for Hamas, the Islam-based organization, until his assassination by Israel.  Rantisi himself was trained as an engineer, not as a religious professional.
    • Unmentioned in class readings, but indicative of involvement of Christian Arab social leaders in the further encouragement of terrorism, are statements in praise of suicide bombing by Father Theodosios Hanna, a Greek Orthodox clergyman of Palestinian ethnicity.

    These all are examples in the MEMRI collection from several years ago, selected to reinforce our course theme of the day, i.e., jihad, and Islamic inspirations for religious terrorism. 

    However, a visitor to the Palestinian section of the MEMRI site will also find voluminous other voices, interviews, and debates which involve secular as well as religious authorities.  These, when read thoroughly, present a more mixed picture on the matter of the degree to which the public in the Palestinian community is led by religious (and secular) voices which sanctify or legitimize terrorism.  I encourage students to read broadly and to form their own informed opinions.

    A similar exercise can be mounted in the Syrian, Iranian, and other national sections of the MEMRI collections. 

    Materials at MEMRI are ideal materials from which to form up evidence to shape term papers that ask questions like: "To what extent does a social atmosphere supportive of terrorism receive further support from social leaders in ____?"

Clarification: What Jihad  means to Osama bin Laden:  On February 23, 1998 the London Arabic-language daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi published bin Laden's declaration of Jihad  which said that killing the Americans and their allies is a commandment for every individual Muslim. The following are excerpts:

"Praise be to God, who brought down the Book, drives the clouds, defeats the factions, and says in His Book: When the sacred months are over, kill the idolaters wherever you find them, take them captive, lay siege to them and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush [Qur'an 5:9]… Prayers and blessings of peace upon our Prophet Muhammad, who said: I was sent with a sword in preparation for the Day of Judgment when God alone will be worshipped with none beside him. He assigned me a livelihood under the shadow of my spear and he assigned humiliation and lowliness to those who disobey my command…

"Killing the Americans and their allies – both civilians and military personnel – is a commandment for every individual Muslim who can do this, in any country in which he can do this, in order to free the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Al-Haram Mosque from their grasp, and so that their armies will leave all the lands of Islam defeated and no longer a threat to any Muslim. This is in compliance with the words of Allah: 'Fight the polytheists all together, as they fight you all together [Qur'an 9:36]' and 'Fight them until civil strife ceases altogether' [Qur'an 8:39].

"This is in addition to the words of Allah the Almighty: 'What keeps you from fighting in the cause of Allah and of the weak from among men, women, and children who supplicate: Lord, deliver us from this town whose people are oppressors, and appoint for us from Thyself some helper?' [Qur'an 4:75]

"With Allah's help, we call on every Muslim who believes in Allah and who wants reward to follow Allah's directive about killing Americans and plundering their property wherever they find them, whenever is possible. Similarly, we also call on the Muslim ulama, leaders, youths, and soldiers to carry out a raid on the American soldiers of Satan and on Satan's aides, who have become their allies…

"Allah also says, 'O ye who believe, what ails you that, when it is said to you: Go forth, all together, to fight in the cause of Allah; you are held down by your worldly interests? Is it that you prefer the hither life to the Hereafter? If so, you must remember that all this life has to offer is of little value in comparison with the Hereafter…[Qur'an 9:38]"

source: "Contemporary Islamist Ideology Permitting Genocidal Murder," MEMRI Institute Special Report No. 25 (January 27, 2004, emphasis above supplied by Prof. Bowen).  The quote (above) is from section II.A. of that report.

Questions on Qutb:

Why does Qutb suggest the believer must pull back from the society around him?

Why is the use of the term "vanguard" by Qutb an indication of the influence of Leninism on his thought?

What is Qutb's attitude toward the governments of the states present in the Islamic world at the time of his writing?

Does Qutb believe that the knowledge found in the Koran needs to be interpreted or explained by clerics in order for the believer to gain proper guidance? 

  • What difference does his position make in terms of keeping coherent the beliefs of followers of Islam?
  • Have elements of Christianity taken a position similar to that which Qutb takes about his religion?  To what effect?

Questions on Laqueur:

Did Muslim terrorism emerge from a strand of idealism?  Explain.

What originally was the Muslim Brotherhood? 

  • Why has it evolved into what is it today?
  • How does it resemble, and how is it different from contemporary Islamist terrorist groups?

How does Laqueur characterize Qutb's contribution to the evolution of Islamism and terrorism in Egypt?

  • What organized groups grew out of, or were inspired by, Qutb?
  • What sort of social background have members of these groups come from? 
    • Does the percentage of university educated persons (41) resemble that of other radical groups?
    • Do you agree with Laqueur's interpretation of motivations involved in these persons' joining in radical politics?

     

  • How have the activities of these groups had impact on the evolution of politics in Egypt?
    • What is Taqfir va'l hejra?  In what sense is it still of significance?
    • What, if any, is the connection to the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York?
    • What impact have Qutb's legacies had on inter-faith relations in Egypt?
    • How does Ayman al Zawahiri emerge as a leader?
    • Why does Zawahiri ultimately turn against the Muslim Brotherhood?
    • What impact have these groups had on the human rights of homosexuals and other minorities?

Questions on Rodgers, "Purifying the Heart: Suicide or Jihadi Acts?" :

The author states: "We have failed to understand the worldview of our enemies because we are too afraid to be politically incorrect." (141).  Explain this statement.

The author argues that what many regard as Islamic terrorists better would be understood as "ghazis."  What would we understand differently if we accepted his choice of words?

The author refers both to writings and incidents in Muhammad's life, and to later Muslim jurisprudence on the matter of dying in violence for the cause of Islam.  Does he find these historic antecedents to reinforce, or to undermine, the position of those who say that the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were "martyrs for Islam"?

Consider the intentions of the perpetrator of violence versus the effect of an act of violence, even if that act of violence by a Muslim kills some believers.  According to the author, of these two things (i.e.: intention, or effect) which is more important within Islam in judging whether a particular act of violence leading to the death of the Muslim perpetrator was an act of jihad (and thus permitted by the religion) or an act of suicide (and thus an act not permitted in the religion)?  What difference does this position make?

