PolS 311: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
Spring Semester 2011
Gordon L. Bowen, Ph.D.,
Professor of Political Science,
Mary Baldwin College Staunton VA 24401
gbowen@mbc.edu
This page last updated
October 13, 2011
Daily Class Notes and Questions
Prof. Bowen's inclement weather policy:
If the College is open, class will occur; if the College is closed,
class is cancelled. To learn if the College is closed on any
snowy/icy day, call 540-887-7000. Any exception to the
statement above will be posted here.
Jan. 10, 2011:
History of
Terrorism Fact: This week in 1998, Ramzi Yousef was sentenced
to life in prison plus 240 years for his role in the first
bombing of the World Trade Center (1993)
PolS 311: First class
overview: Agenda projected onto the screen during class today is now available; follow
this link.
1. Introductions to the course: please consult the course syllabus
whenever there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
2. Personal Introductions
3. content: "The State
System and the Role of Non-State Actors in International Relations"
1. Explanation of Course, advanced
level special topic, intended
student clientele, policies and requirements, read the syllabus
-Basics: Attendance Policy, Need for
Oral participation if a semblance of a seminar style is going to work
-Course content and goals
-Evaluation formula:
oral
participation including oral report on term paper...20%
Quizzes...20%
Midterm examination...20%
Final Exam ...20%
Term Paper... 20%
2. Personal Introductions
Photos will be taken for Seating Chart
Personal Introductions
- Student introductions: name, hometown,
major, class level, foreign travel, internships, summer work, related courses,
etc.
- Prof. Bowen's introduction
3. Lecture: "The State System and
the Role of Non-State Actors in International Relations"
Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman (of the Rand
Corporation, a Santa Monica, CA think tank, at the time; now of
Georgetown University) once wrote:
"The
global security environment has changed. No longer does ideology
dictate superpower confrontation. No longer do the superpowers and
their surrogates compete for the world's allegiance and resources. No
longer do realist and idealist theories based on sovereign state behavior
and state interaction provide satisfactory frameworks for discussing
American and international security. Nowadays failed, failing, and
rogue states and transnational actors are our chief security concerns."
Major points:
- Killing/shooting political leaders aims to destroy legitimate government, whether in Arizona or Pakistan.
- This is a practical course, where we study a pressing problem domestically and internationally.
- The Hobbesian Nature of
the globe: within states there is the possibility of lawful order; but in the global system, there is no sovereign. The will of the strong prevails much like in a human community without law or government.
- Sovereignty of States has made them the Key
Actors (since 1648); most I.R. traditionally has studied the problem of inter-state violence. But U.S. power is so preponderant that all states are deterred from attacking it. This is not true of non-state actors, who cannot (apparently) be deterred.
- (Of course, there have been some feeble attempts to bring order into the
international state system by introducing another form of non-state actor: International Organizations. These differ from today's menacing non-state actors inasmuch as they have been composed chiefly of sovereign states, not non-state political or religious movements).
- Terrorist organizations: non-state
actors are best known by the effect of their actions, not their claims to laudable (or ridiculous) goals.
- This course should introduce you to what the practical problems are in fashioning policies to deal with this threat to national security and to individual Americans.
Jan. 12, 2011:
Defining Terrorism; and the Contemporary Threat
History of
Terrorism fact of the day: While Americans
prefer to believe that the world sympathized with them after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, in fact the attacks were celebrated in several places in the Muslim
world. See picture above, or examine this arresting September 2008 public opinion poll on the matter of who committed the attack of 9/11.
(Many
other polls on related topics are linked here).
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
I.e.:
-
Bruce Hoffman, from
"Defining Terrorism," Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press,
2006), in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment, 3rd edition Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, eds. (McGraw
Hill, 2009), pp 4-33.
-
Eqbal Ahmad (with David Barsamian), from Eqbal Ahmad, Terrorism: Theirs & Ours (Seven Stories
Press, 2001), in Howard and Sawyer, pp 34-41.
- Kristina Goetz, “Memphian drifted to dark side of Islamic extremism, plotted one-man jihad vs. homeland,” The Commercial Appeal (Memphis, TN: Nov. 14, 2010): http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2010/nov/14/memphis-man-plots-jihad-against-homeland/?print=1
Class will
discuss the assigned readings.
Supplemental
(optional) experiences and readings:
- View this brief (2 1/2 minute) excerpt
from the film "Blues by the Beach." Then read an article, "Collateral
Damage," on the impact of the 2003 suicide bombing at Mike's Place, Tel
Aviv, Israel, from Money Magazine, January 2007, can be read by following this link. This is not among the required readings of our course.
But the link is intended to help students appreciate the consequences of terrorism at
an individual level.
- Prof. Bowen's online discussion of types
of terrorism also might be of interest, as might his discussion of what
are the most
effective types of counter-terrorism policies.
- Prof. Bowen's
definition of terrorism, penned five years ago also might assist
understanding.
- Cool stuff from the National
Counterterrorism Center: Download now a copy of the 2011
Counter-Terrorism Calendar's Interactive Timeline and get updated "Facts of the Day" with which to
impress friends and teachers. Also included: biographies
of key terrorists, reward information, maps, and much more in the
multimedia version. That same link also will provide access to interactive maps, profiles, and much more.
Questions from required Readings:
Hoffman:
- Is terrorism a single phenomenon?
- What importance is there in carefully defining
terrorism?
- What do the Geneva Conventions tell us about
terrorism?
Ahmad:
- Who are the "ours" in the title of this article?
- Are the relationships between state terrorism and
terrorism that Ahmad draws credible, factual?
- Is Ahmad's historical account accurate?
- What does Ahmad contend is Osama bin Laden's goal?
Is this credible?
Goetz:
- Describe the transformation of
Carlos Leon Bledsoe into
Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad.
- Was Muhammad a threat prior to becoming a terrorist? In what sense?
- How does Muhammad conceptualize his "enemies"? On what grounds does he justify killing them?
Jan. 17,
2011:
History of Terrorism Facts: This week in 2002, Palestinian
militia leader Ra'id al-Karni was killed by an Israeli bomb
outside his home in the West Bank.
On Jan. 18, 1982,
American University in Beirut President Malcolm Kerr was
assassinated by gunmen claiming to be from the Islamic Jihad.
topics/questions: Theories about terrorism: Arabs' anger theory; globalization theory
- On Sunday Jan. 16, Prof. Bowen published an editorial on matters related to our class. It concerned the relative health of American democracy in light of the shooting Jan. 8 in Tucson, and how our reactions to it differ from the public in Pakistan's reactions to a Jan. 4 assassination there. As levels of support for political violence and extremism in the Muslim world are central analytic issues engaged in our course, the points made in the editorial directly bear on our class. It is, of course, optional, but please read it at either its original place of publication, or a scan of the published version here.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
All assignments should be read, and we will start with focus on:
- Kanan Makiya, “Arab Demons, Arab
Dreams, 1967-2003,” from The Fight is for Democracy ed. George Parker
(NY: HarperCollins/Perennial, 2003): pp 139-164; follow this link to
read Makiya online.
- Audrey Kurth Cronin, from "Behind the
Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security (Winter 2002/2003), in Howard and Sawyer, pp 57-78.
- Mary Habeck, “Teaching
the Long War and Jihadism,” Footnotes (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Foreign Policy Research Institute), Vol. 14, No. 25, October 2009. Should that
link go dead, a copy
is available permanently here.
Agenda: Class notes
projected onto the screen today now are accessible: follow this link.
During
class, we may discuss Makiya, and may watch a film about the life of Osama bin
Laden (Dr. Bowen's tape #75, originally broadcast on The History Channel,
March 28, 2005). Several points made in the film bear reiteration,
including the family's humble background in Yemen, its ties to the ruling
House of Saud in Saudi Arabia that produced great wealth for the bin Ladens,
the prestigious role the bin Ladens played in the renovations of the holy
sites of Islam, and the sources of Osama's estrangement from his family and
the state of his birth. Students first were introduced to the jihad against the Soviet Union in this film, and the mingling of U.S. policies
with the migration of Muslim mujihideen to Afghanistan during the
1980's was established. Also of some importance was the prominent role
of the city of Peshawar, Pakistan in the 1980's war as a staging area and as
a refugee center. While this was briefly touched upon be alert to the
appearance of Peshawar as a continuing hub of jihadist activities down to
the present. Notably, the film mentioned ties between Al Qaeda to the
persons who committed the first bombing of the World Trade Center in New
York (1993). This fact is of greater significance than it was given:
the leader of the 1993 bombings was (and is) the nephew of Khalid Sheikh
Muhammed, the operational planner of 9.11, in U.S. detention since 2003 and about whom U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder cannot decide what to do. Moreover, ties among non-Al
Qaeda Muslim jihadists to Al Qaeda operations will be shown later in the
course to be a key dimension of the contemporary terrorism problem.
Thus, it is of importance to show that this always has been the case and is
not new. The film also responded to errors of fact found in earlier
readings: it addressed the fact of bin Laden's indictment by a U.S. Court
both prior to the 1998 Al Qaeda bombings in East Africa, and for a second time after those bombings. These facts undermine
one of the claims made by author Eqbal Ahmad, whom we read for Jan. 12
(i.e., the faulting of the U.S. for not seeking criminal charges against bin
Laden). Of somewhat lesser importance is the claim made in the film
that Osama fashions himself as a modern Saladin. On this historic
figure, see below:
Insights into the geography of terrorism: an
occasional feature of the PolS 311 daily notes, occasionally interesting.
The odd
coincidences of history: Two places, Qom,
Iran and Tikrit, Iraq, come up a lot when thinking of the history of
anti-Western terrorism.
Qom is where the Order of
the Assassins began in the eleventh century. Hassan I Sabah,
founder of the order, was born in Qom. Walter Laqueur (1999:
11) explains:
"Sabah adopted an
extreme form of Ismaili doctrine that called for the seizure of
several mountain fortresses; the first such fortress, Alamut, was
seized in 1090. Years later the Assassins decided to transfer
their activities from remote mountain regions to the main urban
centers. Their first urban victim was the chief minister of
the Sultan of Baghdad, Nazim al Mulq, a Sunnite by religious
persuasion and therefore an enemy. During the years that
followed, Assassins were active in Persia, Syria, and Palestine,
killing a great number of enemies, mainly Sunnis but also
Christians, including Count Raymond II of Tripoli in Syria and
Marquis Conrad of Montferrat, who ruled the kingdom of
Jerusalem...[who] was killed by a small group of emissaries who had
disguised themselves as monks. Seen in retrospect, the
impact of the Assassins was small -- they did not make many converts
outside their mountain fortress, nor did they produce any
significant changes in Muslim thought or practice. Alamut was
occupied by Mongol invaders around 1270, but the Assassins had
ceased to be a major force well before then. (Their main
contribution was perhaps originating the strategy of the terrorist
disguised -- taqfir, or deception-- as a devout emissary but
in fact on a suicide mission, in exchange for which he was
guaranteed the joys of paradise)." (emphasis by Prof. Bowen)
Qom also was the home of Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the
1978-79 Iranian Revolution. It long has remained a center of Shi'ite
religious training. Until the dawn of the new
millennium, no modern person did more to rekindle animosities between
Shi'ites and Sunnis, and between followers of Shi'ite Islam and the West. Khomeini died in 1989.
two
pictures of the late Ruhollah Khomeini
An excellent article about the impact of Khomeini's fatwa against Salman Rushdie --an order to kill him-- issued
by the Ayatollah Khomeini, ruler of the Islamic Republic of Iran in
1989, is: Christopher Hitchens,
"Assassins of the Mind," Vanity Fair (February 2009).
Tikrit is the home town of
Saladin, leader
of the Arab armies who defeated the Second Crusade. Tikrit also was the home of
(the late) Saddam Hussein, ruler of Iraq, 1978-2003. Hussein was captured by U.S.
armed forces just a few miles outside Tikrit, in December 2003. Tikrit remains home to many with kinship ties to him even today,
was one of many centers of violent opposition to the American
military role in Iraq, 2003-2010, and remains an important center for violent resistance to the elected Iraqi Government. Indeed, on the date of this lesson in 2011, a bombing at a police recruiting station in Tikrit killed 65 residents, principally police trainees and candidates for the police force. Al Qaeda was blamed in the Iraqi press.
Two images of Saladin
Questions on / foci for study of Makiya:
Arrestingly, Makiya suggests (160) that it is "a world
whose own failures are responsible for creating bin Laden in the first
place..."
To what "failures,"
in what "world," and by whom, is Makiya referring?
Recount the main events in the life of Mohammed Atta,
and of Ziad Jarrah.
Makiya suggests that "normal, ordinary people
perpetrated September 11" (140-141) and that it was not "the tenets of
their religion" that inclined them to such "horrific and bestial"
behavior. If so, what did so incline them?
What does he mean by Arabs' "inner defeat"?
What caused this "complex of victim-hood... that is applicable to one
degree or another to all peoples of the Middle East" (144)?
Who (or what) does he blame for
"a vacuum that was increasingly filled by a conspiratorial view of
history" (143-144) among modern Muslim youth?
What difference did it make, according to Makiya,
that all the " 'isms'... had hit the dust" (151) by our contemporary
times?
Does it point to a meaningful difference when Makiya
contrasts the backgrounds of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri as "a
very far cry" different when compared with the backgrounds of Arafat,
Hussein, Gadhafi, and Assad? (155)
How does "purity" figure in Wahhabism, and in the
thought of Osama (according to Makiya)?
Questions on Cronin:
Cronin writes: "Analyzing terrorism as something
separate from globalization is misleading and potentially dangerous."
What does she mean, and in light of what you have learned from reading
Makiya, do you agree?
To what extent, if any, do different rates of
national development in the State of Israel and in the
Palestinian Authority shape the political choice to engage in
suicide / homicide bombing?
What roles does Cronin contend have been played by ____ in
the emergence of contemporary terrorism:
- struggles to end imperial
"empires"
- struggles for self-determination and
against colonialism
- the internationalization of terrorism that
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s
- the revival of religion as a political
force
- the lowering of barriers to commerce,
trade, and the flow of ideas in the modern age
Makiya reminded us that Saudi Arabia
never was colonized: does that point diminish to any degree the argument
made above by Cronin? Why or why not?
What do these two authors think of the
effectiveness of a counter-terrorism policy based on ending the "state
based power" from which terrorism arises?
To what extent does the present situation in Iraq confirm Cronin's views?
... does... Afghanistan?
Questions on Habeck :
Habeck breaks down various terms often used too loosely in describing the elements in global Muslim communities that pose a threat to U.S. national security.
- What is the essential agenda of the Islamists? How big a percentage of Muslims worldwide are they?
- What additional beliefs are held by that portion of the Islamists who properly should be labeled jihadists? How large a group does Habeck believe them to be?
- How is jihad understood differently by each group?
Speaking as a Westerner, Habeck implores readers to grasp that "it's not all about us." What did she mean by this, and are the conclusions she draws in this section of her article reasonable?
Habeck presents five frameworks within which to understand the threat posed today by international terrorism emanating from elements in the Muslim communities. Following her analysis, what are the strengths and weaknesses in looking at this problem as:
- Crime
- Clash of civilizations
- Global Insurgency.
- Islamic Reformation
- World War IV
Jan. 19, 2011
History of
Terrorism facts:
- On this date in
2003, a gunman ambushed a U.S. vehicle in Kuwait, near Camp
Doha, killing one contractor and wounding another.
- This week in 1991, the air war phase of
Operation Desert Storm began the first U.S. war against Iraq, a
chief sponsor of international terrorism at the time.
- Robert
Dean Stethem. Five years ago, in January 2006, Prof. Bowen published an editorial concerning an early act of terrorism in the war of militant Islamists
against the United States. It was committed in
1985 and should not be forgotten: the killing of U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem
in Beirut, Lebanon. Read the editorial here. Stethem's killers have never
been brought to face American justice; they live unmolested in Lebanon. A link to a 2007 statement about the case made by Stethem's family can be found by
following this link. The case is also discussed in the January 22, 2006 entry in the Bowen weblog. U.S. failure to forcefully respond to the killing of Stethem clearly did not
win us many friends in the 1980's, as this"History of Terrorism fact" of the day
indicates. In light of the willingness of the U.S. to launch
anti-terror attacks inside Syria (October 2008) and inside Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia (ongoing), what
signal is sent by continued U.S. reticence to launch a covert operation
to capture or kill these men in Lebanon?
topic: Religious beliefs and the "New Terrorism"
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Announcements:
- The changing face of the enemy: 12 Canadian converts to Islam are training for terror in Pakistan. Syed Saleem Shahzad, Pakistan Bureau Chief for the respected Asia Times reported on Jan. 15, 2011, that a group of Canadians of Anglo appearance are training in North Waziristan (Pakistan) to prepare to attack back at home. His article,
"Al-Qaeda to unleash Western jihadis," points to an alarming trend in which native British and German citizens also are known to have been involved. Egyptian militants of the
Jihad al-Islami organization are reported to have assisted these Canadians get to Afghanistan and into contact with Al Qaeda. The report suggests they have been training since November 2010, and will soon be sent back to sow terror in the West. So, Habeck may (or may not) be right in her estimates (i.e., "a tiny minority-- less than one percent of that 25%" of Muslims who are Islamists) about how marginal these global jihadis are within the larger Islamist and jihadi communities, but it still seems that there are growing numbers of these guys.
- Cool stuff from the National
Counterterrorism Center: Download a copy of the 2011
Counter-Terrorism Calendar's Interactive Timeline and get updated "Facts of the Day" to
impress friends and teachers with. Also included: biographies
of key terrorists, reward information, maps, and much more in the
multimedia version. That same link also will provide access to interactive maps, profiles, and much more.
- Bibliographies for term papers. While
this project is not due for several more weeks (Feb. 28th), it is important to
get started finding sources about a topic in which you have interest.
Do not discount the use of assigned course materials. Their
theories can valuably orient a paper, and their footnotes offer
leads to other sources. Additionally, Prof. Bowen has
assembled a richly detailed annotated bibliography of sources about terrorism which he
invites you to use as you see fit, e.g. to find ideas for topics
about which to investigate, to find leads about books on topics, to
find quotes within works not yet readily available to you, etc.
Assisting students is the whole point of the annotated bibliography,
and the leads found through links in this webpage and others
maintained by Dr. Bowen.
The sources you propose to use to inform your paper are important: I will keep a Xerox copy of what you
proposed and will comment to you about your proposed paper and
bibliography. All bibliographies should continue to evolve as you each become more informed about your
topic, but you should also use the sources you propose to use. To study a single terrorist group,
and / or a single incident requires digging. In those cases where a foreign country's behavior pertains to your
topic, and where brief academic articles may help you to understand that
country's politics, or its role in the war on terrorism, I recommend that
you additionally consult:
- U.S. Department of State "Country
Reports on Terrorism," which are issued annually and which
discuss the situation in nearly all countries impacted by
terrorism.
Though the new administration may change these addresses,
for now go here for
links to all recent State Department reports.
- National Counter-terrorism Center, to check for
information relevant to a topic which interests you.
- Another useful resource is Current History magazine. In it you will find useful articles, which all will be found in our bound periodicals
section of the Grafton Library.
- To find full text of news
information that is up to date, or time specific to past events relevant
to your topic, consult the Lexis
Nexis database, which is accessed through the MBC Library
website. Simply select it from the pull down menu on the left that
says "choose a database." Lexis Nexis will put full text
of articles onto your computer in a downloadable form, complete with their
original source citations. Using Lexis Nexis will make delving into the background of incidents and terrorists through use of local and more obscure regional newspapers much easier. They also will allow you to access articles from the New York Times and the Washington Post archives, without paying fees. The JSTOR, Wilson, and Expanded Academic indexes
will give leads to academic articles; use the key words about your topic
to get started in using them.
- There also are a wealth of leads to be
found on the Warlinks
webpage I have maintained for several years as a way to facilitate
student research on this subject. Here you will find ample statements by terrorists and terrorist groups, well indexed and in translation. These often are the source materials quoted in news sources, so take advantage of their collections to read the full, or longer versions.
- Early submission of your
bibliography also will facilitate us working together so that you can have
available the best quality sources for your topic.
Class today may discuss:
Class will view the film "The Age of Terror: In the Name of God " (Discovery Times Channel March 4, 2004/Prof. Bowen's tape #74) then will discuss the film and
the readings.
Questions about readings:
Discussion today will likely extend into Monday Jan. 24. Our first focus on the "classic" arguments made by Ranstorp; and then we will examine these issues in the Muslim world (Laqueur) and the related contemporary issues raised by Sivan and by Barclay .
Why is
greater attention paid to religious terrorists now? Is this America’s obsession or is it objectively indicated?
To what extent is contemporary terrorism chiefly a manifestation of inter-civilizational
war?
To
what extent is the contemporary terrorist threat to the United States a manifestation of a "civil war"
within Islam?
Describe the
factors that have produced a great upswing in religion-based terrorism within
Islam since 1979.
Are these
factors “reversible” through any sort of foreign policy or
counter-terrorism policy? Why or
why not?
How has
religion-based terrorism had impact on the Israel – Palestinian conflict?
In what sense did a peace agreement between secular political authorities (1993) break down
due to actions of religious zealots, 1993-2000? Have religious authorities
played constructive roles in regard to the current violence (Sept.
2000-present)?
Have societal religious beliefs?
Jan. 24, 2011
History of Terrorism
facts:
-
This week in 1999, France sentenced to eight years in prison
eight leaders of the Algeria-based terrorist group known as the G.I.A.
-
On Jan. 25,
1993, Mir Amal Kansi killed two and wounded three more in an attack
on CIA personnel outside CIA headquarters in McLean, VA.
topics/questions: Islam and Islamists' extremism
Announcements:
- Today's class will feature a guest speaker from the U.S. Intelligence Community: “Understanding Islam and its Extremists” by Michael Knapp, Senior Defense Analyst, United States Army National Ground Intelligence Center (Charlottesville, VA). This talk is open only to enrolled students. Attendance is required, as at all other meetings of PolS 311. Listen carefully, take notes, and ask pertinent questions when given the opportunity.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc. Readings for today include:
Michael Knapp, "The Concept of Jihad," Parameters (Spring 2003), 82-94.
Emmanuel Sivan, “The
Clash within Islam,” Survival (Spring 2003), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 4, Article 3, pp 248-262.
Walter Laqueur, "The Origins of Islamic
Terrorism," in No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Continuum Books, 2003): 30-48.
Warning:
some of what is described in the Laqueur reading for today is
grisly, and may seem excessively graphic in its depictions of
the techniques employed by jihadists against their
targeted enemies. Prof. Bowen understands these reactions.
However, it is important to grasp even the aspects of
terrorists' tradecraft that disgust our sensibilities. As much
as we must understand their motives, we need to connect the dots
that tie the ways in which jihadist terrorists interpret
religious texts to compel them to act on their felt need to
commit specific acts of violence. Laqueur's incorporation
of information about mutilation and beheading (etc.) into his
analysis is not only historically accurate but necessary to his
argument about "The Origins of Islamic Terrorism." If
students are going to be able to fully understand the link
between jihadists' ideological inspirations, their
tactics, and their overall goal of uniting all Muslims, on
occasion we must look with open eyes at the methods of violence
they feel entitled to use toward those persons who are targeted
as enemies. These techniques are intended to induce fear
both among enemies and among Muslims.
For further study on
the specific relationship between beheading and radical Islam, I
recommend (optional): Timothy R. Furnish, "Beheading in the Name of Islam," Middle East Quarterly (Spring 2005): http://www.meforum.org/article/713
Questions on Knapp
How is jihad an obligation to Muslims?
How has its meaning in regard to war changed over time?
Consider modern Islamists' use of the concept of jihad: has it enlarged upon, or adhered to, traditional interpretations? Explain.
According to scholars such as the late Fadlallah, how does the response of the West affect the legitimacy of militants' acts that they refer to as jihad?
Of what significance beyond Pakistan are madrassas in Pakistan?
Questions on Sivan:
The "clash within Islam," the author argues, pits
liberals against both traditionalists and radical Islamists. Why, in
an age of global democratization, are these liberal forces despondent and
not influential in the Muslim world?
What is "ijtihad"? What does the struggle to
realize it entail?
What does the author think of the prospects for
democracy if groups like the Muslim Brotherhood come to power in states,
much like the AKP party has come to power in Turkey?
Is Indonesia ripe for a radical Islamist takeover
through the ballot box? Why or why not?
Questions on Laqueur:
Did Muslim terrorism emerge from a strand of
idealism? Explain.
What originally was the Muslim Brotherhood?
- Why has it evolved into what is it today?
- How does it resemble, and how is it
different from contemporary Islamist terrorist groups?
How does Laqueur characterize Qutb's contribution
to the evolution of Islamism and terrorism in Egypt?
- What organized groups grew out of, or were
inspired by, Qutb?
- What sort of social background have members
of these groups come from?
- Does the percentage of university
educated persons (41) resemble that of other radical groups?
- Do you agree with Laqueur's
interpretation of motivations involved in these persons' joining
in radical politics?
- How have the activities of these groups had
impact on the evolution of politics in Egypt?
- What is Taqfir va'l hejra?
In what sense is it still of significance?
- What, if any, is the connection to the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York?
- What impact have Qutb's legacies had on
inter-faith relations in Egypt?
- How does Ayman al Zawahiri emerge as a
leader?
- Why does Zawahiri ultimately turn
against the Muslim Brotherhood?
- What impact have these groups had on the
human rights of homosexuals and other minorities?
Jan. 26, 2011 topics/questions
History of
Terrorism facts:
-
This week in 1987, four Americans were abducted
by terrorists in Beirut: Allen Steen, Jesse Turner, Robert Polhill,
and Mithileshwar Singh.
-
On Jan. 27,
2002, a female suicide bomber from Fatah killed herself and one
Israeli, and injured 150 others, in an attack in Jerusalem.
topic: The Egyptian roots of Al Qaeda; the terrorists' use of the Islamic concept of jihad
As class was cancelled due to snow, no course notes are available from today's (cancelled) class.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Announcements:
Today's required readings are extensive. Qutb is
a leading ideologist of the thinking that has led to modern Islamist terrorism.
He is assigned so that students can become aware of the mode of
argument, and the mode of invoking religious justification, used to
de-legitimize secular Arab regimes and all others who are viewed by
Islamists as unworthy. His interpretation of Islam is foundational,
and is essential to acquiring the needed understanding of contemporary Islamists. Laqueur's
article from Monday Jan. 24, along with Wiktorowicz's background article from today's assignments, give important
guidance in orienting students to the practical historic impact of Qutb's thought.
(Laqueur also is an important analyst of terrorism and revolution in
other contexts, and has written extensively about Nazism and Soviet
communism).
Class notes projected
onto the screen today now are available: follow this link.
Students may also gain insights from films
not shown today about the life and
influences on the leaders of Al Qaeda today. I recommend these two films: "Osama bin Laden:
In the Name of Allah" (The History Channel, 2005) and "Osama bin Laden:
Prophet of Terror" (Times Discovery Channel, 2007) .
Announcements:
Before class read (required readings):
- Quintan Wiktorowicz, “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2005), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 4, Article 2.
- Recommended (optional) linked supporting
materials on today's topic:
- Daniel Pipes, “Jihad and the
Professors,” Commentary 114, 4 (Nov. 2002): pp 17-22… available online at: http://www.danielpipes.org/article/498
- Several of the issues raised in today's readings are discussed on this associated webpage maintained by Prof. Bowen.
- Qutb
in America: transcript of a May 6, 2003 broadcast on National Public
Radio, concerning Qutb's stay in Greeley, Colorado in 1949, and how what he
experienced there contributed to his world view.
- Highly
motivated students also are encouraged read
further the MEMRI Institute's numerous materials
related to today's theme. Of special interest may be, for example:
- The Saudi
Arabian section of the Middle East Media Research Institute; follow
the links. It should be emphasized that some of these Saudi
Arabian items contain content in which some social and political authorities attempt to
dissuade people from supporting terrorism, and other items appear to be
supporting it. If this material disturbs you, consult Woolsey's December 2005 analysis assigned for today.
- A Palestinian
Islamic leader now deceased, Dr. Abd Al-Aziz Al-Rantisi, urged Iraq to
respond by attacking Americans with the suicide bomber tactic. Dr.
Rantisi was one of the top political spokesmen for Hamas, the Islam-based
organization, until his assassination by Israel. Rantisi himself was trained as an engineer, not as a
religious professional.
- Unmentioned in
class readings, but indicative of
involvement of Christian Arab social leaders in the further encouragement of terrorism, are
statements in praise of suicide bombing by Father Theodosios Hanna,
a Greek Orthodox clergyman of Palestinian ethnicity.
These all are examples in the MEMRI collection
from several years ago, selected to reinforce our course theme of the day,
i.e., jihad, and Islamic inspirations for religious terrorism.
However, a visitor to the Palestinian
section of the MEMRI site will also find voluminous other voices,
interviews, and debates which involve secular as well as religious
authorities. These, when read thoroughly, present a more mixed picture on
the matter of the
degree to which the public in the Palestinian community is led by religious
(and secular) voices which sanctify or legitimize terrorism. I encourage
students to read broadly and to form their own informed opinions.
A similar exercise can be mounted in the
Syrian, Iranian, and other national sections of the MEMRI collections.
Questions on Qutb:
Why does Qutb suggest the believer must pull back
from the society around him?
Why is the use of the term "vanguard" by Qutb an indication of the
influence of Leninism on his thought?
What is Qutb's attitude toward the governments of the states present
in the Islamic world at the time of his writing?
Does Qutb believe that the knowledge found in the
Koran needs to be interpreted or explained by clerics in order for the
believer to gain proper guidance?
- What difference does his position make in
terms of keeping coherent the beliefs of followers of Islam?
- Have elements of Christianity taken a
position similar to that which Qutb takes about his religion?
To what effect?
Questions on Wiktorowicz:
To what degree are differences among Salafis (or
Wahhabis) add meaningful insights into our understanding of the societal
factors that contribute today to terrorism?