What does the author suggest is the line between permissible and impermissible killing in Islam?  Are clear lines found that explain who is a non-combatant entitled to not be harmed? (136).

Did Muhammad actually say that the struggle to purify one's self is "the greater jihad," and that fighting to defeat or convert unbelievers is "the lesser jihad" as some have claimed?  What does the author here say on this (137-138)?

Why is a "guilt-ridden" would-be shahid in some ways more dangerous than a "righteous shahid"? (139-140).

Questions on supplemental (optional) materials:

Questions on Woolsey, i.e: R. James Woolsey, "The Elephant in the Middle East Living Room: Watching Wahhabis," National Review  (December 14, 2005). :

Who is the "elephant in the room"?

Why do American officials have difficulty talking publicly about the elephant?

How is Salafist ideology spread?  Who pays for this?

According to Woolsey, the U.S. now needs to imitate certain things done in the Cold War: what are these things, and do you agree that these measures are now desirable?

Questions on Pipes:

Summarize Pipes argument. 

What social obstacles impede recognition of Pipes' points on U.S. college campuses?

Comment on Pipes' use of the term Jihad.  Students in the past have expressed skepticism about the position taken here by Daniel Pipes, which was among several required readings about the concept of jihad  in earlier editions of this course.  It is now a recommended supplement, not a required reading.  But we still need to engage a variety of perspectives because are reading about jihad in order to grasp a central issue among the topics under study.  The meaning of the concept of jihad  to Al Qaeda, on the other hand, is quite clear: war on behalf of Islam.  That point, not the details of Koranic scriptures, also was Pipes' central argument. 

Pipes' reading of the meaning of jihad is not confined to fringe groups such as Al Qaeda, though it is interesting that the organization's own magazine calls itself "Voice of Jihad."   The concept of jihad also appears prominently in school curricula of the Palestinian Authority: courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch, here is a 2007 analysis of 12th grade texts in use; here is a 2002 overview of religious themes used for incitement P.A. school curricula; and here is a report about "summer camps" for youth run by the P.A..  

Islamists in the Palestinian community are more blunt still:  In a Friday sermon in 2002, at the Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Aal Nahyan mosque in Gaza, broadcast live on official Palestinian Authority television, Sheikh Ahmad Abu Halabiya, member of the PA-appointed Fatwa Council and former acting rector of the Islamic University in Gaza, said:

"Have no mercy on the Jews, no matter where they are, in any country. Fight them, wherever you are. Wherever you meet them, kill them. Wherever you are, kill those Jews and those Americans who are like them – and those who stand by them – they are all in one trench, against the Arabs and the Muslims – because they established Israel here, in the beating heart of the Arab world, in Palestine. They created it to be the outpost of their civilization – and the vanguard of their army, and to be the sword of the West and of the Crusaders, hanging over the necks of the monotheists, the Muslims in these lands. They wanted the Jews to be their spearhead… Allah, deal with the Jews, your enemies and the enemies of Islam. Deal with the crusaders, and America, and Europe behind them, O Lord of the worlds" (MEMRI Institute; link to source).

The November 2008 events in Mumbai, India, --where Jews were killed solely because they were Jews-- underline the importance of hearing the words of religious authorities and fitting them into a broader political analysis.  These ways of thinking retain important influence over people, and for students and scholars, they convey an urgent need for analysis.  To underline once more, consider these disturbing January 2009 broadcasts on HAMAS television (courtesy of Palestinian Media Watch).

February 11, 2009:

History of terrorism fact of the day: this week in 1991, terrorists fired three mortar rounds into the U.K. Prime Minister's office/residence at 10 Downing St., London.

topics / questions: Al Qaeda's road to 9.11.01: its goals and methods

We will discuss today's readings, and our earlier readings regarding the characteristics of the broader movement of which Al Qaeda is a key part.

Class notes projected onto the screen today now are available: follow this link.

Announcements:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.  Be sure to read:

Recommended (optional):

A brief (8 minute) video, "Ghost Wars" (NBC Dateline, Feb. 22, 2004; Prof. Bowen's tape #78), was shown as part of class today .

Study / discussion questions:

Questions from Lewis:

What grievances were cited by Al Qaeda in their February 1998 Declaration of War?  Have these issues been in any degree resolved?

What distinctions, if any, does Al Qaeda make in regard to targeting?  Who do they profess to target?

Given the stated aims of Al Qaeda, could a "deal" be struck with them?  Why or why not?

Think about Al Qaeda's agenda:

From the course readings, lectures and other materials overall to this point:

 

 

 

 

February 16, 2009

topics/questions: U.S. Responses to terrorism, and to al Qaeda before 9.11.01

History of Terrorism fact of the day: On this date in 1992, in Lebanon, Hizballah General Secretary Abbas Musawi was killed in a helicopter ambush

Course notes and discussion questions projected onto the screen in class today now are available for student use: follow this link.

The film, "The Report of the 9/11 Commission," may be shown today.

Announcements:

  • Islamists' and religious freedoms:  Unrelated to today's class, but of interest to the theme in our course of analyzing the extent of public support for social and political positions advocated by Al Qaeda and the other militant Islamists, is an article from BBC Online this weekend concerning an "Egyptian Christian's Recognition Struggle," which shows the extent of encroachment of Islamists' agenda into the secular legal system of our ally, Egypt. 

 

  • Millennium Plot:  In class today, both Prof. Bowen and the film shown mentioned Ahmed Ressam, the convicted Al Qaeda terrorist who is serving time in a U.S. federal prison for his role in the Millennium Plot against Los Angeles International Airport (LAX).  As Prof. Bowen mentioned, Ressam has received what some believe to be too short a sentence for his part in the attempt to import explosives with which to bomb a major U.S. civilian facility.  For example, the prosecutors in the case argued at sentencing for a 35 year sentence.  Ressam was convicted in 2001, but was not sentenced until 2005 (receiving a sentence of 22 years), after he apparently cooperated with U.S. counter-terrorism investigators, then stopped.  In 2007, an appeals court overturned his conviction, but in May 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside that ruling and affirmed the validity of the original sentence.  What this ultimately means is that, according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Ressam is scheduled to be released in July 2019... a mere ten years from now. 