What organizations were influenced by the
thinking of Sayyid Qutb?
What are "voiders" to jihadists (or jihadis)?
What role did Abdullah Azzam play in the
development of modern Muslim understandings of jihad?
On the matter of targeting civilians, what
position did earlier Salafi jihadist ideologues (e.g., Qutb, Ibn
Wahhab) take on this important contemporary issue?
How did the Algerian G.I.A. contribute to the
evolution of Salafist thinking on the matter of targeting civilians?
In what ways do Al Qaeda and other modern jihadist Salafis
tend to blur the line between civilian non-combatants and military
personnel? Why do you think they might do this?
Study questions about the supplemental (optional) items for today:
Questions on Woolsey, i.e: R. James Woolsey, "The
Elephant in the Middle East Living Room: Watching Wahhabis," National Review (December 14, 2005).
Who is the "elephant in the room"?
Why do American officials have difficulty
talking publicly about the elephant?
How is Salafist ideology spread? Who
pays for this?
According to Woolsey, the U.S. now needs to
imitate certain things done in the Cold War: what are these things,
and do you agree that these measures are now desirable?
Questions on Pipes:
What social obstacles impede recognition of Pipes' points on U.S.
college campuses?
Comment on Pipes' use of
the term Jihad. Students
in the past have expressed skepticism about the position
taken here by Daniel Pipes, which was among several required readings about the concept of jihad in earlier editions of this course. It
is now a recommended supplement, not a required reading.
But we still need to engage a variety of perspectives because are reading
about jihad in order to grasp a central issue among the topics under study. The meaning of
the concept of jihad to Al Qaeda, on the other hand, is quite clear: war on
behalf of Islam. That point, not the details of Koranic scriptures, also
was Pipes' central argument.
Pipes' reading of the meaning of jihad is
not confined to fringe groups such as Al Qaeda, though it is interesting that
the organization's own magazine calls itself "Voice
of Jihad."
Islamists in the Palestinian community are more blunt still: In a Friday sermon in 2002, at the Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan
Aal Nahyan mosque in Gaza, broadcast live on official Palestinian
Authority television, Sheikh Ahmad Abu Halabiya, member of the
PA-appointed Fatwa Council and former acting rector of the Islamic
University in Gaza, said:
"Have no mercy on the Jews, no matter where they
are, in any country. Fight them, wherever you are. Wherever you meet them,
kill them. Wherever you are, kill those Jews and those Americans who are
like them – and those who stand by them – they are all in one trench,
against the Arabs and the Muslims – because they established Israel here,
in the beating heart of the Arab world, in Palestine. They created it to
be the outpost of their civilization – and the vanguard of their army, and
to be the sword of the West and of the Crusaders, hanging over the necks
of the monotheists, the Muslims in these lands. They wanted the Jews to be
their spearhead… Allah, deal with the Jews, your enemies and the enemies
of Islam. Deal with the crusaders, and America, and Europe behind them, O
Lord of the worlds" (MEMRI Institute).
The November
2008 events in Mumbai, India, --where Jews were killed
solely because they were Jews-- underline the importance of
hearing the words of religious authorities and fitting them
into a broader political analysis. These ways of thinking retain
important influence over people, and for students and scholars, they
convey an
urgent need for analysis. To underline once more,
consider these disturbing January 2009 broadcasts on HAMAS television (courtesy of
Palestinian Media Watch).
Jan. 31, 2011: topics /
questions
History of
Terrorism fact:
-
This week in 2004, in Jerusalem Hills, a bomb
planted on an Israeli public bus by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
killed 10 and injured 50.
- Also, on Feb. 1, 2004, in Iraq
Ansar al-Sunna attacks Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, killing 117 and wounding 221.
topics / questions: Al Qaeda before 9/11
Materials projected onto the screen during class today
now are available: follow this link.
In light of the cancellation of class on Wed. Jan. 26, today we will first address the general content assigned last week on what are the beliefs that guide radical Islamist terrorists. Qutb, Laqueur and the other readings will be engaged. We also must continue forward with our study this week, which turns toward one specific radical Islamist terrorist group, Al Qaeda. Thus, keep up with the assigned readings as per the syllabus. Anticipate that we will catch up quickly.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc. Readings for today:
Bernard
Lewis, “License to Kill” Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 1998), available online at:
http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/Lewis.htm
Kean, et. al., The 9/11 Report: Chapter
Two: pp 71-103.
Recommended (optional):
Al
Qaeda Training Manual,
What Jihad means
to Osama bin Laden: On February 23, 1998 the London Arabic-language
daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi published bin Laden's declaration of Jihad
which said that killing the Americans and their allies is a commandment for
every individual Muslim. The following are key excerpts:
"Praise be to God, who
brought down the Book, drives the clouds, defeats the factions, and says in
His Book: When the sacred months are over, kill the idolaters wherever you
find them, take them captive, lay siege to them and lie in wait for them at
every place of ambush [Qur'an 5:9]… Prayers and blessings of peace
upon our Prophet Muhammad, who said: I was sent with a sword in preparation
for the Day of Judgment when God alone will be worshipped with none beside
him. He assigned me a livelihood under the shadow of my spear and he
assigned humiliation and lowliness to those who disobey my command…
"Killing the Americans
and their allies – both civilians and military personnel – is a commandment
for every individual Muslim who can do this, in any country in which he can
do this, in order to free the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Al-Haram Mosque
from their grasp, and so that their armies will leave all the lands of Islam
defeated and no longer a threat to any Muslim. This is in compliance with
the words of Allah: 'Fight the polytheists all together, as they fight you
all together [Qur'an 9:36]' and 'Fight them until civil strife ceases
altogether' [Qur'an 8:39].
"This is in addition to the
words of Allah the Almighty: 'What keeps you from fighting in the cause of
Allah and of the weak from among men, women, and children who supplicate:
Lord, deliver us from this town whose people are oppressors, and appoint for
us from Thyself some helper?' [Qur'an 4:75]
"With Allah's help, we call
on every Muslim who believes in Allah and who wants reward to follow Allah's
directive about killing Americans and plundering their property wherever
they find them, whenever is possible. Similarly, we also call on the Muslim ulama, leaders, youths, and soldiers to carry out a raid on the
American soldiers of Satan and on Satan's aides, who have become their
allies…
"Allah also says, 'O ye who
believe, what ails you that, when it is said to you: Go forth, all together,
to fight in the cause of Allah; you are held down by your worldly interests?
Is it that you prefer the hither life to the Hereafter? If so, you must
remember that all this life has to offer is of little value in comparison
with the Hereafter…[Qur'an 9:38]"
source: "Contemporary Islamist Ideology Permitting
Genocidal Murder," MEMRI Institute
Special Report No. 25 (January 27, 2004, emphasis above supplied by Prof.
Bowen). The quote (above) is from section II.A. of that report.
Study / discussion questions:
Questions
from Lewis:
What grievances were cited by Al Qaeda in
their February 1998 Declaration of War? Have these issues been
in any degree resolved?
What distinctions, if any, does Al Qaeda make
in regard to targeting? Who do they profess to target?
Given the stated aims of Al Qaeda, could a
"deal" be struck with them? Why or why not?
Think about Al Qaeda's agenda:
- Are these "ultimate aims"? Or are
they "immediate objectives"?
- Do Al Qaeda statements articulate a religious
justification for their actions that is consistent with Islam?
Are they consistent with Qutb's view of Islam? Why or why not?
From the Kean reading, other course readings, lectures and other
materials overall to this point:
- How well does the life experience of the leaders of Al
Qaeda fit with theories that terrorism is a strategy of the powerless and
the oppressed?
- Osama has represented Al Qaeda as a group pursuing an
Islamic agenda, but he himself is not a trained cleric. Who were Osama's "Islamic guides"?
Does this pattern fit Qutb's model, or a different pattern?
- What characteristics distinguish Al Qaeda
terrorists who have joined while living in the Middle East from those
who have joined while living in the West (i.e., Europe, the U.S.A.)?
February 2, 2011:
History of Terrorism fact:
- This week in 2001, a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands found guilty
Libyan Abd al-Beset al-Megrahi in the bombing of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie,
Scotland on December 21, 1988, killing 240 people, including 189 U.S. citizens.
He received a 27 year jail term, but later was released by Scottish officials (over the sharp objection of the U.S. Government).
Topic: U.S. responses to terrorist groups, and to Al Qaeda, before 9.11.
Class notes projected on the screen will be available after class meets; follow this link.
Anticipate a quiz at the start of class today. It will emphasize things addressed in our last class meeting, the Lewis reading from last class and, especially, the Shultz reading for today. (No questions from the 911 Report will appear).
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc. Readings for today:
- Richard H. Shultz, Jr., from "Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Operations Forces After Al Qaeda Before 9/11," The Weekly Standard (January 26, 2004), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 7, Article 4.
- Kean, et. al., The 9/11 Report: 104-209, online at: http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf
Supplemental (optional) readings for
motivated students:
-
An extensive illustrated timeline of
attacks by Al Qaeda on U.S. personnel, and others, prior to
September 11, 2001.
-
News stories in the Washington Post
on Feb
22 and Feb
23, 2004 directly concerned US policy toward Al Qaeda prior to Sept. 11,
2001
-
Declassified sourcebooks on pre-9.11 U.S. intelligence about Bin Laden, Al Qaeda,
the bombings of the East African embassies, and of the U.S.S. Cole; as
made available at the privately-run National Security Archive at George
Washington University.
- Released Guantanamo Testimony (thanks to BBC) by the mastermind of the
operation in October 2000 against the U.S.S. Cole, Walid bin 'Attash,
includes this admission at page 8, about his role in the bombings in
1998 in Nairobi and dar es Salaam, where 213 perished (including 12
Americans) and 4500 were injured: "I was
the link between Usama bin Laden and his deputy Sheikh Abu Hafs al
Masri and the cell chief in Nairobi..." So much
for the oft heard claim that innocent men fill the cells at
Guantanamo. To read more, follow the link.
Update: Millennium Plot: Ahmed Ressam, the convicted
Al Qaeda terrorist who is serving time in a U.S. federal
prison for his role in the Millennium Plot against Los
Angeles International Airport (LAX) will be touched on in this section of the course. As Prof. Bowen
frequently has stressedd, Ressam has received what some believe to be too
short a sentence for his part in the attempt to import
explosives with which to bomb a major U.S. civilian
facility. For example, the prosecutors in the case
argued at sentencing for a 35 year sentence. Ressam
was convicted in 2001, but was not sentenced until 2005
(receiving a sentence of 22 years), after he apparently
cooperated with U.S. counter-terrorism investigators, then
stopped. In 2007, an appeals court overturned his
conviction, but in May 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court set
aside that ruling and affirmed the validity of the original
sentence. What this ultimately means is that,
according to the Federal Bureau of Prisons, Ressam is
scheduled to be released in July 2019... a mere eight years
from now.
Update: The familial link between Khalid
Sheikh Muhammad (i.e., the mastermind of 9/11) and the 1993 jihadists' attempt to blow up
the World Trade Center is under appreciated. KSM is the uncle of Ramzi Yousef, who was
convicted for his involvement in the 1993 attack on the WTC. Both Muhammad and Yousef studied electrical
engineering at Western universities, with KSM attending North Carolina A and T,
and Yousef attending a college in Wales, U.K.. Yousef was involved in
several other jihadist plots, including plans to assassinate both the Pope and
Benizar Bhutto, and other plots to explode airliners over the Pacific Ocean, including the so called "Manila Plot."
On one occasion in December 1994, a bomb planted by Yousef did in fact explode
on a Manila to Toyko flight, killing Japanese national Haruki Ikegami, but the
bomb failed to bring down the plane, and it safely landed on Okinawa, saving 270
lives. Yousef, while a nephew of KSM, is only 3 years his junior.
While all these things were done independently from Al Qaeda, they clearly targeted
similar victims and symbols using means later employed by Al Qaeda. These
facts would point to the importance of not drawing too tight a
line around what is, and what is not, Al Qaeda. Yousef now
is serving a life sentence; KSM and Binalshib await potential death sentences.
All three are in U.S. custody. For a summary of the evidence against
Binalshib, go here.
A brief (8 minute) video, "Ghost Wars" (NBC
Dateline, Feb. 22, 2004; Prof. Bowen's tape #78), will start as class today
. We then will discuss the readings for today and the events described within them and in the film.
Richard H. Shultz, Jr., from
"Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Operations
Forces After Al Qaeda Before 9/11," The Weekly Standard (January
26, 2004), in Howard and Sawyer, pp 518-530. Shultz's 2004 argument is quite
well supported by these 2009 comments by Clinton's chief anti-terrorism
official, Richard Clarke on the attitude of White House, DoD and CIA about hitting Bin Laden
prior to 9/11: "We went into a period in June
(2001) where the tempo of intelligence about an impending large-scale attack
went up a lot, to the kind of cycle that we’d only seen once or twice
before. And we told Condi that. She didn’t do anything. She said, Well,
make sure you’re coordinating with the agencies, which, of course, I was
doing. By August, I was saying to Condi and to the agencies that the
intelligence isn’t coming in at such a rapid rate anymore as it was in
the June-July time frame. But that doesn’t mean the attack isn’t going
to happen. It just means that they may be in place. On September 4
(2001), we had a principals meeting. The most telling thing for me about
the attitude of these people was on the decision that had been pending
for a long time to resume Predator [remote-controlled drone] flights
over Afghanistan, and to now do what we couldn’t have done in the
Clinton administration because the technology wasn’t ready: put a weapon
on the Predator and use it as not only a hunter but a killer. We
had seen bin Laden when we had it in the Clinton administration, as just
a hunter. We had seen him. So we thought, Man, if we could get this with
a hunter-killer, we could see him again and kill him. So finally we have
a principals meeting and the C.I.A. says
it’s not our job to fly the Predator armed. And D.O.D. says it’s not our
job to fly an unarmed aircraft." From "An
Oral History of the Bush White House," Vanity Fair (Feb. 2009).
Class will continue to analyze the events
leading to 9.11.01.
Questions from Shultz:
Summarize the reasons why the U.S. acted toward
Al Qaeda in the manner that it did prior to 9.11.01., then answer: What
was the single most important, over-riding consideration that impeded
effective action against Al Qaeda?
Consider the role of the U.S. military in the
search for an effective policy response to Al Qaeda in the 1993-2000
period, then weigh:
- Why were U.S. Special Operations Forces
used, or not used, as they were?
- Were new bases of authority needed in
law in order for the military to help here?
- What role did considerations of "force
protection" play in shaping the military's role in regard to
counter-terrorism policy?
- What is meant by the statement "It got
to the point ... [where] the uniforms had become the suits"
(526)?
Questions the 9/11 Report ( http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf):
Which opportunities to respond to the group did
the Commission believe to have had the greatest potential to disrupt the
group? When / where did these occur, and why were these
opportunities missed?
Feb. 7, 2011: The 9/11 terrorist attack on the United States of America
History of
Terrorism facts:
-
this week in 2001, France and Algeria signed
an agreement in which each state pledged to cooperate in
stopping terrorism
-
Feb. 10,
2004: terrorists in Iraq attacked police recruitment
station, killing 55 and wounding 67.
Today we will view the film "The Report of the 9/11 Commission" (Prof. Bowen's tape #76). It will be discussed on Feb. 9.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc. Readings for today:
Announcements:
Keeping the hijackers, and the hijack teams, sorted
out can be difficult when reading the official report. To assist:
Updates related to this section
of the course:
- Of interest is a CRS
study for the U.S. Congress of September 2001. The very first sentence of
that study said "Signs continue to point to a decline in state sponsorship of terrorism, as well as a rise in the scope
of threat posed by the independent network of exiled Saudi dissident Usama bin
Ladin."
- Also of interest is the declassified
Presidential Briefing Document from August 6, 2001, entitled "Bin
Laden Determined to Strike U.S."
- These materials concern confessions
by Al Qaeda members captured by U.S. forces and detained at
Guantanamo:
-
A link to the complete March 10, 2007 Khalid Sheikh Muhammad transcript released on March
15, 2007 is here.
-
A link to the March 9, 2007 Tribunal transcript of Ramzi Binalshibh is here.
-
A link to the March 9, 2007 Tribunal Transcript of Abu Faraj al-Libi is here.
-
A link to the March 12, 2007 Tribunal transcript
of Walid bin 'Attash is here.
- Remember
Hambali? Approximately five years ago, on Thurs. Feb. 9,
2006, President Bush gave new details on a planned 2002 Al Qaeda
attack on Los Angeles that was thwarted by cooperation between the
U.S. and its friends in Southeast Asia. The arrest of the
terrorist "Hambali," to whom we were introduced in our
study of the 9/11 attacks, and others was reported in new detail by
Bush. Noteworthy in this story is the embrace by Al Qaeda of
the use of non-Arabs to make an easier penetration of U.S. security
measures. This theme needs further attention, as does the
Southeast Asian ally of Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiya.
- Prof. Bowen published an editorial March
17, 2007, on the matter of the "apology" issued to Americans by Khalid
Sheikh Muhammad, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The
editorial seems to have aroused some interest.
- Read a scan of the original here. That link provides
links to all the sources I referred to in the editorial.
Review
questions:
Was this plan a
“multinational” one, or should it be viewed as a “Saudi Arabian
attack on the United States”? Why?
Persons of what
nationalities participated? Assisted?
In what
countries did training, planning, financing occur? What "safe
havens" facilitated the attackers?
To what extent,
if at all, did religious authorities or religious institutions of
Islam assist in the 9.11. attack?
Readings in our
course (e.g., Arquilla et. al.) have spoken of al Qaeda as a
“network” type of organization. How well does the “Planes
Operation” illustrate this?
The 9/11
Commission referred to al Qaeda as “not a finite group of people”
but as “an ideological movement.” How well does the “Planes
Operation” illustrate this?
February 9, 2011:
History of terrorism fact of the day: this week in 1991,
terrorists fired three mortar rounds into the U.K. Prime
Minister's office/residence at 10 Downing St., London.
topics / questions: Netwar: the organizational structure of the "new terrorism"
We will discuss today's
readings, and our earlier readings regarding the characteristics of the broader movement of which Al
Qaeda is a key part.
Class notes projected onto the screen today now are available: follow
this link.
Announcements:
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Be sure to read:
Our Day's readings:
- John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and
Michele Zanini, from "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,"
in Ian O. Lesser, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, David Ronfeldt, Michele
Zanini and Brian Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism (RAND
Corporation, 1999), in Howard and Sawyer, pp 134-157.
- Russell D. Howard, “The New Terrorism,” (2007), in Howard and Sawyer, pp
112-133.
- Rohan Gunaratna,
“Defeating Al Qaeda—The Pioneering Vanguard of the Islamic Movements,” Washington Quarterly (2007) in Howard, et. al., Chapter 3, Article 3.
Supplemental readings:
In others' words: The topic of today's class
--what to do about "netwar" terrorism-- was one of the subjects that was addressed in
an April 2005 study from the Atlantic Council of the United States. The study, no longer available at their website, contained the following
thought provoking statement in its discussion of how better to coordinate
U.S., European, and Russian policy responses to terrorism:
"... terrorism itself seems to be
evolving, as more connections develop between traditional 'nationalist'
terrorist groups and global terrorist networks. Terrorism is
increasingly characterized by decentralized networks that allow maximum
flexibility in operations. Different nodes of the network may have
considerable autonomy, and destroying one cell — or even several — may
not affect operations planned by another. Even a global terrorist
network such as al-Qaeda may find it convenient to cooperate with
international criminal networks or with traditional nationalist
terrorist groups, such as the IRA or ETA, especially in weapons
smuggling, training, and various criminal activities designed to provide
financial support. Changes in the nature of terrorism are happening so
rapidly that analysts must constantly rethink their conclusions about
terrorist operations and the threats they represent. This convergence of
views about the nature of terrorism has not, however, led to a consensus
over the most appropriate way to respond to that threat. Differences
reflect the complexity of the terrorist threat, but also grow out of the
distinct experiences the United States, Europe, and Russia have had with
terrorism and the different capabilities each can bring to bear.
Responses can be divided into three distinct elements, not all of which
are equally accepted in importance among the U.S., Russian, and European
governments: protection of domestic society, penetration and defeat of
the terrorist groups, and the pursuit of political steps to divorce
terrorists from their broader base of support."
Given the high public hopes that once accompanied the inauguration of more
engaging qualities to U.S. foreign policy in the Obama
Administration, student study and thought about the role alliances and allies
have played, and can play, in
the achieving U.S. counterterrorism goals is especially timely.
Questions on Arquilla et. al. (John
Arquilla, David Ronfeldt,
and Michele Zanini, from "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age
Terrorism," in Ian O. Lesser, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, David
Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism, RAND Corporation, 1999)
What is “Netwar”? Why do
these authors regard it as both new and of increasing importance?
Who is involved in it?
How does it differ from “cyber war”?
What roles do old techniques of asymmetrical conflict play in “netwar”?
How has
“netwar” affected Middle Eastern terrorist groups and what they do?
Are states playing greater or reduced roles with these new
groups? Who/what is replacing
their influence?
What roles do “willing amateurs” play in “Netwar”? Exemplify using Al Qaeda.
Countering “Netwar.” What
do the authors think is needed to meet this challenge?
The
authors pose three "paradigms" of terrorists' uses of netwar.
What difference to counter-terrorism strategy does it make if they are
following a paradigm of:
Questions
on Howard, "The New Terrorism" (2007):
How do
"new" terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda differ from
"old" ones, such as the Red Brigades or Abu Nidal?
How
is what is new about terrorism of significance to developing a strategy to
defeat it?
What
relationships are there between "new" terrorism and charitable
organizations? Between traditional systems of money-transferring?
How
authentic are claims of a jihadi attempt to develop and use WMD?
Questions on
Gunaratna, “Defeating Al Qaeda—The Pioneering Vanguard of the Islamic Movements,”
(2007).
Gunaratna argues that the U.S. and its allies must
"start to think beyond the counter-terrorist military and financial
dimensions" of the war on terrorism. What additionally does he
think needs to be done?
Gunaratna states that "the rate of production of
Islamists is greater than the rate of their kill or capture."
Is this the case, and if so why is it so?
Against whom does Gunaratna believe the U.S. "war on
terrorism" properly should be focused? Against whom is Al Qaeda's
war focused? (179). Who is winning, and who is losing, and why?
(181)
Why are the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) of Pakistan, and Iraq, important to Al Qaeda?
What significance do Peshawar, Pakistan, and Sudan
have in showing us something important about Al Qaeda's historic
tendencies?
How does Gunaratna characterize the relationship
over the years of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Al Qaeda?
Gunaratna speaks of Al Qaeda both as a capable
terrorist group and as a vanguard inspiring and training up to three
dozen other Islamist groups worldwide. The core group has
decentralized and is resilient. What, then, does he recommend be
done to combat this?
How and on what basis are linkages established
between Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups? Who leads and who
follows in these relationships? Where geographically is the danger
posed most acute? Why?
Gunaratna states: "government countermeasures have
increased the vulnerability of population centres (sic) and economic
targets." (166). What does he mean, and can you exemplify some
cases where this has been shown to be true?
Gunaratna states: "Mapping the family and social
trees of leaders, members, supporters and sympathizers is key to
understanding the deepening operational nexus between al-Qaeda and its
associate groups" (167). Why? Can you explain a real world
example to support his conclusion? (E.g., the Limburg, and
Bali incidents)
How do "stand-alone attacks" differ from "wave
attacks" (also called "swarming" by Arquilla and others)? What
advantages do "wave attacks" present for Al Qaeda?
Why does Al Qaeda frequently call for targeted
peoples to convert to Islam? (169)
February 14, 2011
topics/questions: Facilitators of Contemporary Islamist Terrorism
History of Terrorism fact of the day: On this
date in 1992, in Lebanon, Hizballah General Secretary Abbas Musawi was killed
in a helicopter ambush
Course notes
and discussion questions projected onto the screen in class today now are
available for student use: follow this link.
Announcements: Prof. Bowen wishes to correct himself on the matter of the slide shown in today's class
"2.3.b. Support for the tactics of Al Qaeda is considerable..." in which 2010 figures from the Pew Research Center showed support in Pakistan for suicide bombing to be over 30 million. When double checked against the original source, the correct number in that slide should have been much lower: 13.7 million. See http://pewglobal.org/files/2010/12/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Muslim-Report-FINAL-December-2-2010.pdf, page 19.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc. I.e.:
- Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2002), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 2, Article 2.
- Stewart Patrick, “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction,” Washington Quarterly (Spring 2006), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 2, Article 3.
- Gordon Bowen, “Measuring the Enemy: Social Support for Islamist Terrorism,” in Adam Lowther and Beverly Lindsay, Terrorism’s Unanswered Questions (New York, NY: Praeger Security International, 2009). Chapter 3, online at: http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/BowenMeasuringTheEnemy.pdf
Make special effort to read the
entirety of the chapter by your professor.
Supplemental reading opportunities. For the very latest study about which Prof. Bowen is aware that concerns the substantive focus of his assigned paper (i.e.: Muslims' support of terrorists and terrorism), go to this address, then download the full study released in December 2010 from the link at the upper right of that page: http://pewglobal.org/2010/12/02/muslims-around-the-world-divided-on-hamas-and-hezbollah/
Questions on / foci for study of
Bowen, "Measuring the Enemy: Social Support for Islamist Terrorism"
in Lowther and Lindsay, pp 32-59 (2009):
How has support for the goals of
Al Qaeda evolved since 9/11? Has it largely gone up, or gone
down?
Is support for Islamists'
terrorism principally an Arab problem, or
is it a trans-national, trans-regional Islamism problem:
-
To what extent is support for
extremism and terrorism primarily a problem among Arabs, only?
-
To what extent is support for extremist ideals and terrorism found
in non-Arab Muslim populations?
Evaluate the claim made by the
author that the "significant minorities" who support Al Qaeda
and/or jihadist violence are more
important than majority opinions against Al Qaeda or against
terrorism.
Questions on Takeyh and Gvosdev,
"Do terrorist networks need a home?" in Howard and Sawyer, pp
79-87 (2002):
According to the authors, how are terrorist
networks similar to international business organizations? Does
this make them fundamentally different from earlier political organizations?
How?
What do the authors contend on each issue:
- Do governments create environments
that sustain terrorist networks? Who?
- Or is it that lack of governance
allows for terrorist networks to thrive? Exemplify.
- What are some of the failed states
that the authors mention? Do these each still
facilitate terror networks?
- How do failed states provide terror
groups more than the anonymity to hide in scattered safe
houses?
- What roles do human smuggling and
drug trafficking play in this?
Should the nominal sovereignty of what are in
fact "failed states" be respected by other states, or is it fair
game to conduct anti-terrorism operations on their soil without
regard to the preferences of the ostensible government?
In 2002, the authors wrote (p. 82) that "the U.S. and
its allies has been largely successful so far in destroying Al Qaeda's infrastructure on Afghan territory." Is this a dated
statement? Why or why not?
How does the problem of "de facto statelets"
figure in the anti-terrorism strategy of the U.S.? Of Russia?
Is there any solution to these areas across Southeastern Europe and
Central Asia?
What is nation building? What position
do the authors take about "nation building" as a bulwark against
terrorism? Why is the U.S. military less enthusiastic than are
the authors?
Questions on Patrick, "Weak
States and Global Threats: fact or fiction?" in Howard and Sawyer,
pp 88-111 (2006):
What are "weak and failed states"?
Has their role in facilitating terrorism been exaggerated as it
concerns U.S. national security?
Are the weak states that incubate terrorism
also the poorest states? If not, then why do policymakers
pursue economic development as a solution to terrorism?
Are there particular regions in which
weak/failed states should be of particular concern to U.S. national
security? Which ones does Patrick identify? Are these
identical, or even substantially similar, to those identified by Takeyh and Gvosdev?
What can account for their differing foci?
Patrick (94) wrote: "In other words, weak and
failing states can provide useful assets to transnational
terrorists, but they may be less central to their operations than
widely believed." Evaluate his reasons for arguing this.
Consider these points made by Patrick:
"When states do not meet basic social needs,
they provide openings for charitable organizations or educational
systems linked to radical networks" (95). Evaluate.
Patrick suggested (95) that Pakistan (a weak
state) and Saudi Arabia (a not weak state) each impede the struggle
against transnational terrorism. He suggests that we need to
distinguish between a state's capacity to perform
comprehensive counter-terrorism tasks and a state's will to
do so. Evaluate which factor most is missing in these cases.
Who is Abdul Qadeer Khan? What does his
case show us about the importance of poor versus middle level
countries in regard to threats to U.S. national security?
Feb. 16, 2011
History of
terrorism fact of the day:
- On this
day in 2002 in Israel, a policeman was killed by a
suicide bomber he had stopped for questioning; the
al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, a part of Fatah, claimed
responsibility.
- this week in 2005,
Lebanese politician Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated by
a powerful bomb while driving in Beirut (Feb. 14). A U.N.
investigation found Syria responsible for the murder.
topics / questions: Suicide / Martyrdom Terrorism, Part. 1
Course notes
and discussion questions projected onto the screen in class today now are
available for student use: follow this link.
Today in class we will view the film "Suicide Bombers: The Cult of Death"(Discovery Channel, 2005; Prof. Bowen's tape #77)
Updates on the broader subject of the course:
- It is not just us: Turkey bombings of Nov. 2003: The Washington Post several years ago detailed the role Al Qaeda played in four
bombings that rocked Istanbul in November 2003. Directed at
Jewish and British sites, the bombers' loose relationship with Osama
bin Laden effectively was detailed in a long article , "Al
Qaeda's Hand in Istanbul Plot." Reflecting broader changes
since 9/11 in the threat the West still confronts from jihadist terrorism, author Karl Vick describes the attack in the following
terms: "The attacks, which killed 58 people and wounded 750, may
have been the last terrorist strikes specifically authorized by bin
Laden." Even this
may overstate the degree of control exercised by the bearded one of
Tora Bora. As we progress in the course to better understand
the evolution of Al Qaeda from a murderous organization to the
inspirational star that guides through the night emerging groups of
self-starters --volunteer terrorists only loosely connected to Osama-- evidence
from cases such as the Istanbul bombings can enlarge our grasp of
the loose edges of that organization even in its heyday. I
recommend the article.