 

  • The August 6, 2001 "Presidential Daily Briefing," or PDB, secret U.S. document mentioned in class on Feb. 11 and entitled "Bin Laden Determined to Strike U.S." is available for students to view and read: follow this link.

Correction: In class on Feb. 11, Prof. Bowen mis-stated the familial link between Khalid Sheikh Muhammad (i.e., the mastermind of 9/11) and the 1993 jihadists' attempt to blow up the World Trade Center.  In class, KSM was linked to Ramzi Binalshib, who in fact was part of the 9/11 plot but is not a blood relative of KSM.  Rather, the correct fact is that KSM is the uncle of Ramzi Yousef, who was convicted for his involvement in the 1993 attack on the WTC.  (The identical first names clouded my memory, I guess).  All other facts presented in class were accurate: Both Muhammad and Yousef studied electrical engineering at Western universities, with KSM attending North Carolina A and T, and Yousef attending a college in Wales, U.K..  Yousef was involved in several other jihadist plots, including plans to assassinate both the Pope and Benizar Bhutto, and other plots to explode airliners over the Pacific Ocean.  On one occasion in December 1994, a bomb planted by Yousef did in fact explode on a Manila to Toyko flight, killing Japanese national Haruki Ikegami, but the bomb failed to bring down the plane, and it safely landed on Okinawa, saving 270 lives.  Yousef, while a nephew of KSM, is only 3 years his junior.  While all these things were done independent of Al Qaeda, they clearly targeted similar victims and symbols using means later employed by Al Qaeda.  These facts would point to the importance of not drawing too tight a line around what is, and what is not, Al Qaeda.  Yousef now is serving a life sentence; KSM and Binalshib await potential death sentences.  All three are in U.S. custody.  For a summary of the evidence against Binalshib, go here.

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc. I.e.:

Supplemental (optional) readings for motivated students:

Class will continue to analyze the events leading to and including 9.11.01.  Take close notes on the film which is likely to be shown.  We should be trying to fit the events described to the analytic perspectives we have read and discussed earlier, e.g. netwar theory and what it tells us about the shifting organizational structures used in contemporary terrorism; factors surrounding use of suicide bombing as a tactic and as a strategy; the component of religion, especially Islamism, in shaping the worldviews of the actors in the attack; and the relationships of states (failing and otherwise) to the modern terrorist threat as revealed in the events of 9.11.01.

Questions from Shultz:

Summarize the reasons why the U.S. acted toward Al Qaeda in the manner that it did prior to 9.11.01., then answer: What was the single most important, over-riding consideration that impeded effective action against Al Qaeda?
 

Consider the role of the U.S. military in the search for an effective policy response to Al Qaeda in the 1993-2000 period, then weigh:

  • Why were U.S. Special Operations Forces used, or not used, as they were?
  • Were new bases of authority needed in law in order for the military to help here?
  • What role did considerations of "force protection" play in shaping the military's role in regard to counter-terrorism policy?
  • What is meant by the statement "It got to the point ... [where] the uniforms had become the suits" (526)?

Questions on optional readings from the 9/11 Report ( http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf):

Which opportunities to respond to the group did the Commission believe to have had the greatest potential to disrupt the group?  When / where did these occur, and why were these opportunities missed?

 

 

 

Feb. 18, 2009
 

History of terrorism fact of the day:

  • On this day in 2002 in Israel, a policeman was killed by a suicide bomber he had stopped for questioning; the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a part of Fatah, claimed responsibility.
  • this week in 2005, Lebanese politician Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated by a powerful bomb while driving in Beirut (Feb. 14).  A U.N. investigation found Syria responsible for the murder.

topics / questions: The Attacks of 9.11.01

Announcements: class notes projected onto the screen during class now are available, follow this link.

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Before class consider looking over Kean, et. al., The 9/11 Report, pp 3-70, 211-250.  It explains the attacks completely.  It is not required reading, but is a fascinating read nonetheless: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf  The History Channel film, "The Report of the 9/11 Commission," will continue to form part of today's class.

Updates related to this section of the course:

Updates on the broader subject of the course:

 

 

 

Feb. 23, 2009 

History of terrorism facts of the day:

  • On Feb. 24, 1998, Osama bin Laden issued his fatwa calling for the killing of American civilians anywhere in the world.  (See here for analysis)

  • this week in 2001, the U.K. enacted the Terrorism Act of 2000.

topics/questions: Review for Midterm Exam.  Recap on 9.11.01: What does a "failure of imagination" mean?  What is the point of labeling the event  "an intelligence failure," or a "policy failure"?

Announcements: Daily class notes and questions projected onto the screen during class now are available: follow this link.

Updates: In class today, Prof. Bowen mentioned an article in the current issue of the Long War Journal, an article that dealt with the creation by Al Qaeda and the Taliban of a new "Shadow Army" that unifies their efforts with those of other jihadist organizations in Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.  The article is: Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda's Paramilitary 'Shadow Army'," Long War Journal (Feb. 9, 2009): http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php The article brings out some interesting points regarding the evolution of the enemy.

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Keeping the hijackers, and the hijack teams, sorted out can be difficult when reading the official report.  To assist:

Supporting this meeting is the supplemental (optional) reading: Kean, et. al., The 9/11 Report, pp 251-399.  ( http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf):

Class will discuss any and all course materials, including the attack of 9.11.01, so better to be prepared for the Midterm Exam on Wednesday.  Review questions:

Was this plan a “multinational” one, or should it be viewed as a “Saudi Arabian attack on the United States”?  Why?

Persons of what nationalities participated?  Assisted?   

In what countries did training, planning, financing occur?  What "safe havens" facilitated the attackers?

To what extent, if at all, did religious authorities or religious institutions of Islam assist in the 9.11. attack?

Readings in our course (e.g., Arquilla et. al.) have spoken of al Qaeda as a  “network” type of organization.  How well does the “Planes Operation” illustrate this?

The 9/11 Commission referred to al Qaeda as “not a finite group of people” but as “an ideological movement.”  How well does the “Planes Operation” illustrate this?

Feb. 25, 2009:

History of Terrorism facts of the day:

  • this week in 1970, the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command blew up a Swiss Air jet, killing 47.

 

  • Feb. 25, 1996—Israel: HAMAS bombed buses in Jerusalem, killing 28 and wounding 80.

     

Midterm Exam

Bring a blank Blue Book / Green Book exam booklet.  Put your name on its cover, only.

 

No Class on March 2 or March 4, 2009: Spring (?) Break

 

 

 

March 9, 2009

History of terrorism fact of the day:

  •  March 9, 2002, in Israel: Suicide bomb kills 11 and injures 25 inside a crowded Jerusalem cafe; HAMAS claimed responsibility.

  • This week in 2003, a HAMAS bomb planted on an Israeli bus killed 15 year old U.S. citizen Abigail Litle (pictured above) and 14 others, and injured 40 others.  For more on this case, follow this link.

  • March 9, 2004 in Turkey: Two suicide bombers in Istanbul kill two, wound six; Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade claimed responsibility.

     

topics/questions: Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Daily class notes and questions projected onto the screen during class now are available: follow this link.

Announcements:

Updates on Al Qaeda's strategy and methods: Prof. Bowen often emphasizes the declining direct supervision over terrorist attacks that is exercised by Al Qaeda's top leaders, contrasting the 9/11/01 attacks with the emerging role of "self-starter" jihadist cells in major attacks such as the July 2005 bombings of the London transit system.  This trend toward an "Al Qaeda 2.0" is a chief feature of international and domestic terrorism with which U.S. counter-terrorism policy now must contend.  For more about this phenomenon in Turkey, see: 

This trend is often mistaken as a sign of a weakening of Al Qaeda.  In the view of Prof. Bowen, such a reading is a mistake, for Al Qaeda for many years has openly committed itself to a decades-long war of attrition to achieve its ultimate objective of establishing a Caliphate over all of what it regards as Muslim lands.  Current strategy should be understood in that light, and current challenges to U.S. counter-terrorism policy need to be evaluated in reference to how U.S. choices have impact on Al Qaeda's strategy and tactics.  In this light, I call attention to the analysis of Fred Burton:

Before class read these required readings:

Supplemental (optional) materials relevant to this class meeting:

Pakistan's father of the nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has admitted involvement in the sale of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea: "I have voluntarily admitted that much of it is true and accurate."   These matters were reported by Associated Press and the Washington Post, Feb. 4, 2004.  In the print edition of the Post (though, curiously, in a story not presently online), others close to him have been alleged to have discussed with Osama bin Laden matters concerning supply of nuclear technologies to Al Qaeda.  These matters were briefly confirmed in a Post editorial (Feb. 1, 2004) by Pakistani nuclear physics scientist Pervez Hoodbhoy, who pinned the timing of the meetings with Osama as having occurred in 2002.  Associated Press (Feb. 4, 2004) had a slightly different date and more detailed information on the participants in the meetings.  It addressed this matter in the following way:

"The nuclear black market that let Iran, Libya and North Korea acquire weapons technology from Pakistan under the noses of international monitors raises suspicions that terror groups also acquired bomb components or plans, experts told The Associated Press.

Al-Qaida apparently has shown interest in acquiring nuclear technology. Two Pakistani nuclear scientists were detained in late 2001 after meeting Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan on suspicion of giving away secrets, but they were later released without being charged. The military, which controlled the weapons program, also is known to have elements who sympathize with the Taliban and bin Laden.

Pakistan has for years denied spreading nuclear technology and claimed its arsenal was safe from extremists. But strong international pressure after Iranian revelations to the U.N. nuclear watchdog forced Islamabad to begin an investigation of its weapons program in November. It admitted last month for the first time that scientists had leaked technology.

Officials say Abdul Qadeer Khan - the father of Pakistan's nuclear program - has confessed to selling equipment related to centrifuges, which are used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Libya also received designs for a nuclear bomb from Pakistan that it handed over to U.S. and British intelligence last month, European diplomats say.

Khan, however, has denied making a confession, according to the leading Islamic party, Jamaat-e-Islami.

Pakistan itself relied on international black market supplies for the equipment used in its nuclear weapons program that started in the 1970s.

"If the black market could transfer technology from Europe to Pakistan in spite of all these sanctions and embargoes, that same black market of smugglers can also pass on materials from this lab to terrorist groups," said A.H. Nayyar, a nuclear physicist and head of the Pakistan Peace Coalition. "The possibility exists and needs to be investigated thoroughly."

Military spokesman Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan on Tuesday denied that Pakistani nuclear technology had fallen into terrorist hands. "It's absolutely negative, there is no truth in it," he said.

The government also has denied official complicity in giving away technology, but a friend of Khan's told the AP that top army officials, including now-President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, were "aware of everything."

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the Bush administration accepted Musharraf's assurances that the Pakistani government was "not involved in any kind of proliferation."

Musharraf has said the scientists were given wide latitude to develop the nuclear program and worked in secret even from top officials. That secrecy also has raised fears that nuclear workers may have transferred technology or equipment to terrorists, either for money or ideological sympathy.

Experts say centrifuge technology wouldn't be of much use to terror groups, who probably couldn't set up the vast facilities required to enrich useful quantities of uranium, with hundreds of technicians needed to run thousands of centrifuges.

"It's hard enough for countries to do," said Gary Samore, a nonproliferation expert at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The acquisition of weapons designs, however, would make it far easier for terrorists to make a workable bomb, said David Albright, head of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.

And if a terror group was able to obtain highly enriched uranium - anywhere from about 110 to 220 pounds - it could possibly build a bomb similar in design to that used on Hiroshima, Japan, at the end of World War II, experts said.

"It's not something that you or I could do in our backyards, but it's relatively easy," Samore said.

Pakistan is estimated to have produced more than 1,540 pounds of highly enriched uranium, but no official figures have ever been released.

"It is very important that all the material that has been produced is accounted for to the last gram," said Nayyar. "If it is not done, then the doubt remains."