Today's readings: Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Readings for today include:
- Bruce Hoffman, “The logic of suicide terrorism,” The Atlantic (June 2003), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 5, Article 4.
- Assaf Moghadam, “The Evolution of Suicide Terrorism and Its Implications for Research,” (2007) in Howard, et. al., Chapter 5, Article 5.
- Robert Baer, “There is no Defense Against these Children of Death,” The Times (London: October 8, 2007): http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article2609641.ece
Supplemental readings on this topic:
Follow ups about
the content about suicide terrorism:
Viewing the film “Suicide Bombers: The Cult of Death,”
one could get the impression that Israel is under constant siege by terrorist bombings.
From Prof. Bowen's study of this issue, he argues that this impression is a
myth. Many of the figures he has on this cannot be cited due to
the confidential terms under which the statistics on this were provided
to him by well informed Israelis. But some evidence to support the view that the problem has waned in recent
years has been made public, and it is to be found on this chart.
Only 6 suicide attacks occurred February 2005-January 2006, and their
were fewer still in 2006, 2007, and 2008; none in 2009 or 2010. While whatever number of suicide attacks occurs is more than most of us would prefer to see there or anywhere,
this hardly has been a siege, and in recent years it has
compared quite favorably to the average week in Baghdad or Kabul.
Specific updates
regarding the film: “Suicide Bombers: The Cult of Death”
(Discovery Channel, 2005):
- The
author of the film we viewed actually overstated how many attacks
have occurred in Israel: more suicide / martyrdom attacks
were targeted on U.S. forces in Iraq in May 2005 alone than had
targeted Israel in the entire period of suicide bombing there to
that moment (i.e., in the 11 years down to May 2005). Source: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, "The Jihad: Change and Continuation," Strategic
Comments 11, 7 (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies, September 2005). That study is
annotated in the Supplemental online materials for this course: follow this link to read Professor Bowen's annotation there about
that study. A link to the website where the original study can
be found also is provided there, but you may need to use InterLibrary Loan to obtain a copy of the study.
Questions
from Moghadam (2007): "The evolution of suicide terrorism and its
implications for research"
Periodizing suicide terrorism. Moghadam suggests suicide terrorism
has been around for a long time, and breaks it into three periods: ancient
times to the early 1980's, early 1980's to 1998, 1998 to the present.
- Why, according to the author, were ancient and
pre-1980's suicidal attacks classified as mere "precursors" of modern
suicide terrorism?
- What
changed things in the early 1980's, and who / what group(s) was/were
instrumental in this change? What new tactical innovations were
involved as suicide terrorism came to Lebanon? What roles did
religious authority play? What roles did mass media play?
Where did these features spread from Lebanon?
- On what
evidence does the author argue that the key thing that changed things in
1998 had to do with converting matters into a "global phenomenon?
What organizations, and schools of religious thought, played important
roles?
What is "Salafi-Jihadist
ideology"? What unique contributions has this school of thought
brought to suicide terrorism?
Schools of thought
about suicide terrorism:
- What are
the strengths and weaknesses in studying the motives of the specific
individuals who practice suicide terrorism? Must the grievances of
individuals who choose suicide terrorism be directly experienced, or can
they be experienced "vicariously" (335)?
- In
studying at a different level of analysis, the organizational/strategic
level, many authors (e.g., Crenshaw, Pape) have found a certain
rationality in the choice by groups to use suicide tactics. What are
some of these considerations, e.g.: how does a strategy of suicide attacks
advance the military and the political purposes of an organization?
- Moghadan
offers a review of a third level of theories about suicide terrorism,
which he calls Socio-Cultural theories. In examining the strengths
and weaknesses of these explanations, what does he show about:
- Differences between the milieu surrounding suicide bombing in Lebanon
and Israel/Palestine when contrasted to that factor insofar as
contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan?
- What
accounts for changes in methods of recruitment of suicide bombers (from
"top-down" selection, to "bottom-up" volunteers)? (334-335).
Questions from Baer “There is no Defense Against these Children of Death,” http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest_contributors/article2609641.ece :
Baer presents a suicide bomber in Jalalabad, Afghanistan: a Pakistani boy named Farman Ullah. On what basis does he suggest there to be "no defense" against weapons such as Farman Ullah? Was Farman Ullah truly a suicide bomber, or something else: a bomb waiting to be set off by an organized terrorist group?
Baer wrote: "
The key concept in suicide bombing is not martyrdom but this notion of jihad – of what constitutes a righteous holy war. In the Koran there are many different interpretations of jihad, some personal and some charitable – alms to the poor. But bin Laden and the Taleban rely upon just one Koranic verse that declares jihad a religious obligation on all Muslims if another Muslim land has been invaded."
On what basis does Baer suggest bin Laden is "wrong"?
Why is the "silent army" who could stop future Farman Ullahs silent?
Questions
from Hoffman (2003): "The logic of suicide terrorism."
What is the "smile of joy" in regard to suicide terrorism?
How does living under a siege of suicide terrorism alter life?
How do these responses conform to the expectations of the strategists
behind a terrorist campaign?
What does the experience of Israel teach us about the assumption that
suicide campaigns are launched out of desperation by poor, miserable
people who have few other options?
Why are "handlers" and "minders" necessary in this dirty business?
Hoffman quotes an Israeli officer as saying "We try to make certain
that we fight on their ground... We are now bringing the war to them."
Has this approach worked (follow this link to the Washington Post's 2004 suicide
bombings chart)?
Has this strategic approach been imitated by the U.S. since 9.11?
What counter-terrorism strategy does Hoffman
infer will be most effective against suicide / martyrdom terrorism?
Feb. 21, 2011
History of
terrorism facts of the day:
-
On Feb. 24,
1998, Osama bin Laden issued his fatwa calling for the killing
of American civilians anywhere in the world. (See
here for analysis)
-
this week in 2001, the U.K. enacted
the Terrorism Act of 2000.
topics/questions: Suicide / Martyrdom terrorism, Part 2
Announcements: Daily class notes and questions projected
onto the screen during class now are available: follow this link.
Updates:
- (from 2009's version of this class): Prof. Bowen calls attention to an article in the Long War Journal, an article
that dealt with the creation by Al Qaeda and the Taliban of a new
"Shadow Army" that unifies their efforts with those of other jihadist organizations in Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The article
is: Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda's Paramilitary 'Shadow Army'," Long War
Journal (Feb. 9, 2009): http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/al_qaedas_paramilita.php The article brings out some interesting points regarding the evolution
of our enemies.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Readings for today:
- Martha Crenshaw, from "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 1, Article 1.3.
- Russ Rodgers, “Purifying the Heart: Suicide or Jihadi Acts?” in Adam Lowther and Beverly Lindsay, Terrorism’s Unanswered Questions (New York, NY: Praeger Security International, 2009). Chapter 7, online at: http://www.mbc.edu/faculty/gbowen/RodgersPurifyingTheHeart.pdf .
Today in class we will discuss the film viewed on and the readings from Wed. Feb. 16, and today's readings, in light of the content of the film seen on Feb. 16.
Questions from Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism..." (1998) :
She argues that "terrorism is assumed
to display a collective rationality". What does this
mean? Do you agree? If so, does that necessarily mean that the
actions of Al Qaeda are rational?
If something is rational, does that mean that
it must be accepted as legitimate? Why or why not?
Do all revolutionary and/or nationalist
organizations seeking radical change resort to terrorism? Why or why
not?
Who was Sean MacStiofain? What is the
importance of his innovative idea of the "one shot sniper"?
What were the two "innovations" in
terrorism in 1968? Why might that moment have been a particularly
fertile opportunity for terrorists to turn in new directions?
What is "the power to hurt"?
Why is the taking of hostages a potent form of it? What calculations
affect the release of hostages?
What counter-terrorism strategy does Crenshaw
suggest will be most effective against suicide / martyrdom terrorism?
Questions on Rodgers, "Purifying the Heart: Suicide or Jihadi Acts?" :
Where/when in history does Rodgers locate the origin of suicidal behavior in Muslims' warfare?
The author states: "We have failed to understand the worldview of our enemies because we are too afraid to be politically incorrect." (141). Explain this statement.
The author argues that what many regard as Islamic terrorists better would be understood as "ghazis." What would we understand differently if we accepted his choice of words?
The author refers both to writings and incidents in Muhammad's life, and to later Muslim jurisprudence on the matter of dying in violence for the cause of Islam. Does he find these historic antecedents to reinforce, or to undermine, the position of those who say that the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were "martyrs for Islam"?
Consider the intentions of the perpetrator of violence versus the effect of an act of violence, even if that act of violence by a Muslim kills some believers. According to the author, of these two things (i.e.: intention, or effect) which is more important within Islam in judging whether a particular act of violence leading to the death of the Muslim perpetrator was an act of jihad (and thus permitted by the religion) or an act of suicide (and thus an act not permitted in the religion)? What difference does this position make?
What does the author suggest is the line between permissible and impermissible killing in Islam? Are clear lines found that explain who is a non-combatant entitled to not be harmed? (136).
Did Muhammad actually say that the struggle to purify one's self is "the greater jihad," and that fighting to defeat or convert unbelievers is "the lesser jihad" as some have claimed? What does the author here say on this (137-138)?
Why is a "guilt-ridden" would-be shahid in some ways more dangerous than a "righteous shahid"? (139-140).
Feb. 23, 2011: Midterm exam
History of Terrorism facts of the
day:
- this week in 1970, the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of
Palestine-General Command blew up a Swiss Air jet, killing 47.
- Feb. 25, 1996—Israel: HAMAS
bombed buses in Jerusalem, killing 28 and wounding 80.
Midterm Exam
Bring a blank Blue Book / Green Book exam booklet. Put
your name on its cover, only.
Feb. 28, 2011
topics/questions: Terrorist attacks since 9/11: Attacks against U.S. allies
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Daily class notes and questions projected
onto the screen during class now are available: follow this link.
Announcements:
Class today will first go over the Midterm Exam.
A new case of attempted jihadist terrorism inside the U.S. was broken up on Feb. 25, 2011 with the arrest in Texas of
20 year old Khalid Aldawsari, a citizen of Saudi Arabia enrolled as a college student at South Plains College in Lubbock, TX. Aldawsari's preparations to use a weapon of mass destruction has been reported primarily as a plot against former President George W. Bush, but the case also indicates a broad aspiration to sow havoc through targeting with bombs many other locations, including dams, hydroelectric plants, nightclubs in Dallas, and the homes of U.S. servicemen. The official court documents filed at the time of his arrest are available from your professor, go here.
We may view two items today:
- A longer film, "America at a Crossroads: Europe's 9/11" (PBS, April 18, 2007; Prof. Bowen's tape #90). More about the film can be learned by following this link: http://www.pbs.org/weta/crossroads/about/show_europes_911.html
- A short film, “The Network” (CBS “60 Minutes,” March 25, 2007; Prof. Bowen's tape #75). Largely, this is a portrait of Hassan Butt, a British citizen of Pakistani heritage who was a member of, and who defected from, the network of radical Islamists in the U.K. (and elsewhere). Those of you who have taken PolS 111 will have seen this brief film in that course.
Readings for today:
Updates on Al Qaeda's
strategy and methods: Prof. Bowen often emphasizes the declining direct supervision over
terrorist attacks that is exercised by Al Qaeda's top leaders,
contrasting the 9/11/01 attacks with the emerging role of "self-starter" jihadist cells in major attacks such as the July 2005 bombings of the
London transit system. This trend toward an "Al Qaeda 2.0" is
a chief feature of international and domestic terrorism with which U.S.
counter-terrorism policy now must contend. For more about this
phenomenon in Turkey, see:
This trend is often mistaken as a sign of a
weakening of Al Qaeda. In the view of Prof. Bowen, such a
reading is a mistake, for Al Qaeda for many years has openly committed
itself to a decades-long war of attrition to achieve its ultimate
objective of establishing a Caliphate over all of what it regards as
Muslim lands. Current strategy should be understood in that light,
and current challenges to U.S. counter-terrorism policy need to be
evaluated in reference to how U.S. choices have impact on Al Qaeda's
strategy and tactics. In this light, I call attention to the
analysis of Fred Burton:
- This broader analysis of Al
Qaeda's strategy appeared in 2007 written by Fred Burton of the private U.S. intelligence analysis publication Stratfor.
In it, Burton reviews Al Qaeda's statements regarding their ultimate
aims and their immediate objectives at that dark moment.
Things have looked up considerably in Iraq since then, but announced
plans by the Obama Administration to withdraw by the end of 2010 may
yet vindicate al Qaeda's strategy of provoking sectarian war.
Disturbingly, Iraq-style attacks on Shi'ites resumed in Pakistan
early 2009, and against Christians in Iraq in November 2010. I highly recommend this article.
- But Al Qaeda's grisly methods increasingly
are also being challenged by fellow Islamists, as is argued in this
Feb. 22, 2009 commentary by Clifford May (of the Foundation for the
Defense of Democracies). In "Dr.
Fadl's Complaint," May informs about Dr. Fadl, an Islamist
co-founder of Al Qaeda who no longer supports bin Laden, and he
extensively quotes the Islamist thinker. I also highly recommend this article.
Questions on Riedel, "Al Qaeda Strikes Back,"
- In 2007, Riedel perceived Al Qaeda to be
"more dangerous" than ever. Consider that interpretation
of the evidence: was it true when the author wrote it, and is it
true today? Why?
- Where has Al Qaeda "relocated",
according to Riedel? Beyond clear bases in Pakistan and
Iraq, where has their influence grown? Why?
- While some of what Riedel wrote failed to
anticipate military changes, 2007-09, some of his points echo
recent news. Consider his analysis of the relationship
between Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad.
Are these relations really best understood as a bi-product of
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, or of some deeper ideological and
strategic affinity?
- How have the years since 9/11 impacted
the threat of militant Islamist terrorism in Europe?
- What are "false flag" operations?
Why does the U.S. need to be especially slow in responding to
what may be false flag Al Qaeda attacks? (587)
- Consider what Riedel (589) advocates
about "free and fair elections." How does this view
compare to that of Bynam on the matter of transforming "breeding
grounds" for terrorism? Given the weight of existing
evidence, who is realistic and who is unrealistic here?
- Interested students might wish to pursue the subsequent thinking of Mr. Riedel, who in addition to being a career CIA officer, was the person asked early in 2009 by Pres. Obama to advise him on how to approach winning the war against Al Qaeda and other extremists, and who (according to Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars, 2010), on Air Force One on March 18, 2009, told Pres. Obama of the problems the U.S. faces: "Bin Laden can't be found because he is swmming in a sea of like-minded people" (p 106) in Pakistan's lawless frontier areas, with at least some protection from a Pakistani state that has yet to make the strategic choice to eradicate these extremists. It is a problem so profound that it "is not something you do in two years. It may take two decades. It may not be possible." (p. 108-109).
- Much of this was understood by thinking readers at the time, as The Los Angeles Times reported on March 9, 2009: "Bruce Riedel, a former South Asia specialist for the CIA and
National Security Council, said in an interview after the Mumbai
attacks that Pakistan had long protected the militant groups. He
warned that a “global jihadist syndicate” of disaffected young
Pakistanis was the most likely mechanism for launching an attack in
the United States, possibly with Al-Qaeda. Riedel, who now chairs
the Obama administration’s Pakistan-Afghanistan strategy review,
said Mumbai was only the latest of several attacks by such militants
on soft targets frequented by Americans, including hotels in Kabul,
Afghanistan, and Islamabad." To read the whole article, see:
Josh Meyer, “Pakistan
Sets Roadblocks in U.S. Hunt for Extremists, Officials Say,” Los Angeles Times (March 9, 2009).
- For a quite different assessment of the threats posed by jihadists abroad, see: Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy (NY: Cambridge U. P., 2005): in MBC Grafton
Library stacks. Follow this link for a
synopsis of the book written by Prof. Bowen.
March 2, 2011 topics/questions
Topic: Factors influencing attacks inside the U.S. since 9/11: radicalization
History of
terrorism facts of the day:
-
March
9, 2002, in Israel: Suicide bomb kills 11 and injures 25
inside a crowded Jerusalem cafe; HAMAS claimed
responsibility.
-
This week in 2003, a HAMAS bomb
planted on an Israeli bus killed 15 year old U.S. citizen
Abigail Litle (pictured above) and 14 others, and injured 40 others. For
more on this case, follow this
link.
-
March 9, 2004 in
Turkey: Two suicide bombers in Istanbul kill two, wound six;
Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade claimed responsibility.
-
March 11, 2004, in Spain: Abu Hafs al-Masri
Brigade claimed responsibility for four bombs on Madrid trains, killing
198, wounding 600.
Announcements:
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Daily
class notes as projected onto the screen during class now are available: follow
this link.
After discussing radicalization and differences between what Sageman found interviewing terrorists in foreign venues versus what Gartenstein-Ross/Grossman found in the U.S. and U.K., w e will begin to view the 2008 film "The Third Jihad." The basic problems it identifies will be returned to in a future class.
Discussion today focuses on issues raised by the Gartenstein-Ross/Grossman reading, and related issues surrounding what the U.S. should do to stop radicalization within the U.S. The related phenomena of recruitment to terrorist organizations, and "self-starter" terrorists, also will be addressed. Students studying as part of the term paper project for this course any of the several recent cases inside the U.S., and/or outside the U.S. involving U.S. citizens/residents, please feel free to contribute preliminary insights from your projects.
Readings:
Supplemental readings (optional) supporting today's lesson:
- Pew Center for Research, “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” (Washington: Pew Center for Research, 2007), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf
- Spencer Hsu and Carrie Johnson, "Somali
Americans Recruited by Extremists: U.S. Cites Case of Minnesotan
Killed in Suicide Blast in Africa," Washington Post (March 11,
2009): 1, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/10/AR2009031003901.html
- Dan Ephron and Mark
Hosenball, "Recruited for Jihad?" Newsweek (Feb. 2,
2009): http://www.newsweek.com/id/181408/output/print ; permanent link.
- A 2007 article from
the Washington Post also addresses our course topic today. I
recommend it: "Terrorists
Proving Harder to Profile."
Questions on Gartenstein-Ross/Grossman:
What six factors do the authors focus upon as things that change in Islamists undergoing radicalization?
In what settings does most of this radicalization occur?
How do the authors see the role of religious belief somewhat differently than does Sageman?
What features of the radicalization process appear to be common in the U.S. and the U.K.? Where did differences between the two groups of cases about radicals turn up? What might explain the differences?
What helps you to understand the high number of converts to Islam among U.S. radicals?
Should major efforts be put into stopping radicalization in the prisons in the U.S.? Why or why not?
No Class on March 7 or
March 9, 2011: Spring
Break
March 14, 2011
History of
terrorism facts of the day:
- March 16, 1984,
in Lebanon: U.S. CIA official William Buckley was seized and
later killed by Hizballah.
- March 16, 1985,
in Lebanon: US journalist Terry Anderson was kidnapped.
- March 16, 1988,
in Iraq: Iraqi armed forces of the Saddam Hussein regime attacked the Kurdish village of
Halabja, killing 5000+ residents by use of chemical weapons.
- This week in 1993, Islamist bombers killed
250 and wounded 700+ in attacks in India which the Indian
government blamed on Pakistan. Pakistan denied
involvement.
topics/questions: Countering Terrorists' potential use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Announcements
related to the course:
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
You can anticipate a quiz on the assigned readings for today.
Course notes to be projected
onto the screen during today's class now are available: follow
this link.
Updates/Plan for class today : Segments from the 2008 film "The Third Jihad" will be part of our class again today, beginning with the "American Scene" segment that was truncated in our last class meeting, through segments titled the "Nuclear Threat," continuing through "The Iranian Threat." More can be learned about the film, and you can obtain a copy for yourself, contact: www.thethirdjihad.com
Before class read these required readings:
-
Charles Meade and Roger C. Molander,
“Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack: Summary,”
Rand Technical Report (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Center for Terrorism Risk
Management Policy, 2006): available
online:
-
Gavin Cameron and
Natasha E. Bajema, “Assessing the Post-9/11 Threat of CBRN Terrorism
(2007),” in Howard, et. al.,
Chapter 5, Article No. 1.
-
Richard F. Pilch, "The Bioterrorist Threat to the United States," in Terrorism and Counterterrorism, eds. Russell D. Howard and Reid
L. Sawyer, second edition (Dubuque, IA: McGraw-Hill, 2006): 263-297.
Supplemental (optional) materials relevant to this class
meeting:
Pakistan's
father of the nuclear bomb, Abdul Qadeer Khan, has admitted involvement
in the sale of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya, and North
Korea: "I have voluntarily admitted that much of it is true and
accurate."
These matters were reported by Associated Press and the
Washington
Post, Feb. 4, 2004. In the print edition of the Post (though, curiously,
in a story not presently online), others close to him have been alleged
to have discussed with Osama bin Laden matters concerning supply of
nuclear technologies to Al Qaeda. These matters were briefly
confirmed in a Post editorial (Feb. 1, 2004) by
Pakistani
nuclear physics scientist Pervez Hoodbhoy, who pinned the timing of
the meetings with Osama as having occurred in 2002. Associated
Press (Feb. 4, 2004) had a slightly different date and more detailed
information on the participants in the meetings. It addressed this
matter in the following way:
"The nuclear
black market that let Iran, Libya and North Korea acquire weapons technology
from Pakistan under the noses of international monitors raises suspicions
that terror groups also acquired bomb components or plans, experts told The
Associated Press.
Al-Qaida apparently has shown interest in acquiring nuclear technology. Two
Pakistani nuclear scientists were detained in late 2001 after meeting Osama
bin Laden in Afghanistan on suspicion of giving away secrets, but they
were later released without being charged. The military, which controlled
the weapons program, also is known to have elements who sympathize with the
Taliban and bin Laden.
Pakistan has for years denied spreading nuclear technology and claimed its
arsenal was safe from extremists. But strong international pressure after
Iranian revelations to the U.N. nuclear watchdog forced Islamabad to begin
an investigation of its weapons program in November. It admitted last month
for the first time that scientists had leaked technology.
Officials say Abdul Qadeer Khan - the father of Pakistan's nuclear program -
has confessed to selling equipment related to centrifuges, which are used to
enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, to Iran, Libya and North Korea. Libya
also received designs for a nuclear bomb from Pakistan that it handed over
to U.S. and British intelligence last month, European diplomats say.
Khan, however, has denied making a confession, according to the leading
Islamic party, Jamaat-e-Islami.
Pakistan itself relied on international black market supplies for the
equipment used in its nuclear weapons program that started in the 1970s.
"If the black market could transfer technology from Europe to Pakistan
in spite of all these sanctions and embargoes, that same black market of
smugglers can also pass on materials from this lab to terrorist
groups," said A.H. Nayyar, a nuclear physicist and head of the Pakistan
Peace Coalition. "The possibility exists and needs to be investigated
thoroughly."
Military spokesman Maj. Gen. Shaukat Sultan on Tuesday denied that Pakistani
nuclear technology had fallen into terrorist hands. "It's absolutely
negative, there is no truth in it," he said.
The government also has denied official complicity in giving away
technology, but a friend of Khan's told the AP that top army officials,
including now-President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, were "aware of
everything."
White House spokesman Scott McClellan said the Bush administration accepted
Musharraf's assurances that the Pakistani government was "not involved
in any kind of proliferation."
Musharraf has said the scientists were given wide latitude to develop the
nuclear program and worked in secret even from top officials. That secrecy
also has raised fears that nuclear workers may have transferred
technology or equipment to terrorists, either for money or ideological
sympathy.
Experts say centrifuge technology wouldn't be of much use to terror groups,
who probably couldn't set up the vast facilities required to enrich useful
quantities of uranium, with hundreds of technicians needed to run thousands
of centrifuges.
"It's hard enough for countries to do," said Gary Samore, a
nonproliferation expert at the London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
The acquisition of weapons designs, however, would make it far easier for
terrorists to make a workable bomb, said David Albright, head of the
Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.
And if a terror group was able to obtain highly enriched uranium - anywhere
from about 110 to 220 pounds - it could possibly build a bomb similar in
design to that used on Hiroshima, Japan, at the end of World War II, experts
said.
"It's not something that you or I could do in our backyards, but it's
relatively easy," Samore said.
Pakistan is estimated to have produced more than 1,540 pounds of highly
enriched uranium, but no official figures have ever been released.
"It is very important that all the material that has been produced is
accounted for to the last gram," said Nayyar. "If it is not done,
then the doubt remains."
Sultan, the military spokesman, declined to comment on whether Khan's
alleged confession mentioned highly enriched uranium and potential leaks of
it outside Pakistan.
The strongest known link between Pakistani scientists and terrorists were
the 2001 arrests Sultan Bashir-ud-Din Mahmood and Abdul Majid, who worked
for Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission until retiring in 1999. The
commission, together with Khan's lab worked on the nuclear weapons program.
Mahmood's son told the AP in December 2002 that his father - a deeply
conservative Muslim who sympathized with the Taliban - met bin Laden several
times between 2000 and July 2001 and the al-Qaida leader asked how to make
nuclear bombs. Mahmood claimed to have rebuffed the request, telling bin
Laden "it is not child's play for you to build a nuclear bomb,"
according to his son, who didn't want to be named.
The scientists were cleared of all charges and released in December 2001.
"Pakistani scientists were active there (in Afghanistan) - we never got
to the bottom of it," said Albright, also a former Iraq nuclear weapons
inspector.
In light of recent news, the years of Pakistani denials ring especially
hollow, Albright said, hoping international pressure would finally make
Pakistan come clean.
"There's a lot of smoke and mirrors that the government is throwing up,
but at the same time it's being forced to reveal information," he
said." (Emphasis added by Prof. Bowen)
One final news item on
Pakistan and WMD proliferation: A. Q. Khan was released from his lenient house arrest and became a free man in
February 2009. U.S. officials questioned this move,
viewing the continuing "restrictions" on Khan as inadequate.
See: Karen deYoung, "U.S. Skeptical about Pakistan's
restrictions on Nuclear Scientist," Washington Post (Feb. 9,
2009): A18: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/08/AR2009020801964.html ; or Sue Pleming, "U.S. seeks assurances from Pakistan over
A. Q. Khan," Reuters/Washington Post online, February 9,
2009.
Questions on the readings for March 14:
WMD in general:
Enumerate the
broad categories of WMD
Which are most readily, easily
created?
Which are most difficult in
this regard? (Draw the continuum) Why?
States and WMD
1. Consider
the relative size of the set of states that possess, or are suspected to
possess, each category of WMD.
· Why does the set, at
times, get smaller?
· Why does the set grow?
2. What
measures have states taken to limit the availability of each category of
weapons among states?
What are
the strengths and weaknesses in these approaches? Exemplify.
3. States
have pursued several strategies to limit the threat WMD-possessing
adversary states pose to their own security?
Consider
deterrence, prevention, and preemption.
Which of
these measures worked most successfully with problem states?
Which
have not worked well? Why or why not?
Terrorists and the WMD problem
What do we
know about efforts by Al Qaeda to acquire, develop, or use WMD?
What do we
know about the efforts of Al Qaeda’s group headed by Mohammed Atta in
regard to using bio-weapons in the USA?
September 2002 news item (BBC): Al
Qaeda plotted nuclear attack
Jan. 31, 2003 news item (BBC): Evidence of Al
Qaeda "dirty bomb" found near Herat, Afghanistan
Questions on Meade and Molander, "Considering the effects of a Catastrophic Attack"
What are the differences between "direct" and "indirect" effects of a hypothetical nuclear attack on the Port of Long Beach, CA?
Which impact would be greater, according to the authors?
Could the impact of an attack such as described in this study be limited to the single region in which it occurred? Why or why not?
Questions on Pilch, "The Bioterrorist Threat to the United States"
What evidence is there that Al Qaeda has tried to use biological WMD against the U.S.?
March 16,
2011
topics/questions: Preemptive Military Action in the Counter-Terrorism Policy of the United States
History of Terrorism facts:
- On March 17, 1992, in Argentina: A car
bomb destroyed the Israeli Embassy, killing 28 and wounding 220;
Lebanese Hizballah claimed responsibility.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Daily
class notes projected onto the screen today now are available: follow
this link. Additionally, here is a link to the chart shown concerning public support of the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan, and here is a link to the chart shown about the (very small) number of civilian casualties in Pakistan that have been created by the U.S. airstrikes using Predator drones.
Today's class will be a guest lecture by one of the most renowned military historians alive, Robert L. O'Connell. O'Connell is a graduate of Colgate University and holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Virginia. For more than 30 years, O'Connell worked for the U.S. Department of Defense as a Senior Defense Analyst, serving as part of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva Arms Control talks in the 1980s, being posted to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during the Reagan Presidency, and working longest at the National Ground Intelligence Center, Charlottesville, VA. During his long career, O'Connell wrote hundreds of classified studies, and published five important books, three of which were Book of the Month Club selections. His 1989 Of Arms and Men (Oxford University Press) told of the man-weapons relationship throughout human civilization, from the pre-historic steppes of Asia to the nuclear confrontation of the Cold War. In Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (Westview, 1991) he demonstrated the bureaucratic forces that have shaped weapons procurement decisions at the expense of national security. Ride of the Second Horseman: The Birth and Death of War (Oxford, 1995) was his definitive history of human conflict, and is widely regarded among the top works in military history published in the later 20th century. Along with Of Arms and Men, it brought still wider acclaim to O'Connell within and beyond the community of professional historians. No book makes weaponry more readily understandable to novices and experts alike than his 2002 "coffee table" volume, Soul of the Sword: An Illustrated History of Weaponry from Prehistory to the Present (The Free Press): it is virtually an irreplaceable part of any serious student's collection. On July 28, 2010, his Ghosts of Cannae: Hannibal and the Darkest Hour of the Roman Republic, made a big enough splash that Jon Stewart featured the author on his program The Daily Show. He currently is researching the career of Gen. William Tecumsah Sherman.