Sultan, the military spokesman, declined to comment on whether Khan's alleged confession mentioned highly enriched uranium and potential leaks of it outside Pakistan.

The strongest known link between Pakistani scientists and terrorists were the 2001 arrests Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood and Abdul Majid, who worked for Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission until retiring in 1999. The commission, together with Khan's lab worked on the nuclear weapons program.

Mahmood's son told the AP in December 2002 that his father - a deeply conservative Muslim who sympathized with the Taliban - met bin Laden several times between 2000 and July 2001 and the al-Qaida leader asked how to make nuclear bombs. Mahmood claimed to have rebuffed the request, telling bin Laden "it is not child's play for you to build a nuclear bomb," according to his son, who didn't want to be named.

The scientists were cleared of all charges and released in December 2001.

"Pakistani scientists were active there (in Afghanistan) - we never got to the bottom of it," said Albright, also a former Iraq nuclear weapons inspector.

In light of recent news, the years of Pakistani denials ring especially hollow, Albright said, hoping international pressure would finally make Pakistan come clean.

"There's a lot of smoke and mirrors that the government is throwing up, but at the same time it's being forced to reveal information," he said." (Emphasis added by Prof. Bowen)

One final news item on Pakistan and WMD proliferation: A. Q. Khan was released from his lenient house arrest and became a free man in February 2009.  U.S. officials questioned this move, viewing the continuing "restrictions" on Khan as inadequate.  See: Karen deYoung, "U.S. Skeptical about Pakistan's restrictions on Nuclear Scientist," Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2009): A18: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/08/AR2009020801964.html ; or Sue Pleming, "U.S. seeks assurances from Pakistan over A. Q. Khan," Reuters/Washington Post online, February 9, 2009: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/10/AR2009021002923.html

Questions on the readings for March 9:

WMD in general:

Enumerate the broad categories of WMD

Which are most readily, easily created?

Which are most difficult in this regard?  (Draw the continuum)  Why?

States and WMD  

1. Consider the relative size of the set of states that possess, or are suspected to possess, each category of WMD. 

·        Why does the set, at times, get smaller?

·        Why does the set grow?

 

2. What measures have states taken to limit the availability of each category of weapons among states? 

What are the strengths and weaknesses in these approaches?  Exemplify.

 

3. States have pursued several strategies to limit the threat WMD-possessing adversary states pose to their own security?

Consider deterrence, prevention, and preemption. 

Which of these measures worked most successfully with problem states?

Which have not worked well?  Why or why not?

Terrorists and the WMD problem

What do we know about efforts by Al Qaeda to acquire, develop, or use WMD?

What do we know about the efforts of Al Qaeda’s group headed by Mohammed Atta in regard to using bio-weapons in the USA?

e.g.:

Consider Lowther's argument and conclusion.  Do you find his skepticism to be warranted in light of what you have read about the motivation of terrorists and/or the vulnerability of the U.S.?  Why or why not?

 

 

 

March 11, 2009 topics/questions

Are there Effective Alternatives to Pre-emption?

Terrorism fact of the day:

 

Announcements:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Daily class notes as projected onto the screen during class now are available: follow this link.

Discussion today will focus on the options confronting the new administration.  We will rely on the three related articles in the Howard and Sawyer text:

Questions on Brig. Gen. Howard, "Preemptive Military Doctrine: No Other Choice,":

  • States traditionally have had four options for their militaries when confronting threats to their security.  What are these four?  Why does Howard suggest that three no longer make sense in regard to the threat posed by international terrorism?

 

  • Howard argues that the past actions of terrorist groups constitute an "imminent danger" to the U.S.  What does his use of this language mean?  What does it justify?  Do you agree with his analysis on this point?

Questions on Byman, "U.S. Counter-Terrorism Options: a taxonomy":

  • Why does the author contend that there are "inherent tensions" between counter-terrorism policies that intend to disrupt the terrorist groups we confront and policies designed to change the overall environment so that it is more difficult for them to raise money, find recruits, etc.?
  • Evaluate Byman's 7 Options:
    • Option One (unilaterally crush): Review what Turkey has done to crush the PKK.  Why can't such an approach be used toward Al Qaeda?
    • Option Two (rely on allies): Effective as this approach has been for some others (e.g., Egypt), what are the limitations on this approach being enough for the U.S. today?
    • Option Three (containment): the author seems to prefer this choice; do you?  What are some of the potential up and down sides?
    • Option Four (defense): the author emphasizes the tactical successes of this approach, pointing to the Israeli security barrier.  What are the obstacles to a similar approach in the USA?  Consider the strategic down side of security barriers: do they offset gains made tactically?  And just what would be the minimum that the U.S., a global presence, would defend?
    • Option Five (diversion): what is the "campfire and the bear" strategy?  Did the U.S. follow such a strategy by invading Iraq (475)? Would Americans support or oppose an administration that openly was guided by the axiom "others will die so Americans will live" (473)?  Why or why not?
    • Option Six (de-legitimization): Byman argues "theologically, the terrorists are on thin ice."  Is this interpretation consistent with what we have read elsewhere in the course?  How so, or how not so?
    • Option Seven (transforming the breeding grounds): given what we have seen of the democratic process in the Muslim world, if this option is possible, is it in practical terms desirable?  And is it really possible?

 

Questions on Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back,"

  • In 2007, Riedel perceived Al Qaeda to be "more dangerous" than ever.  Consider that interpretation of the evidence: was it true when the author wrote it, and is it true today?  Why?
  • Where has Al Qaeda "relocated", according to Riedel?  Beyond clear bases in Pakistan and Iraq, where has their influence grown?  Why?
  • While some of what Riedel wrote failed to anticipate military changes, 2007-09, some of his points echo recent news.  Consider his analysis of the relationship between Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.  Are these relations really best understood as a bi-product of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, or of some deeper ideological and strategic affinity?
  • How have the years since 9/11 impacted the threat of militant Islamist terrorism in Europe?
  • What are "false flag" operations?  Why does the U.S. need to be especially slow in responding to what may be false flag Al Qaeda attacks? (587)
  • Consider what Riedel (589) advocates about "free and fair elections."  How does this view compare to that of Bynam on the matter of transforming "breeding grounds" for terrorism?  Given the weight of existing evidence, who is realistic and who is unrealistic here?

 

 

 

 

March 16, 2009

History of terrorism facts of the day:

  • March 16, 1984, in Lebanon: U.S. CIA official William Buckley was seized and later killed by Hizballah.
  • March 16, 1985, in Lebanon: US journalist Terry Anderson was kidnapped.
  • March 16, 1988, in Iraq: Iraqi forces attacked the Kurdish village of Halabja, killing 5000+ residents by use of chemical weapons.

  • This week in 1993, Islamist bombers killed 250 and wounded 700+ in attacks in India which the Indian government blamed on Pakistan.  Pakistan denied involvement.

topics/questions: Countering Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist organizations: financing networks

General announcement: Prof. Bowen published an editorial on March 12 concerning Pres. Obama's early policies and how we should regard them.  Read it online where it was published by following this link, or read a scan of it here in his permanent collection of editorials.  (All 50+ editorials, 2001-2009, are linked here).

Announcements related to the course:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Course notes projected onto the screen during today's class now are available: follow this link.

Readings by Brachman and by Weimann originally assigned for Wed. March 18 have been moved, and are now to be read prior to class on Wednesday April 2.

PolS 311 readings again bring students close to the pulse of U.S. policy: the "black hole" of Pakistani non-cooperation with U.S. anti-terrorism policy.   Former CIA and national Security Council expert Bruce Riedel, who we read for our last class (March 11), has been appointed by the Obama Administration to head up its review of policy toward terrorism arising from Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The Los Angeles Times on March 9, 2009 described Riedel's views this way:

"Bruce Riedel, a former South Asia specialist for the CIA and National Security Council, said in an interview after the Mumbai attacks that Pakistan had long protected the militant groups. He warned that a “global jihadist syndicate” of disaffected young Pakistanis was the most likely mechanism for launching an attack in the United States, possibly with Al-Qaeda. Riedel, who now chairs the Obama administration’s Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy review, said Mumbai was only the latest of several attacks by such militants on soft targets frequented by Americans, including hotels in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Islamabad."  To read the whole article, see: Josh Meyer, “Pakistan Sets Roadblocks in U.S. Hunt for Extremists, Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times (March 9, 2009).

Following up:  this book was mentioned in class on March 11 in the context of a "diversion" strategy to turn jihadists away from the U.S., and toward their adversaries elsewhere.  I recommend it: Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy (NY: Cambridge U. P., 2005): in MBC Grafton Library stacks.  Follow this link for a synopsis of the book written by Prof. Bowen.

Two articles in the press were mentioned by Prof. Bowen in class on March 11 and some of them were mentioned again on March 16; they now are linked below.  While they are optional, they convey important case evidence about the changing nature of the threat posed by jihadist terrorism in 2009. 

Updates:

 

 

Class today will view the film "Al Qaeda 2.0," then will discuss it and these readings, continuing the discussion of them on Wed. March 18.

To help with orienting events, a timeline on the U.S. war against Al Qaeda can be found here, courtesy of the Discovery-Times Channel.

Questions on Levitt, "...Crossover between Terrorist Groups" (2004):

  • To what extent have terrorist groups cooperated at an operational level?

  • To what extent have terrorist groups cooperated on financing and logistics?

  • What roles have been played by American jihadists in facilitating crossover between groups?

  • What do the Madrid and Zarqawi cases show us about crossover between groups?

  • Who is Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi, and why was his luggage of interest?

  • How have differing U.S. and European assessments of Hamas impeded effective counter-terrorism policies in regard to the financing of international terrorism in general?

Questions on Mark Basile, "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s, Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terror Financing" (2004)

  • In what ways do the methods of finance employed by the Al Qaeda organization differ from methods of finance used by their operational cells?

  • How were problems in financing the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center related to the failure of this terrorist cell and its project?

Questions on Paul R. Pillar, “Beyond Al Qaeda: Countering a Decentralized Terrorist Threat,” Washington Quarterly (dated in the book as "Summer 2004," but clearly newer, e.g. 496 refers to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 8, Article No. 4.

  • If Al Qaeda is as CIA official Pillar views it to be, more an "inspiration" than an instigator of attacks, how much sense does it make to focus on capturing (or killing) bin Laden? (see page 499)

  • What does Pillar mean by the change to "decentralized" threats?

  • Why does Pillar suggest (495) that counter-terrorism analysis must move beyond assembling connections made between known terrorists, or "link analysis"?

  • What are the chief constraints he cites in evaluating and finding some limitations to "data mining"?

  • Why, according to Pillar, is global cooperation in counter-terrorism "fragile"?  Does it make sense that this cooperation will diminish still further as the U.S. focus wanders from Al Qaeda to decentralized groups, as Pillar argues (496)?

  • Consider the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.  Do they fit Pillar's conception of a "decentralized" threat, or do they more resemble a still hierarchically organized "subcontracting" of Al Qaeda's tasks of international terrorism by it to independent terrorist groups about which some authors have written? 

  • Pillar views international cooperation as a function of states' separate national interests, and sees much "cooperation" in counter-terrorism fading.  Apply his analytic point about why this necessarily is: Has Indian support for U.S. counter-terrorism waned in the wake of Mumbai?  Has Pakistan's?  Why?

  • Pillar states (497): "U.S. policies toward Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular will be especially influential" in re-shaping Muslims' attitudes away from the belief that the War on Terrorism is a cover for an actual war by the West against Islam in general.  Does the evidence support this linkage, i.e.: have Muslims' attitudes toward the War on Terrorism changed when significant steps toward reconciling U.S.-Iraq relations have occurred?

 

 

 

 

March 18, 2009  

 

topics/questions: Countering Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, Part II: The role of media.

History of Terrorism facts:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Daily class notes projected onto the screen today now are available: follow this link.

Additional recommended readings:

Aside: Should HAMAS be included among the "new terrorism" groups?