Since 2005, Dr. O'Connell has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Defense Analysis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
O'Connell also has published a novel, Fast Eddie.
Three articles in the Howard and Sawyer text are assigned for today and our guest speaker is familiar with these arguments:
-
Brigadier General Russell D. Howard
(Ret.), from "Preemptive Military Doctrine: No Other Choice," in Howard and
Sawyer, Chapter 8, Article 3.
-
Daniel Byman, “US Counter-terrorism Options: A
Taxonomy,” Survival (Autumn 2007), in Howard, et. al., Chapter
8, Article No. 2.
-
Rob de Wijk, “The Limits of
Military Power,” Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002), in
Howard and Sawyer, pp 505-517.
- Additional supplemental (optional / recommended) readings related to today's topics:
- How others have succeeded: An excellent article on the role played by use of traditional military forces in Sri Lanka
to defeat a terrorist campaign there led by the Tamil Tigers, t is: V.K. Shashikuman,
"Lessons from the War in Sri Lanka," Indian Defense Review
(July/Sept. 2009): Dr. Bowen's permanent link: go here.
- For those inclined to see the current U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan as hopeless, and as contrary to the aspirations of the Afghan people, please read this about the Taliban's attacks on school children.
- Michael Evans, “Death
from Above: How Predator Is Taking Its Toll on Al-Qaeda,” London
Times (London, UK: January 3, 2009). This article describes the uses
being made of sharply targeted air strikes against Al Qaeda leaders. (alternate
link to original source).
Questions on Brig. Gen. Howard, "Preemptive Military Doctrine: No Other Choice," (2005) :
- States traditionally have had four
options for their militaries when confronting threats to
their security. What are these four? Why does
Howard suggest that three no longer make sense in regard to the
threat posed by international terrorism?
- Howard argues that the past
actions of terrorist groups constitute an "imminent danger" to
the U.S. What does his use of this language mean?
What does it justify? Do you agree with his analysis on
this point?
Questions on
Byman, "U.S. Counter-Terrorism Options: a taxonomy" (2007) :
- Why does the author contend that there are
"inherent tensions" between counter-terrorism policies that
intend to disrupt the terrorist groups we confront and policies
designed to change the overall environment so that it is more
difficult for them to raise money, find recruits, etc.?
- Evaluate Byman's 7 Options:
- Option One (unilaterally crush): Review
what Turkey has done to crush the PKK. Why can't such an
approach be used toward Al Qaeda?
- Option Two (rely on allies): Effective
as this approach has been for some others (e.g., Egypt), what
are the limitations on this approach being enough for the U.S.
today?
- Option Three (containment): the author
seems to prefer this choice; do you? What are some of the
potential up and down sides?
- Option Four (defense): the author
emphasizes the tactical successes of this approach, pointing to
the Israeli security barrier. What are the obstacles to a
similar approach in the USA? Consider the strategic down
side of security barriers: do they offset gains made tactically?
And just what would be the minimum that the U.S., a global
presence, would defend?
- Option Five (diversion): what is the
"campfire and the bear" strategy? Did the U.S. follow such
a strategy by invading Iraq (475)? Would Americans support or
oppose an administration that openly was guided by the axiom
"others will die so Americans will live" (473)? Why or why
not?
- Option Six (de-legitimization): Byman
argues "theologically, the terrorists are on thin ice." Is
this interpretation consistent with what we have read elsewhere
in the course? How so, or how not so?
- Option Seven (transforming the breeding
grounds): given what we have seen of the democratic process in
the Muslim world, if this option is possible, is it in practical
terms desirable? And is it really possible?
Questions on Rob de Wijk, "The Limits of Military Power," (2002)
- de Wijk quotes an 1898 military history that refers to
"Savage Warfare" as blurring the distinction between
"rear," "front," and "flank." What does
this mean for the war on terrorism? Does it mean the same things for
our current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Why or why not?
- What factors limit the effectiveness of contemporary
Special Operations Forces? Have these been remedied in the years since
de Wijk composed this article?
- de Wijk wrote in 2002 that the Sept. 11 "attackers
very likely miscalculated not only the resolve of the leadership and
population of the United States but also most of the world's willingness to
form and maintain coalitions to fight terrorism." Does
that seem still to be the case in 2011; why or why not?
- de Wijk argues that concern about collateral
damage and proportionality of
response "have little value" in the war on terrorism.
Critique.
- What is coercive diplomacy? Is it being
practiced now? To what effect?
- de Wijk appeared to advocate some fairly
shocking things, e.g. the use of fuel air explosives and limited
yield tactical nuclear weapons in the war in Afghanistan. Yet,
he also argued that success in asymmetric warfare there involves
winning over the cooperation of the population. Has this been
achieved? Haven't the (much less gruesome) weapons we actually
have used in Afghanistan, 2001-present, and in Pakistan (2008-present)
alienated the people anyway? Given this, how should we
evaluate de Wijk's central arguments about how to counter new age
"savage warfare"?
- On what basis does de Wijk suggest that 1998-99, and not 2001, was
the turning point in modern anti-terrorism efforts? What impact did
this, in combination with other trends in the 1990's, have on
attitudes toward the West in the Muslim world?
- The struggle for "hearts and minds" figures
prominently in de Wijk's recommendations, yet he closes with
reflections that suggest anti-Western trends in the Muslim world
when he wrote almost certainly would get worse. Has this come
to pass? Given this, what should we conclude about the
ultimate impact of the way we have been fighting on achievement of
the goals of the U.S. in the GWOT? Has it been fought wrong, or has a
strategy along the lines of what de Wijk suggested simply not been
tried?
March
21 and 23, 2011: Fighting Terrorism inside and outside the United States
March 21: Sleeper cells, terrorists' recruitment of U.S. citizens, Targeted killings
March 23: Issues involving the interrogation of Suspected Terrorists
History of Terrorism
Fact of the day:
- March 23, 1998—Algeria:
Seven GIA extremists sentenced to death for assassinating Archbishop
Announcements:
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Course
notes projected onto the screen on March 21 now are available:
follow this link.
Course
notes projected onto the screen on March 23 will be made available after that class:
follow this link.
Overall plan for these two class meetings :
- In our March 21 class a film, "Chasing the Sleeper Cell (The Lackawanna Six)" (PBS Frontline 2003, Prof. Bowen's tape #79)
will focus on Al Qaeda recruitment efforts in the U.S., and
counter-terrorism efforts by the U.S. Government to stop such
recruitment. That 2001-02 event focuses us on issues of
surveillance, profiling, and targeted killings (or assassination). To learn more about the film, go to its website: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/etc/script.html
- Readings for March 23 broaden into matters of
interrogation. Discussion on both of these related topics will occur on March 23.
Before class read:
- Richard K. Betts, from "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly (2002), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 7, Article No. 1.
- Jane Mayer, “Outsourcing Torture,” The New Yorker (February 14 and 21, 2005): pp 106-123, available online at: http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/02/14/050214fa_fact6
- Bruce Hoffman, from "A Nasty Business," The Atlantic Monthly (January 2002), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 7, Article No. 2.
- Supplemental (optional) materials on these topics:
-
Jane Mayer, “A Deadly
Interrogation,” The New Yorker (November 14, 2005).
-
Jane Mayer, "Annals of the Pentagon: The Memo," New Yorker (Feb.
27, 2006): 32-41 (permanent link):
online at: http://www.newyorker.com/printables/fact/060227fa_fact
-
The
original item about which Mayer wrote (above): The 2003 "Yoo Memo" on interrogation/torture
-
An
editorial by (Prof. Bowen's friend, who in Nov. 2010 was elected to the Pennsylvania state legislature) Richard Saccone on the distinction needed in
interrogation techniques between coercion and torture:
Baltimore Sun (April 22, 2009).
- This item questioning the
efficacy of enhanced interrogation techniques in the
case of Abu Zubaida, see: Peter Finn and Joby Warrick, "Detainee's
Harsh Treatment Foiled No Plots," Washington Post (March 29, 2009).
-
George Anastasia and Troy
Graham, “Dix Case a Test of New Laws,” Philadelphia Inquirer,
(December 24, 2008):link has gone dead. Would need to be found via Lexis Nexis.
Class on March 21 will view a film, "Chasing the Sleeper Cell: The
Lackawanna Six," (PBS, 2003, Prof. Bowen's tape #79). The "Lackawanna Six"
film tells the story of a radical Islamist terrorism ring inside the United States.
- It depicts an Al Qaeda cell
in the Buffalo, NY area.
- Jaber Elbaneh, one of the imprisoned Al Qaeda members who escaped
from a Yemeni prison on Feb. 3, 2006, trained in Afghanistan with the
others described in today's video. Read more about him, his ties
to the Buffalo cell including his indictment for aiding Al Qaeda from there, and his escape from
prison in these two linked articles at the Washington Post.
The FBI poster about Elbaneh is linked here: have you seen this guy?
This 2008 story describes the odd circumstances of his re-incarceration
in Yemen. This story,
also from the Washington Post in 2008, assesses what happens when
large rewards are offered in order to induce the capture of men like
Elbaneh by the U.S. Government.
- The formal indictment against Jaber Elbaneh can be read by following
this link.
- The case of Kemal Derwish (which comes up
in the "Lackawanna
Six" video) will focus us on the use of tactics of focused pre-emption
against terrorists who are targeted outside a specific conflict area,
such as Afghanistan or Iraq.
- The legal
issues raised by the topic of targeted pre-emption, or assassination, in general are discussed
in timeline form elsewhere on this website. On Feb. 22, 2004,
Steve Coll (author of Ghost Wars) in a Washington
Post article discussed a related issue: pre-Sept. 11, 2001 attempts to kill or
arrest Bin Laden.
- However, the legal authorization of
use of U.S. military force in the War on Terrorism (i.e., Senate
Joint Resolution 23 of Sept. 14, 2001) extends globally so long as
the target is connected to organizations tied to the events of Sept. 11,
2001, or future similar threats. The key language in that
resolution is:
"That the President is authorized
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such
nations, organizations or persons."
- Unrelated to the Lackawanna case, it
was reported Feb. 21, 2006 that another similar group in Toledo, OH
was broken up in 2006 and its
members arrested for various plots and threats.
Questions
on Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages
of Terror" (2002):
-
Why, according to Betts, is America's primacy both an asset and a cause
of terrorism?
-
Americans think of themselves as being above the random killing of
civilians, but Betts points out circumstances in which historically, and
hypothetically in the future, the U.S. would so act. What were
these precedents, and does Betts' case convince you we might so act
again?
-
In
reviewing counterinsurgency theory and offense-defense theory, Betts
states "if Al Qaeda-like groups can stay in the field indefinitely, they
win" (392). Explain this.
-
Betts concludes that a response to terrorism would be wise that would "focus
attention on the political causes of their grievance." What does
Betts suggest or imply this would involve? Do you concur with him?
Why or why not?
Questions on Bruce Hoffman, “A Nasty Business:” (2002)
-
According to Hoffman, in
fighting terrorism which is most important: information, military measures,
or police work? Why?
-
Why does Hoffman contend that
the film “Battle of Algiers” is important?
-
What is the meaning of the
phrase “the innocent deserve more protection than the guilty”?
-
What is your reaction to
“Thomas”? Has the U.S.
become “like Thomas”?
Questions on Mayer,
"Outsourcing Torture" (2005):
- To whom has the U.S. "outsourced" interrogations
in the "Global War on Terrorism"?
- What are the benefits to the U.S. in this
"extraordinary rendition" policy?
- What are the costs to the U.S.? E.g., what
has it done to U.S. - Sweden relations?
Aside: Why interrogate detainees
in the Global War on Terrorism?
Are there really moments of imperative action as
Hoffman suggests in his article for March 23? Several years ago, terrorists used a surface-to-air missile to
down a large transport aircraft from Belarus
while it was on takeoff after delivering relief
supplies near Mogadishu, Somalia. This
event seems to have happened on Saturday March
24, 2007. A brief Washington Post news
story about the incident is linked here (scroll down to find it there). An AP story on this also mentioned an earlier
attack on a relief plane from Belarus, one that
was struck by a rocket propelled grenade on
March 13. All this points to the continued
vulnerability of non-military aircraft in many
places around the world, a topic that was the
subject of a December 2005 PBS documentary, "Defending the Sky."
Prof. Bowen views this missile
attack as it relates to advocacy within the U.S.
for installation of anti-missile technologies
onto U.S. commercial aircraft by U.S. Senator
Charles Schumer (D-NY), and in relation to the
dangers posed to homeland security if such
technologies are not adopted. Schumer has
been advocating installation of anti-missile
technologies on U.S. commercial aircraft since
2003 (go to CNN transcript; Schumer press release). The connection
of these events and issues to today's class
content lies in the nature of the further Al
Qaeda plots against the U.S. to which 9/11
mastermind Khalid Sheikh Muhammad has confessed,
and the urgency felt within U.S. security
bureaucracies regarding his interrogation about
such plots. Not only were his plans not
hypothetical: ongoing terrorists' actions
against commercial aircraft aren't hypothetical
either, as the 2009-10 XMas bomber and postal package explosives plots revealed.
March
28, 2011
History of
terrorism facts: On this date in 2002, a suicide/homicide bomber
from the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade exploded a bomb filled with
nails in a Jerusalem open air shopping street, killing 1 and
injuring 50.
topics/questions: Countering the spread of the terrorist threat beyond the Al Qaeda organization
Announcements:
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Class notes projected onto the screen during class today now are
available: follow this link.
Plan for class today: more from the 2008 film "The Third Jihad" will be shown, as will a 2007 segment from the CBS news program "60 Minutes" entitled "The Network."
- The segments viewed from theThird Jihad concern the roles played by "mainstream" Muslim groups in America, their squishy relationship with HAMAS and Hezbollah; the growing radicalization of Muslims inside U.S. prisons; and Muslim faith-based communities such as Islamberg in upstate New York. Attention in this film also falls on the U.S. case of Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi, which bears your close listening. Prof. Bowen has prepared this supplemental webpage, about
Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi, whose case
also was mentioned in Levitt's article assigned for today. Further sources about it are to
be found at the bottom of that linked webpage.
- The latter video concerned a British Muslim defector from a support group for Al Qaeda, describing its activities inside the U.K. and in Pakistan. Information is provided concerning how this cell was financed, information that supplements and enlarges what we have learned about post-9/11 financing of terrorism from our readings for today. Both flims will be discussed.
Before class read these required readings for today. They will likely be discussed on Wed. March 30:
- Matthew Levitt, from “Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover between Terrorist Groups,” SAIS Review (Winter 2004), in Howard, in Howard, et. al., Chapter 8, Article No. 6.
- Mark Basile, from "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terror Financing," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2004), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 9, Article No. 1.
- Paul R. Pillar, “Beyond Al Qaeda: Countering a Decentralized Terrorist Threat,” Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004), Howard, et. al., Chapter 8, Article No. 4.