  • Incitement: In this course in 2007, during discussion about the question of whether HAMAS appropriately should be included in analysis of "new terrorism," reference was made to practices of incitement to violence which some class members contended were found in the official school curricula of both the Palestinian Authority and the State of Israel.  Prof. Bowen disputed and continues to dispute this point.  At that time, I said that studies I have read tend to show that only the Palestinian Authority, and not the State of Israel, has failed in its obligation under the Oslo Accords (1993) to remove incitement from school textbooks and other materials.  My source of these studies was the Center for the Monitoring of the Impact of Peace, whose site has gone dead in the 2 years since.  While the studies there were done prior to the election of HAMAS to lead the Palestinian legislature and Ministry of Education (January 2006), information presented to Prof. Bowen in Israel after that date reinforced these findings.  Routine vilification of Jews (and not merely Israelis), glorification of suicide terrorists, and incitement to violence at HAMAS era schools, HAMAS-run day care centers, and summer camps continued in 2006.  Children no older than five years of age are routinely depicted to mimic the costumes and rituals of suicide bombings in settings organized by HAMAS.
  • This same general point about persistent anti-Semitic education in Palestinian areas, was the gist of a report issued by Palestinian Media Watch on March 19, 2007.  It concerned  high school textbooks issued by the P.A.  Read about it in the Jerusalem Post.
  • Israeli Jews' and Arabs' attitudes:  It is also fair to report that attitudes of suspicion and fear toward the behavior of the "other" group are widespread among adults of both Israeli Jewish and the Israeli Arab communities (i.e., among Muslims who are citizens of Israel).  That poll was published March 12, 2007 in Ha'aretz.  Polls linked at warlinks also speak to issues related to this point, especially the December 10, 2008 PIPA poll on the U.N.

Required readings: in addition to the articles we were to read for Monday March 16, you should be prepared to discuss in class on March 18 having read: 

Supplemental (optional) materials: The ways of the Global War on Terrorism. As terrorists' recruitment of new jihadists is a focus in this part of the course, I call students' attention to this piece published March 20, 2007, at the Middle East Media Research Institute  (MEMRI) on how jihadists were then being advised to manipulate U.S. public opinion by posting as if they are Americans on U.S. websites' message boards, forums, etc.

 

Class today will discuss all the readings for March 16 and March 18, and the film about Al Qaeda 2.0.  

Questions on Simon and Martini, "Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support," (2004/2005):

Can changes in international norms change the way states behave?  Exemplify.

Of what importance are norms in the war on terrorism?

How can "norm entrepreneurs" be helpful?

What steps can be taken to bring states and regional organizations to better support norms against terrorism?

  • Why are efforts toward the Arab League of particular importance in this regard?

Why are steps that are directed at states not enough?

What can be done to affect social attitudes about terrorism, to eliminate "cheerleading" for the terrorists?

How have U.S. actions, such as at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, had impact on this project?

What evidence is there that even Al Qaeda has been forced to recognize emerging norms in regard to respect for the laws of war as they impact Arabs and Muslims?

Questions on Boaz Ganor, "Dilemmas Concerning Media Coverage of Terrorist Attacks" (2005):

  • Weigh the advantages and disadvantages of media coverage of terrorist attacks?

    • How does media coverage figure in realizing the aims of the terrorists?

    • What was Abu Iyad's position on media coverage of the Munich Olympics massacre of 1972?  Does this still seem to "make sense" to contemporary terrorists?

    • Would complete lack of coverage serve the interests of the West?

    • What is the "journalist's dilemma"?  How does Ganor suggest it best can be resolved?

Questions on John F. Stacks: "Watchdogs on a Leash" (2003):

  • According to your understandings of the era from World War II to the end of the Vietnam war, were these truly the "good old days" for the press?  Was the world Stacks misses ever really like what he described? 
  • What were the worrisome policies. as described by Stacks?  Briefly list a few in your mind.
  • Are these worrisome policies described by Stacks largely over?  Is this whole article just anti-Bush hysteria, or are the concerns that led to some of the policies criticized here likely to lead to the continuation of the policies?

 

 

 

 

 

March 23 and 25, 2009 topics/questions

Challenges in Fighting Terrorism, I: Is the “Global War on Terrorism” eroding values central to our free society?

History of Terrorism Fact of the day:

Announcements:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Course notes projected onto the screen during class March 23  now are available: follow this link.

Course notes from our guest speaker's talk (March 25) are linked here.

Updates:

  • Today's class film, "In Search of the Sleeper Cell (The Lackawanna Six)," will focus on Al Qaeda recruitment efforts in the U.S., and counter-terrorism efforts by the U.S. Government to stop such recruitment.  That 2001-02 event focuses us on issues of surveillance, and readings for today broaden into matters of interrogation.  But more sleeper cells keep cropping up.  A 2007 CBS "60 Minutes" segment dealt with this same topic.  Class time is not likely to be devoted to it, but interested students who want to view that segment can do so at: http://www.cbsnews.com/sections/i_video/main500251.shtml?id=2534933n .  Also, the articles linked below by Anastasia (i.e., Fort Dix case) and Ephron (i.e., Somali Americans' recruited to jihad) will underline to students that the issues in the Lackawanna Six case remain live issues.

Before class read:

Class today will view a film, "The Lackawanna Six," (PBS, 2004).  The "Lackawanna Six" film tells the story of a radical Islamist terrorism ring inside the United States.

Questions on Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror" (2002):

  • Why, according to Betts, is America's primacy both an asset and a cause of terrorism?

  • Americans think of themselves as being above the random killing of civilians, but Betts points out circumstances in which historically, and hypothetically in the future, the U.S. would so act.  What were these precedents, and does Betts' case convince you we might so act again?

  • In reviewing counterinsurgency theory and offense-defense theory, Betts states "if Al Qaeda-like groups can stay in the field indefinitely, they win" (392).  Explain this.

  • Betts concludes that a response to terrorism would be wise that would "focus attention on the political causes of their grievance."  What does Betts suggest or imply this would involve?  Do you concur with him?  Why or why not?

Questions on Bruce Hoffman, “A Nasty Business:”

  • According to Hoffman, in fighting terrorism which is most important: information, military measures, or police work?  Why?

  • Why does Hoffman contend that the film “Battle of Algiers” is important?

  • What is the meaning of the phrase “the innocent deserve more protection than the guilty”?

  • What is your reaction to “Thomas”?  Has the U.S. become “like Thomas”?

    Aside:  Why interrogate detainees in the Global War on Terrorism?  Are there really moments of imperative action as Hoffman suggests in his article for Wednesday?  Two years ago, terrorists used a surface-to-air missile to down a large transport aircraft from Belarus while it was on takeoff after delivering relief supplies near Mogadishu, Somalia.  This event seems to have happened on Saturday March 24, 2007.  A brief Washington Post news story about the incident is linked here (scroll down to find it there); a longer Reuters' story confirming the basic details presented in class is linked here.  An AP story on this also mentioned an earlier attack on a relief plane from Belarus, one that was struck by a rocket propelled grenade on March 13.  All this points to the continued vulnerability of non-military aircraft in many places around the world, a topic that was the subject of a December 2005 PBS documentary, "Defending the Sky."  Prof. Bowen views this missile attack as it relates to advocacy within the U.S. for installation of anti-missile technologies onto U.S. commercial aircraft by U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY), and in relation to the dangers posed to homeland security if such technologies are not adopted.  Schumer has been advocating installation of anti-missile technologies on U.S. commercial aircraft since 2003 (go to CNN transcript; Schumer press release).  The connection of these events and issues to today's class content lies in the nature of the further Al Qaeda plots against the U.S. to which 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad has confessed, and the urgency felt within U.S. security bureaucracies regarding his interrogation about such plots.  Not only were his plans not hypothetical: ongoing terrorists' actions against commercial aircraft aren't hypothetical either.

 

 

 

March 30, 2009

History of terrorism facts: On this date in 2002, a suicide/homicide bomber from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade exploded a bomb filled with nails in a Jerusalem open air shopping street, killing 1 and injuring 50.

topics/questions: Challenges in Fighting Terrorism, II: Do costs associated with "extraordinary rendition" exceed the benefits?

Announcements:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

Class notes projected onto the screen during class today now are available: follow this link.

Before class read these required readings:

 

 

 

  April 1, 2009:

topics / questions: Challenges in Fighting Terrorism III: Has the American Public been involved adequately in U.S. counter-terrorism efforts?

History of Terrorism facts of the day.  On this date in:

1986: A bomb exploded on TWA flight 840, killing four and wounding nine; Hawari group blamed.

2001: In Gaza. Palestinian Islamic Jihad official Muhammad ‘Abd al-Il‘al was killed in Israeli rocket attack

2003: In the Philippines, the Indonesian jihadist group J.I. (Jemaah Islamiyah) exploded a bomb on a crowded passenger wharf, killing 16 and injuring 55.

Announcements:

Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.

An abbreviated version of the 2008 film "The Third Jihad," which concerns the radical Islamist movement in the United States today, and which was begun on March 30, is likely to form part of our class today.  Interested students wanting an advanced look may do so by following this link.

Required readings for today will be discussed:

  • Jarret Brachman, “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer 2006), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 6, Article No. 3.

 

  • Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” Special Report No. 116 (March 2004), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 6, Article No. 4.

 

Questions on Jarret Brachman, "High Tech Terror: Al Qaeda's Use of New Technology" (2006).  (Brachman works at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point):

Questions on Gabriel Weimann, "www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet" (2004):

 

 

Questions on Beverly Lindsay, “Democracy, Terrorism, and University Engagement,” in Lowther and Lindsay, Chapter 9.:

 

Questions on Reid Sawyer and Jodi Vittori, “The Uncontested Battles: The Role of Actions, Networks, and Ideas in the Fight against Al-Qaeda (2007),” in Howard, et. al., Chapter 10, Article No. 3.

 

 April 6, 2009: topics / questions

Limits, Futures

History of terrorism fact of the day:  On April 6, 2001, Algerian Ahmed Ressam was convicted for participation in New Year’s Day 2000 bomb plot against Los Angeles International Airport.

Class notes projected onto the screen during class today now are available: follow this link.

Announcements: Today's class is about what we need to do to prepare and to win the conflict with militant Islamist terrorism.

Before class read:

 

Discussion of Rob de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," (2002)

Questions on Howard, "Winning the Campaign against Terrorists: five considerations" (2007)

Describe what Howard means by each of  his five propositions, then evaluate the extent to which what he suggests will help.

 

 April 8, 2009: topics / questions

All term papers are due today.

History of Terrorism Fact of the Day:  On this date in 1998, in Greece: Rocket attack damaged US Citibank and other buildings; the terrorist group "17 November" claimed responsibility on 9 April 2001.

Announcements:

 April 13, 2009: topics / questions

History of Terrorism Fact of the Day:  On this date in 2003. in Pakistan: Jamiat Ulema-e Islami member killed two relatives of the Governor of Kandahar, Afghanistan, and wounded another.

Announcements:

The procedures for delivery of oral reports: no advance schedule of term paper oral reports will be announced.  Attendance at all oral reports is required by each student, who may be called on at any time to deliver her report.

 

 April 15, 2009: topics / questions

History of Terrorism Fact of the Day:  On this date in 1986, in Sudan: US Embassy communicator shot and wounded in Khartoum.

Announcements: course notes projected onto the screen today now are available, follow this link.

Prof. Bowen has been informed of a summer opportunity for students interested in careers in intelligence work.  Announced only this week, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is seeking applications from college seniors (and graduate students) for a two week residential program in Washington, D.C., July 13-24.  Topic of this program is "“Political Instability – International Systems in Transition.”  Students will receive SECRET clearances for the duration of the session, will work with intelligence professionals, hear lectures, go on field trips, etc.  All will take place in the D.C. area.  Students will receive room, board, travel expenses, course materials, and a $1000 stipend.  Application deadline is April 30.  For more information, follow this link.

The procedures for delivery of oral reports: no advance schedule of term paper oral reports will be announced.  Attendance at all oral reports is required by each student, who may be called on at any time to deliver her report.

Concluding Remarks. 

This page last updated December 16, 2009

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