Supplemental suggestions:
Questions on Levitt,
"...Crossover between Terrorist Groups" (2004):
- To what extent
have terrorist groups cooperated at an operational level?
- To what extent
have terrorist groups cooperated on financing and logistics?
- What roles have
been played by American jihadists in facilitating
crossover between groups?
- What do the
Madrid and Zarqawi cases show us about crossover between groups?
- Who is Abdurahman Muhammad Alamoudi, and why was his luggage of
interest?
- How have
differing U.S. and European assessments of Hamas impeded
effective counter-terrorism policies in regard to the financing
of international terrorism in general?
Questions
on Mark Basile, "Going to the Source: Why Al
Qaeda’s, Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terror
Financing" (2004)
- In what ways do the methods of finance
employed by the Al Qaeda organization differ from methods of finance
used by their operational cells?
- How were problems in financing the
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center related to the failure of this
terrorist cell and its project?
Questions on Paul R. Pillar, “Beyond Al Qaeda:
Countering a Decentralized Terrorist Threat,” Washington
Quarterly (dated in the book as "Summer 2004," but clearly
written more recently, e.g. 496 refers to the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 8,
Article No. 4.
- If Al Qaeda is as CIA official Pillar
views it to be, more an "inspiration" than an instigator of
attacks, how much sense does it make to focus on capturing
(or killing) bin Laden? (see page 499)
- What does Pillar mean by the change to
"decentralized" threats?
- Why does Pillar suggest (495) that
counter-terrorism analysis must move beyond assembling
connections made between known terrorists, or "link
analysis"?
- What are the chief constraints he cites
in evaluating and finding some limitations to "data mining"?
- Why, according to Pillar, is global
cooperation in counter-terrorism "fragile"? Does it
make sense that this cooperation will diminish still further
as the U.S. focus wanders from Al Qaeda to decentralized
groups, as Pillar argues (496)?
- Consider the November 2008 Mumbai
attacks. Do they fit Pillar's conception of a
"decentralized" threat, or do they more resemble a still
hierarchically organized "subcontracting" of Al Qaeda's
tasks of international terrorism by it to independent
terrorist groups about which some authors have written?
- Pillar views international cooperation
as a function of states' separate national interests, and
sees much "cooperation" in counter-terrorism fading.
Apply his analytic point about why this necessarily is: Has
Indian support for U.S. counter-terrorism waned in the wake
of Mumbai? Has Pakistan's? Why?
- Pillar states (497): "U.S. policies
toward Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular will
be especially influential" in re-shaping Muslims' attitudes
away from the belief that the War on Terrorism is a cover
for an actual war by the West against Islam in general.
Does the evidence support this linkage, i.e.: have Muslims'
attitudes toward the War on Terrorism changed when
the U.S. has undertaken significant policy changes favored by much of the Muslim world (e.g., policies of the Obama Administration ending combat in Iraq; distancing from Israel; announcing timetables for withdrawal from Afghanistan, etc.? (See Prof. Bowen's 2010 paper on this specific topic)
March 30, 2011:
topics: Hearts and Minds: The roles of mass media in terrorism and in counter-terrorism policy.
History of Terrorism
facts of the day. During this week in:
1986: A bomb
exploded on TWA flight 840, killing four and
wounding nine; Hawari group blamed.
2001: In Gaza.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad official Muhammad
‘Abd al-Il‘al was killed in Israeli rocket
attack
2003: In the
Philippines, the Indonesian jihadist group
J.I. (Jemaah
Islamiyah) exploded a bomb on a crowded
passenger wharf, killing 16 and injuring 55.
Announcements:
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Class notes projected onto the screen during class today now are
available: follow this link.
Plan for today: The film from March 28 will be discussed. Readings for today may be discussed today (and/or on April 6).
Required readings:
- Steven Simon and Jeff Martini,
from "Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support," The
Washington Quarterly (Winter 2004/2005), in Howard and Sawyer, pp
484-494
- Boaz Ganor, “Dilemmas Concerning Media
Coverage of Terrorist Attacks,” The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, A Guide
for Decision Makers (2005), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 6,
Article No. 1.
- John F. Stacks, “Watchdogs on a Leash:
Closing Doors on the Media,” The War on Our Freedoms: Civil Liberties
in an Age of Terrorism (Public Affairs, 2003), in Howard, et.
al., Chapter 6, Article No. 2.
Questions on Simon and Martini, "Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support," (2004/2005):
Can changes in international norms change the way states behave?
Exemplify.
Of what importance are
norms in the war on terrorism?
How can "norm
entrepreneurs" be helpful?
What steps can be
taken to bring states and regional organizations to better
support norms against terrorism?
- Why are efforts
toward the Arab League of particular importance in this
regard?
Why are steps that are
directed at states not enough?
What can be done to
affect social attitudes about terrorism, to eliminate
"cheerleading" for the terrorists?
How have U.S. actions,
such as at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, had impact on this
project?
What evidence is there
that even Al Qaeda has been forced to recognize emerging
norms in regard to respect for the laws of war as they
impact Arabs and Muslims?
Questions
on Boaz Ganor, "Dilemmas Concerning
Media Coverage of Terrorist Attacks" (2005):
- Weigh the advantages and disadvantages
of media coverage of terrorist attacks?
- How does media coverage figure in
realizing the aims of the terrorists?
- What was Abu Iyad's position on
media coverage of the Munich Olympics massacre of 1972? Does
this still seem to "make sense" to contemporary terrorists?
- Would complete lack of coverage
serve the interests of the West?
- What is the "journalist's
dilemma"? How does Ganor suggest it best can be resolved?
Questions on John F. Stacks: "Watchdogs
on a Leash" (2003):
- According to your understandings
of the era from World War II to the end of the Vietnam
war, were these truly the "good old days" for the press?
Was the world Stacks misses ever really like what he
described?
- What were the worrisome
policies as described by Stacks? Briefly list a
few in your mind.
- Are these worrisome policies
described by Stacks largely over? Is this whole
article just anti-Bush hysteria, or have the concerns
that led to some of the policies criticized here continued in the Obama years, leading to continuation of substantially identical policies?
April
4, 2011. Topic: Countering Terrorism inside the United States: the online challenge
History of terrorism fact of
the day: On April 6, 2001, Algerian Ahmed Ressam was
convicted for participation in New Year’s Day 2000 bomb plot against Los
Angeles International Airport.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Class notes projected onto the screen during class today now are available:
follow this link.
Plan for today's class: the 2006 Discovery/Times film "The New Al Qaeda: jihad.com " will be shown (Prof. Bowen's tape #81); the readings from April 4 and 6 also may be discussed. For those interested in seeing a 2007 visual depiction on these issues from CBS News' "60 Minutes" program, follow this link to their March 7, 2007 broadcast of "jihad.com" .
Announcements: Today's class
is about what we need to do to prepare and to win the conflict with militant
Islamist terrorism.
Before class read:
- Jarret Brachman, “High-Tech Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Use of New Technology,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs (Summer 2006), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 6, Article No. 3.
- ( Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” Special Report No. 116 (March 2004), in Howard, et. al., Chapter 6, Article No. 4. ) This chapter NO LONGER NEEDS TO BE READ closely in light of reading the updated piece below:
- Gabriel Weimann, "Terror in Cyberspace" Marquette Law Review (2009): http://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=mulr_conferences NOTE: this more current work by Prof. Weimann is to be preferred over his 2004 chapter (above) that was assigned in the syllabus. The most pertinent parts of the article begin on page 8, where Weimann turns to "Advantages of the Internet for Modern Terrorism." When you arrive at that address, you will note that there is a strong qualification stating "DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION." However, Prof. Weimann's Jan. 27, 2011 email to Prof. Bowen specifically grants to my students in this class permission to use this important study as part of our course. Prof. Weimann also invites interested students to read his other works, located at: http://soc.haifa.ac.il/~rsso343/
Questions on Jarret Brachman, "High Tech
Terror: Al Qaeda's Use of New Technology" (2006).
- Brachman suggests that,
important as high-tech is to Al Qaeda's operations, it
is at the strategic level that high-tech techniques are
significant: "it is the strategic--not
operations--objectives of the jihadi movement's
use of technology that engenders the most enduring and
lethal threat to the United States over the long term"
(360).
- Explain what is meant by this
distinction between "operations" and "strategic
objectives".
- Do you agree with this point?
Why?
- What parts of Al Qaeda's use of
high tech does Brachman suggest we pay too much
attention to, and which have been neglected to our peril
by public and policymakers alike? (361)
- How do Al Qaeda web operatives
evade permanent disappearance from the web?
- Who was Babar Ahmad? Why
was he important? (363)
- Why would "shutting down the
jihadi internet" necessarily fail as an attempt to
stifle jihadis' learning from one another?
- Who is Abu Musab al-Suri?
Why is he so important as to have been labeled the
"chief architect" of Al Qaeda's internet efforts? (367)
What does his biography suggest about the development
and duration of the contemporary conflict? Who has assumed this role in 2008-2010?
- Given Brachman's analysis, what
are the dangers in the U.S. devoting effort to making
internet access universal worldwide?
Questions on Gabriel Weimann, "www.terror.net:
How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet" (2004):
- Brachman distinguished between
uses of the internet for terrorist operations and
uses of the internet strategically by terrorists.
While Weimann does not employ this distinction, which of
Brachman's foci most concerns Weimann? Why?
Do you agree or disagree with his emphasis?
- What is "steganography"
(382-383)? How does it have impact on terrorist
uses of the internet?
- What did you think of the
mention (383) that al Qaeda and Hamas both once used one
particular website? Does this color how you view
either organization? Why or why not?
Questions on Gabriel Weimann, "Terror in Cyberspace" (2009)
- Much effort is put into protecting vital American computer systems from "cyber attack." What does Weimann think of this focus of resources?
- How has the use of internet websites by militant Islamists changed and grown in recent years?
- What "advantages" does the internet now present to terrorists?
- Weimann (14) suggests 8000 websites now are used by militant Islamist terrorists. What do they use them primarily to do?
- How has YouTube served as a model platform for terrorists groups?
- How does deception play a role in militant Islamists' uses of the internet? What sort of appealing issues are used by terrorist groups on their websites? (18-19)
- How are "bystander publics" targeted by militant Islamist websites? Is this effective? (19)
- How are contemporary terrorists using the internet in recruitment and operations? Are these "instrumental" functions more or less important than other uses of the internet by them?
April
6, 2011: topic: Is winning possible?
History of terrorism fact of
the day: On April 6, 2001, Algerian Ahmed Ressam was
convicted for participation in "Millennium Plot"/ New Year’s Day 2000 bombing attempt against Los
Angeles International Airport.
Before class please consult the course syllabus whenever
there are questions about assignments, requirements, etc.
Class notes projected onto the screen during class today now are available:
follow this link.
Plan for today's class: Discussion of film from April 4, and of readings from April 4 and 6.
Announcements: Today's class
is about what we need to do to prepare for what is coming, and what to do to win the conflict with militant
Islamist terrorism.
Before class read:
- Reid Sawyer and Jodi M. Vittori, “The Uncontested Battles: The Role of Actions, Networks, and Ideas in the Fight against Al-Qaeda (2007),” in Howard, et. al., Chapter 10, Article No. 3.
- Russell D. Howard, “Winning the Campaign against Terrorists: Five Considerations (2007),” in Howard, et. al., Chapter 10, Article No. 4.
- John Arquilla, “The Coming Swarm,” New York Times (Feb. 14, 2009): http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/opinion/15arquilla.html?_r=1
Supplemental (optional) readings for this date:
Overall question in light of all films and readings to this point in the course: Have U.S. allies behaved with sufficient urgency in their responses to U.S. efforts to insure cooperative counter-terrorism policies among allied governments? Why or why not?
Questions on Howard, "Winning the
Campaign against Terrorists: five considerations" (2007)
Describe what Howard means by each of
his five propositions, then evaluate the extent to which what he
suggests will help.
- If you are not going to fight a war, don't
call it a war.
- Rewrite the National Security Act of 1947
- Fight an ideology with a better (or more
correct) ideology.
- Fight networks with networks.
- Educate, educate, educate susceptible youth.
Questions on Arquilla, "The coming swarm" (2009)
- What about the Mumbai attacks (November 26-28, 2008) leads Arquilla to believe is of relevance to U.S. homeland security?
- Do events in 2009-10 suggest Arquilla's ideas were (or still are) correct? Why or why not?
Questions on Reid Sawyer and Jodi Vittori, “The Uncontested Battles:
The Role of Actions, Networks, and Ideas in the Fight against Al-Qaeda (2007),” in Howard, et. al., Chapter 10, Article
No. 3.
- Name the three levels at which the
authors suggest the U.S. must act if we are to win the war on terrorism.
- Sawyer and Vittori point to Egypt and
Somalia as settings in which there is "good news" in the GWOT.
However, since this chapter was written, several incidents of terrorist
bombings have occurred in Egypt, and the Islamist movement in Somalia
has gained such strength that the 2006 defeat of the "Islamic Courts"
movement by U.S.-backed Ethiopian troops (to which the authors referred
as "good news" on page 626) by late 2008 had evolved into a situation in
which the far more radical al-Shabab Islamist movement had taken control over much of the country, though to
this moment not yet including
the capital, all with substantial encouragement from Al Qaeda. Given
this, wher is the good news?
- The
authors suggest that America's GWOT has overly focused on military
measures focused on Al Qaeda, the organization, while failing to contest
sufficiently its adaptation and growth at other levels. What are
these levels and what can be done to reverse this situation?
- If
all modern wars have to some extent been "wars of ideas," who is winning
this one, and why?
April
11, 2011: topic
All term
papers are due at the start of class today.
Oral reports on term papers will be the content today. Focus: Islamist radicals inside the U.S. and terrorists' attacks inside the U.S. since 9/11
History of Terrorism Fact of the Day: This week in 2003 in Pakistan: a
Jamiat Ulema-e Islami member killed two relatives of the Governor of Kandahar,
Afghanistan, and wounded another.
Announcements: Questions to focus upon answering in our class meeting today and on April 13 are outlined in this agenda that was also shown in classs today. Our discussion today will continue on Wednesday, with additional opportunities provided first to those who wrote term papers on cases outside the U.S.
The
procedures for delivery of oral reports: no advance schedule of term paper oral
reports will be announced. Attendance at all oral reports is required of
each student, who may be called on at any time to deliver her report.
April
13, 2011: topic
Oral reports on term papers will be the content today. Focus: terrorist organizations outside the U.S., and terrorist attacks outside the U.S. since 9/11
History of Terrorism Fact of the Day:
On this date in 1986, in Sudan: US Embassy communicator shot and wounded
in Khartoum.
Announcements:Questions to focus upon answering in our class meeting on April 13 are outlined in this agenda that was also shown in classs on April 11 . Our discussion then will continue in class on April 13, with additional opportunities provided first to those who wrote term papers on cases outside the U.S.
The
procedures for delivery of oral reports: no advance schedule of term paper oral
reports will be announced. Attendance at all oral reports is required of
each student, who may be called on at any time to deliver her report.
Concluding Remarks.
This page last updated
October 13, 2011
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